De Hoff v. Black

Decision Date20 June 1934
Docket Number567.
Citation175 S.E. 179,206 N.C. 687
PartiesDE HOFF et al. v. BLACK et al.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from Superior Court, Surry County; Shaw, Emergency Judge.

Action by B. E. De Hoff and others against C. G. Black and others. From a judgment on the verdict, defendants appeal.

New trial ordered.

CONNOR J., dissenting.

Civil action to recover damages for alleged negligent injury to plaintiff's truck.

Summons and copy of complaint were served on the defendants April 4 1931.

It is alleged in the complaint that on the morning of March 31 1931, on Highway No. 1, near South Hill, Va., a truck owned by the defendant C. G. Black, operated by the defendant K. & S. Trucking Company, and driven by C. W. Silver, who was also accompanied by Hunter Black, brother of the owner of the truck, negligently ran into, and completely demolished, a truck owned by the plaintiff and operated at the time by its employee, F. M. Akins; and that both defendants are liable to plaintiff for the damages sustained.

On May 25, 1931, judgment by default and inquiry was entered against the defendants for want of an answer; motion thereafter to set it aside for excusable neglect overruled; and at the January term, 1934, said inquiry was executed before a jury the damages being assessed at $400.

Upon the execution of the inquiry, the defendants sought to show how the collision occurred; that it was really due to the conduct of F. M. Akins, driver of plaintiff's truck; and that the defendant K. & S. Trucking Company was in no way connected with C. G. Black's truck as lessee or otherwise. All this proffered testimony was excluded as irrelevant and immaterial on the issue of damages. The appeal presents the question of the competency of this evidence.

From judgment on the verdict, the defendants appeal, assigning errors.

H. O. Woltz, of Mt. Airy, and R. A. Freeman, of Dobson, for appellants.

W. M. Allen, of Elkin, and A. D. Folger, of Dobson, for appellee.

STACY Chief Justice.

What is the effect of a judgment by default and inquiry? The answer is threefold:

(1) It establishes a right of action of the kind properly pleaded in the complaint. Bowie v. Tucker, 206 N.C. 56, 173 S.E. 28; Strickland v. Shearon, 193 N.C. 599, 137 S.E. 803; Mitchell v. Ahoskie, 190 N.C. 235, 129 S.E. 626; Beard v. Sovereign Lodge, 184 N.C. 154, 113 S.E. 661; Armstrong v. Asbury, 170 N.C. 160, 86 S.E. 1038; Allen v. McPherson, 168 N.C. 435, 84 S.E. 766; Banks v. Mfg. Co., 108 N.C. 282, 12 S.E. 741; 34 C.J. 173-175. See, also, dissenting opinion of Connor, J., in Junge v. MacKnight, 135 N.C. 105, 47 S.E. 452, later declared to be the law on petition to rehear, 137 N.C. 285, 49 S.E. 474.

(2) It determines the right of the plaintiff to recover at least nominal damages and costs. Foster v. Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 148 S.E. 36; Hill v. Hotel Co., 188 N.C. 586, 125 S.E. 266; Blow v. Joyner, 156 N.C. 140, 72 S.E. 319, 320; Farmer-Cole Plumbing Co. v. Hotel Co., 168 N.C. 577, 84 S.E. 1008; Patrick v. Dunn, 162 N.C. 19, 77 S.E. 995.

(3) It precludes the defendant from offering any evidence, on the execution of the inquiry, to show that the plaintiff has no right of action. Mitchell v. Express Co., 178 N.C. 235, 100 S.E. 307; Hollifield v. Tel. Co., 172 N.C. 714, 90 S.E. 996; Lee v. Knapp, 90 N.C. 171; Garrard v. Dollar, 49 N.C. 176, 67 Am. Dec. 271; 15 R. C. L. 667.

