Hoffman v. Board of Trustees, East Mississippi Junior College
| Decision Date | 12 September 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-CA-0250,89-CA-0250 |
| Parties | 63 Ed. Law Rep. 373 James Kenneth HOFFMAN v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, EAST MISSISSIPPI JUNIOR COLLEGE, and Dr. James B. Moore, President. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Joseph A. Kieronski, Jr., Daniel P. Self, Jr., William B. Jacob, Self & Jacob, Meridian, for appellant.
Robert L. Lancaster, Wallace & Lancaster, Columbus, for appellee.
Before HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ.
I.
James Kenneth Hoffman appeals from his dismissal as an employee of East Mississippi Junior College 1 (EMJC). The Chancery Court of Kemper County, Mississippi, found that the Board's termination decision was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed. Hoffman now appeals to this Court. He denies that the evidence is adequate that he breached his contract. He denies the fundamental fairness of the process the Board afforded him.
We have carefully considered Hoffman's claims and, for the reasons set forth below, now affirm.
II.
The record reflects that Hoffman, 54 years of age at the time of his hearing, began working for EMJC in 1971. Between 1974 and 1987, Hoffman served as Vocational Director on EMJC's Scooba campus. On June 26, 1987, the Board of Trustees offered Hoffman a one year contract as District Director for Vocational-Technical Education for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1987. Hoffman accepted and shortly thereafter assumed his new duties.
EMJC has been a troubled institution for some time. On September 16, 1987, James B. Moore became its President. On that day Moore held a faculty meeting and obtained a vote of no confidence in Hoffman as Vo-Tech District Director. President Moore attempted to reassign Hoffman to maintenance duties, but employees in that division objected and Moore backed down. In the meanwhile Moore received information that Hoffman had claimed reimbursement for expenses supposedly incurred in taking his personal car to an out-of-town school-related meeting, when in fact, Hoffman had actually taken a school car.
On September 24, 1987, President Moore dismissed Hoffman. At that time Moore delivered to Hoffman a letter advising him that the grounds for his dismissal were, summarized, lack of leadership, improper handling of funds and failure to take reassignment. Hoffman immediately secured counsel and demanded a hearing before the Board of Trustees. Thereafter, counsel requested a further specification of charges and a listing of witnesses and other evidence which may support the charges. On November 25, 1987, President Moore responded itemizing eleven (11) specific charges:
1) Lack of necessary leadership ability for service in position of Vo-Tech Director
2) Improper handling of funds
3) Refusal to accept reassignment
4) Lack of necessary dedication and professionalism
5) Lack of academic qualifications
6) Questionable use of school automobile
7) Improper use and supervision of district personnel
8) Excessive absences from post during day 9) Failure to correct deficiences cited by Southern Association of Colleges and Schools
10) Failure to establish acceptable financial accounting system
11) Failure to take necessary actions to maintain enrollment.
Moore listed witnesses to be called in support of all of these charges.
On December 17, 1987, EMJC's Board of Trustees held a hearing upon Hoffman's complaint and at the conclusion thereof upheld President Moore's decision. The Board attorney served as hearing officer. The "primary thrust" of the Board's decision, in the words of the Chancery Court (which later affirmed), was Hoffman's "unprofessional conduct which centered around his absence and inattention to administrative duties."
III.
Two preliminaries.
Substantively, this is a suit for breach of contract. Effective July 1, 1987, EMJC entered into a contract of employment with Hoffman. Impliedly Hoffman bound himself to competent and diligent and faithful performance of the duties of District Director Vo-Tech Education. More specifically, Moore accepted the obligation to conform to all lawfully adopted school policies and procedures. EMJC could discharge Hoffman only for cause, that is, upon Hoffman's substantial breach of some material provision of his contract.
Procedurally, Hoffman enjoys protections under the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and of this state's constitution. Miss. Const. Art. III, Sec. 14 (1890). This is so because, on September 24, 1987, Hoffman was a public employee with an expectancy in continued employment at least through June 30, 1988. Spradlin v. Bd. of Trustees of Pascagoula Sch. Dist., 515 So.2d 893, 897 (Miss.1987) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Stewart v. Bailey, 556 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.1977); Roane v. Callisburg Independent School District, 511 F.2d 633 (5th Cir.1975); Cantrell v. Vickers, 495 F.Supp. 195 (N.D.Miss.1980). This does not mean that in cases such as this the Board must hear Hoffman with all of the formalities of a trial in a court of law. See Merchant v. Board of Trustees of Pearl Municipal Separate School District, 492 So.2d 959, 964 (Miss.1986). In the end, the question is whether the hearing the Board afforded Hoffman employed fundamentally fair process.
We have established procedures in matters like this where the teacher works for a public school, see Miss.Code Ann. Secs. 37-9-109, et seq. (Supp.1987), but have always thought those covered only elementary, junior high and high schools and special schools operated by our various public school authorities. We have held that statutory process to satisfy the structure of federal and state due process and though it has no per se application to junior colleges, now community colleges, we have regarded it an adequate analogous measuring stick. Robinson v. Board of Trustees of East Central Junior College, 477 So.2d 1352, 1354 (Miss.1985).
Parenthetically, we note that bodies such as EMJC may provide enforceable procedures by contract, subject only to due process limitations. We accept that employee handbooks are ordinarily a part of an employee's contract. See Robinson v. Board of Trustees of East Central Junior College, 477 So.2d at 1353. The point need not detain us as we have here no claim that EMJC has failed to follow any procedure it had by contract obligated itself to observe.
IV.
It is important that Hoffman makes no per se objection to the fact that the hearing agency was the Board of Trustees itself. Invoking the EMJC Board Policy Manual, Hoffman demanded "a full hearing before the Board." Instead he identifies several features of the process the Board employed and claims them deficient.
First, Hoffman argues that the Board was not an impartial decision-maker because one of its members, George Gerhart, had conducted a private, personal investigation of Hoffman's case prior to the Board's hearing. Hoffman's claim collides with established principle grounded in due process considerations: that we will hold disqualified from service on a hearing board only those persons who, out of personal animosity, personal or financial stake in the decision, are shown of such bias that the presumption of honesty and integrity of Board members is overcome. See Harrison County School Board v. Morreale, 538 So.2d 1196, 1201 (Miss.1989); Spradlin v. Board of Trustees of Pascagoula Municipal Separate School District, 515 So.2d 893, 897-98 (Miss.1987). See also, United Cement Company v. Safe Air for the Environment, Inc., 558 So.2d 840, 842 (Miss.1990).
In Spradlin the entire Board had participated in a pre-hearing investigation. We affirmed the teacher's dismissal on grounds he had not shown that any Board member had a personal or financial stake in the matter or that they bore any substantial personal animosity toward him. Spradlin, 515 So.2d at 898.
Hoffman may have no relief on this issue.
We have also considered the matter of President Moore's enlarging upon the grounds for Hoffman's termination following his September 24 letter dismissing Hoffman. The record of the hearing before the Board reflects that this enhancement was fully disclosed. Hoffman's position, of course, was that President Moore had manufactured eight additional charges once it became apparent that his action in terminating Hoffman would be subject to scrutiny by the Board. While this certainly is a matter that should have been and was fully explored at Hoffman's hearing before the Board, we find no impropriety or illegality.
We know of no law requiring that one such as President Moore, at the time of delivering notice of termination, specify every fact or reason which might support his action. Indeed, it may well be to the employee's future advantage that all of his perceived deficiencies not be a matter of written record. In the case at bar, Hoffman's counsel demanded a specification of charges and this was provided well in advance of the Board hearing. President Moore also provided names of the prospective witnesses. This is what--and all--the law requires. The question is whether there has been fair advance notice of the grounds for dismissal, as well as substantial evidence supporting those grounds, and not whether those grounds may or may not have been enumerated expressly at the time of the original termination.
Hoffman's claim is without merit.
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