Hoeft v. Fleetguard, Inc., No. 8-810/07-0551 (Iowa App. 6/17/2009)
| Decision Date | 17 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 8-810/07-0551,8-810/07-0551 |
| Parties | FAYE ELLEN HOEFT, Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. FLEETGUARD, INC., and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondents-Appellants/Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Worth County, Stephen P. Carroll, Judge.
An employer and its insurance carrier appeal, and petitioner cross-appeals, a district court decision remanding the decision of the Iowa Workers' Compensation Commissioner for further findings concerning petitioner's medical condition. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Richard G. Book of Huber, Book, Cortese, Happe & Lanz, P.L.C., West Des Moines, for appellants.
Mark Soldat of Soldat & Parrish-Sams, P.L.C., West Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Faye Hoeft was formerly employed by Fleetguard, Inc. as a press operator. Hoeft injured her neck and shoulder on July 20, 1998, during the course of her employment, when she slipped and grabbed a scrap hopper with her right hand and arm. She was subsequently diagnosed with a spinous process fracture at the C6 level, and on July 28, 2000, had surgery to remove a bone fragment.1 She was able to return to work as a press operator. She continued to report pain in her neck and shoulder.
Hoeft filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. An administrative hearing was held on April 3, 2001. Hoeft was awarded benefits based on a finding:
It is concluded that claimant had a preexisting Clay Shoveler's condition in her neck that was asymptomatic prior to July 20, 1998, but which became symptomatic after being aggravated by the work injury of July 20, 1998. Although later repetitious work activities occurring after July 20, 1998, may have contributed to claimant's symptoms, the greater weight of the evidence is that the traumatic slip injury of July 20, 1998, was the principal causative event that aggravated claimant's condition.
Hoeft's physical impairment rating was determined to be eight percent, and her industrial disability was determined to be twenty percent.
Hoeft continued to seek medical treatment for muscle spasms in her neck and right upper back. Her primary physician, Dr. Connie Arispe, diagnosed chronic myofascial pain. Dr. Arispe approved Hoeft for ongoing chiropractic treatments. Hoeft was placed on work restrictions by her chiropractor, Dr. Jeff Anderson, of no lifting over ten pounds, no reaching over shoulder height, and no repetitive shoulder motion. On January 15, 2002, Fleetguard informed Hoeft it had no work available that would meet her work restrictions.
Dr. Anderson revised Hoeft's work restrictions, but Fleetguard still stated it had no work available for her. Hoeft has not returned to work, and she was approved for long term disability through her employer. Hoeft has received a series of injections of botulinum toxin (Botox) to her shoulder, which give her temporary relief from her symptoms.
Hoeft filed a petition for review-reopening proceedings on January 21, 2003. On July 16, 2003, the employer's long term disability carrier determined Hoeft no longer qualified for benefits because she was capable of engaging in employment.2 Fleetguard terminated Hoeft's employment the next day, July 17, 2003. In November 2003, Hoeft was approved for Social Security disability benefits effective July 27, 2001.
Hoeft had an independent medical examination on March 31, 2004, by Dr. John Kuhnlein, who determined "[t]he chronic myofascial pain syndrome would be an outgrowth of the original work injury." He found Hoeft's physical impairment rating had not increased from eight percent. A vocational rehabilitation evaluation found Hoeft was employable in a variety of occupations.
An administrative hearing was held on July 13, 2004. The employer raised an argument that Hoeft's condition had changed, but the change was caused by an injury that occurred on July 26, 2001, when Hoeft was pulling a 400-pound basket at work. The employer asserted Hoeft's current condition was not proximately caused by the July 20, 1998 work injury.
The deputy found Hoeft "has not sustained a change of condition warranting the award of additional industrial disability." The deputy found:
The claimant has continued to have pain and problems as contemplated in the original award of disability. It was known that the claimant had exacerbations of her problems when she worked at the time of the award. Claimant obtains treatment and gets some temporary relief as a result of the treatment as she did at the time of the award. Perhaps in retrospect the award of industrial disability should have been larger but that is not the purpose of a review reopening.
As the claimant has not established a change of condition the issues of additional healing period, permanent disability and penalty are moot.
The deputy found the issue of medical expenses was not moot, noting "Defendants essentially agreed to pay these medical expenses with the exception of those incurred with the chiropractor Dr. Anderson." Because Dr. Arispe recommended continuing chiropractic adjustments, the deputy awarded these expenses as well. Furthermore, the deputy determined the employer should provide alternate medical care consisting of Botox injections.
Hoeft appealed the deputy's decision. The workers' compensation commissioner affirmed and adopted the deputy's decision, with the additional analysis:
I find that claimant's condition deteriorated in a way that was not contemplated when the arbitration hearing was held and formed the basis for the appeal decision that awarded benefits, including compensation for twenty percent permanent partial disability. I find that the evidence fails to prove that it is probable that the deterioration was proximately caused by the injury of July 20, 1998. Claimant sustained an injury, was treated and recovered. Her current state of ill health is not shown to be a consequence of that injury.
Hoeft filed a petition seeking judicial review of the commissioner's decision. The district court entered a decision on February 19, 2007, which found that while the issue of proximate cause had been raised at the administrative hearing, it was not raised in the intra-agency appeal of the deputy's decision. The court found the commissioner improperly brought up an issue not raised by the parties. The court also determined the commissioner's conclusions were not supported by a reasoned opinion as required by Iowa Code section 17A.16(1) (2003). The court remanded the matter to the commissioner for additional findings.
On February 28, 2007, Hoeft filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) seeking to enlarge or amend the court's decisions. However, the motion was filed under the wrong case number in the wrong county.3 She later realized her mistake, and in a motion filed on March 9, 2007, sought additional time to file her rule 1.904(2) motion. She filed a new rule 1.904(2) motion on March 14, 2007. Before the district court could rule on these motions, the employer and its insurance carrier (employer) filed a notice of appeal on March 21, 2007. Hoeft filed a conditional notice of appeal on the same day.
Hoeft filed a motion with the Iowa Supreme Court for limited remand to allow the district court to rule on her rule 1.904(2) motion. The employer resisted the motion. The Supreme Court denied the motion for limited remand. The case was subsequently transferred to the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Our review is governed by the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. Iowa Code ch. 17A; Acuity Ins. v. Foreman, 684 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Iowa 2004). We review the district court's decision by applying the standards of section 17A.19 to the agency decision to determine if our conclusions are the same as those reached by the district court. Univ. of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics v. Waters, 674 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa 2004).
Hoeft asserts we do not have jurisdiction to hear the employer's appeal because the district court did not rule on her pending motions, and thus, there has been no final decision in the district court proceedings.
When a timely rule 1.904(2) motion "is pending prior to the taking of an appeal, the decree to which the motion is addressed becomes in effect interlocutory until the court rules on the motion."4 Wolf v. City of Ely, 493 N.W.2d 846, 848 (Iowa 1992). Hoeft points out that under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1(3), there is no appeal as of right from an interlocutory ruling.5 Obtaining permission to bring an interlocutory appeal is jurisdictional. IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Iowa 2000).
In raising this argument, Hoeft asserts her rule 1.904(2) motion was properly filed. A rule 1.904(2) motion must be filed within the time allowed for a motion for new trial. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(2). A motion for new trial must be filed within ten days after the filing of a verdict, report or decision "unless the court, for good cause shown and not ex parte, grants an additional time not to exceed 30 days." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1007; State ex rel. Miller v. Santa Rosa Sales & Mktg., Inc., 475 N.W.2d 210, 213 (Iowa 1991). A motion for an extension of time must be filed within the time period for filing the motion, here ten days. See Polk County v. Davis, 525 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). An untimely motion for extension of time should be denied. See Sandler v. Pomerantz, 257 Iowa 163, 167, 131 N.W.2d 814, 817 (1964); McQueen v. Garrett, 255 Iowa 761, 763, 124 N.W.2d 166, 167 (1963).
An untimely or improper rule 1.904(2) motion does not extend the time for appeal.6 In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 265-66 (Iowa 2005). When a rule 1.904(2) motion is untimely, the time for filing an appeal is computed from the date of the judgment that was the subject of the motion. Estate of Morgan v North Star Steel Co., 484 N.W.2d 199, 200 (I...
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