A judgment by default final as authorized by C. S. § 595, as amended by Pub. Laws 1929, c. 66, is different in effect and result from a judgment by default and inquiry as authorized by C. S. § 596. Gillam v. Cherry, 192 N.C. 195, 134 S.E. 423. The former establishes the allegations of the complaint, and concludes by way of estoppel, while the latter "established a right of action in plaintiff of the kind stated in the complaint" (Blow v. Joyner, supra), the precise character and extent of which remain to be determined by a hearing in damages and final judgment thereon. Osborn v. Leach, 133 N.C. 427, 45 S.E. 783; 2 Black on Judgments, § 697.

Thus, in Stockton v. Mining Co., 144 N.C. 595, 57 S.E. 335, it was said that a judgment by default and inquiry, in an action for fraud and deceit, did not establish the truthfulness of the allegations of fraud, which still remained to be proved, but merely the fact that the plaintiff was entitled to recover at least nominal damages and costs on the cause of action set out in the complaint and foreclosed a hearing only upon the existence of the right of action.

Likewise in Blow v. Joyner, supra, the following discriminating statement appears: "The authorities are very generally to the effect that, where a complaint has been properly filed, showing a right of action for unliquidated damages, a judgment by default and inquiry establishes plaintiff's right of action and that he is entitled at least to nominal damages. Osborn v. Leach, 133 N.C. 428, 45 S.E. 783; 2 Black on Judgments, § 698; 23 Cyc. p. 752; 6 Enc. Pl. & Pr. p. 127. And in this state it is further held that such a judgment concludes on all issuable facts properly pleaded, and that evidence in bar of plaintiff's right of action is not admissible on the inquiry as to damages. McLeod v. Nimocks, 122 N.C. 438, 29 S.E. 577; Lee v. Knapp, 90 N.C. 171; Parker v. House, 66 N.C. 374; Parker v. Smith, 64 N.C. 291; Garrard v. Dollar, 49 N.C. 175, 67 Am. Dec. 271. In McLeod v. Nimocks it is said: 'The judgment by default and inquiry, the defendant having said nothing in answer to plaintiff's complaint, was conclusive that the plaintiff had a cause of action against the defendant of the nature declared in the complaint, and would be entitled to nominal damages without any proof.' The statement sometimes made, that a judgment of this kind 'merely admits a cause of action, while the precise character of the cause of action and the extent of defendant's liability remains to be determined,' simply means, as stated, that a judgment by default and inquiry established a right of action in plaintiff of the kind stated in the complaint, and entitling plaintiff...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Morton v. Blue Ridge Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 27 Settembre 1961
    ...the plaintiff became entitled as a matter of law to recover on the cause of action set out in his complaint. G.S. § 1-212; DeHoff v. Black, 206 N.C. 687, 175 S.E. 179; Johnson v. Sidbury, 225 N.C. 208, 34 S.E.2d 67. Defendants' failure to answer, however, admitted only the averments in the ......
  • Presnell v. Beshears
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 26 Marzo 1947
    ...the plaintiff became entitled as a matter of law to recover on the cause of action set out in his complaint. G.S. s 1-212; DeHoff v. Black, 206 N.C. 687, 175 S.E. 179; Johnson v. Sidbury, 225 N.C. 208, 34 S.E.2d Defendants' failure to answer, however, admitted only the averments in the comp......
  • Potts v. Howser, 439
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 14 Giugno 1968
    ...action.' 5 Strong's N.C.Index 2d, Judgments § 15. See also Rich v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 244 N.C. 175, 92 S.E.2d 768; DeHoff v. Black, 206 N.C. 687, 175 S.E. 179. The most defendant can accomplish by his evidence on the inquiry is to reduce the recovery to nominal damages. Garrard v. Do......
  • Johnson v. Sidbury
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 8 Maggio 1946
    ... ... in excess of the scope of the inquiry as fixed by the default ... judgment, DeHoff v. Black, 206 N.C. 687, 175 S.E ... 179, it is not perceived wherein the defendant can complain, ... if the judgment is to be considered a final ... ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT