Hoffman Company v. Pelouze

• Decision Date: 16 June 1932
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: HOFFMAN SPECIALTY COMPANY, INCORPORATED v. HENRY L. PELOUZE.

Page 586

158 Va. 586

HOFFMAN SPECIALTY COMPANY, INCORPORATED v. HENRY L. PELOUZE.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Wytheville.

June 16, 1932.

Present, Campbell, C.J., and Holt, Epes, Browning and Chinn, JJ.

1. MASTER AND SERVANT — Termination of Employment — Whether Hiring of Servant may be Terminated at Will or was the Hiring from Year to Year — Case at Bar. — The instant case was an action by a servant for damages for discharge before the expiration of his term of employment. The employment began on the 10th day of May, 1926, and was terminated on the 25th day of May, 1929. Thus, at the date of the termination of the employment plaintiff had worked for fifteen days on a new period of service. The issue between the parties was whether the master had the right to discharge the plaintiff on May 25, 1929, or was it obligatory upon the master to continue the servant's employment until May 10, 1930. The pivotal question was whether the contract of employment was for a year or a month.

Held: That the evidence supported the jury in finding that the contract of employment contemplated a year's hiring at an annual salary, payable in monthly installments.

2. WORDS AND PHRASES — "Annually." — The word "annually" means every year.

3. MASTER AND SERVANT — Duration of Employment — Employment at Will or Employment for Fixed Term. — Where no specific time is fixed determining the duration of the employment, it is presumed to be an employment at will, terminable at any time by either party, and this is so even when the consideration is to be paid at specific intervals; but this presumption, of course, is rebuttable.

4. MASTER AND SERVANT — Duration of Employment — Employment at Will or Employment for Fixed Term — Case at Bar. — The instant case was an action by a servant against his master for discharge before the term of his employment had expired. The original contract between the master and the servant, in the light of the evidence, contemplated a year's hiring at $2,400.00 a year, payable at $200.00 per month; the servant's salary was subsequently increased to $2,700.00, and ran on from year to year.

Held: That the master could only terminate the servant's employment at the end of a year.

5. MASTER AND SERVANT — Duration of Employment — Questions of Law and Fact. — In the absence of precise and definite terms in a contract of employment, where the evidence is conflicting as to whether the employment constitutes a hiring at will, or is for a fixed term, the question is one for determination by the jury.

6. MASTER AND SERVANT — Duration of Employment — Questions of Law and Fact — Case at Bar. — The instant case was an action by a servant against his master for damages arising from the termination of the servant's employment. The master claimed that the employment was a hiring at will. The servant claimed that the employment was a yearly one. In evidence was a letter from defendant increasing the plaintiff's salary from $2,400.00 to $2,700.00 "annually." There was also a letter in evidence from defendant requesting the servant's immediate resignation and offering the servant a gratuity in consideration thereof.

Held: That these letters and other evidence in the case rendered the question of the duration of the servant's employment a question for the jury.

7. MASTER AND SERVANT — Breach of Contract of Employment by Master — Original and Subsequent Contracts — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action by a servant against his master for breach of the contract of employment, it was only incumbent upon the servant to prove the contract of employment in existence at the time of the breach.

8. MASTER AND SERVANT — Action by Servant for Breach of Contract of Employment — Burden of Proof — Instructions. — In an action by a servant against his master for a breach by the master of the contract of employment, defendant was entitled to an instruction on the burden of proof, but it was obligatory upon it to propose one which was free from valid objection.

Error to a judgment of the Law and Equity Court of the city of Richmond, in a proceeding by attachment. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant assigns error.

The opinion states the case.

Williams & Mullen, Guy B. Hazelgrove and Ralph T. Catterall, for the plaintiff in error.

Allen G. Collins, for the defendant in error.

BROWNING, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The parties will sometimes be referred to as they were related in the trial court, plaintiff and defendant.

The plaintiff, Pelouze, instituted suit by petition for attachment and judgment against the defendant, Hoffman Specialty Company, Incorporated, in the Law and Equity Court of the city of Richmond, Virginia, for the sum of $2,437.39, the balance claimed to be due him on account of unpaid salary.

The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as its Virginia and North Carolina representative, with headquarters in Richmond. The employment began on the 10th day of May, 1926, and continued until the 25th day of May, 1929, when it was terminated by the defendant. The fidelity of the plaintiff to his employer and his efficiency in his work were not questioned. His discharge was based upon the policy of the company to reduce its sales expense.

It will be observed that upon the date of the termination of the employment the plaintiff had worked for fifteen days on a new period of service — that is, his third year with the company expired on the 10th of May, 1929, and his resignation was requested on the 25th of May, 1929, to take effect immediately. The letter of the company to the plaintiff on this subject contains this statement: "In view of the foregoing, we are asking that you submit your resignation to take effect at once, with the understanding that your salary will be continued until June 30, 1929."

The plaintiff declined to tender his resignation and returned a check, sent him by the company, for $114.71, which bore this notation: "Acceptance of this check indicates a settlement in full of all claims against this company as per our letter June 20, 1929." The plaintiff, in returning the check, replied in part as follows: "I was originally employed by your company for one year beginning May 9, 1926, and my salary after May 9, 1927, became from year to year and therefore you could not properly discharge me during a current year and I could not resign without your consent during the current year."

The issue then between the parties is whether the company had the right to discharge the plaintiff on May 25, 1929, or was it obligatory and binding upon it to continue him in its employ until May 10, 1930, the end of another year. The pivotal question is whether the contract of employment was for a year or a month.

It was proven that the plaintiff had earned $700.00 in other employment during the portion of the year following his discharge, which the jury deducted from the amount sued for and returned a verdict for the plaintiff for the residue, $1,737.29, which verdict the trial court refused to set aside. The motion of the defendant was based on its assertion that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence; that the court had misdirected the jury as to the law; had refused instructions which should have been granted and had erred in not sustaining its motion to exclude the plaintiff's evidence.

In 28 R.C.L. 692, section 29, it is said: "The courts are not agreed as to the duration of a contract of hiring which specifies no term, but fixes compensation at a certain amount per day, week, month, or year. In some jurisdictions it is held that such a contract, in the absence of other circumstances controlling its duration, is an indefinite hiring only, terminable at the will of either party. * * * However, in a large number of cases where the term of employment was not provided for, it has been held that a hiring at a specified rate per year, month, or week imports a hiring for such full period. Thus an offer by telegraph `If $1,000.00 a year is an inducement, come immediately. Answer,' and the answer `Will accept $1,000.00 a year,' are communications which unexplained show a single contract for a year. And a contract of hiring was held to have been made for the term of a year, although the salary was fixed at a certain rate per month, when a clause in the agreement provided for an increase of salary at the end of the first year if satisfaction was given."

In Moss Decatur Land Improvement & Furnace Co., 93 Ala. 269, 9 So. 188, 30 Am.St.Rep. 55, it is said in the syllabus: "If one is employed to be paid by the month at a designated price, this constitutes an entire contract by the month, which the employer cannot terminate at will, and under which he is liable for a month's wages if he discharges his employee without cause before the expiration of the month."

In the opinion in the above case, Beach Mullin, 34 N.J. Law 344, is cited as follows: "A contract to pay $16.00 for a month's service is as entire in its consideration as is a contract to pay a sum for a chattel. If the payment of monthly or weekly wages is the only circumstance from which the duration of the contract is to be inferred, it will be taken to be a hiring for a month or a week."

In Moss Decatur Land Improvement & Furnace Co., supra, the defendant discharged the plaintiff in the middle of the month under the claim that the hiring was by the day at the rate of so much per month. In the case in judgment the claim is that the hiring was by the month at the rate of so much per year, provided the plaintiff's version of the contract is the true one, which, however, the defendant does not...