Hoffman v. King

• Decision Date: 21 November 1899
• Citation: 55 N.E. 401,160 N.Y. 618
• Parties: HOFFMAN v. KING et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

160 N.Y. 618

55 N.E. 401

HOFFMAN

v.KING et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 21, 1899.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Third department.

Action by Wilhelmina Hoffman against John King and John G. McCullough, as receivers of the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company, for damages. From a judgment of the appellate division (52 N. Y. Supp. 1143) affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed.

Parker, C. J., and Vann, J., dissenting.

Henry Bacon, for appellants.

John F. Anderson, for respondent.

HAIGHT, J.

This action was bought to recover damages alleged to have been occasioned by a fire negligently set by the defendants or their employés. The negligence complained of consisted in allowing to accumulate upon the defendants' right of way, adjacent to their tracks, inflammable material which was liable to become ignited from the sparks emitted from their passing locomotives. The evidence tended to show that, the fall before, the defendants had caused sweetfern brush, huckleberry brush, weeds, and stuff to be mowed, which they then permitted to lie upon the ground, and that it was in this material the fire started upon the defendants' right of way, and spread upon adjoining lands, and thence, across the lands of several intervening owners for a distance of two miles, upon the plaintiff's lands, causing the damage that is sought to be recovered in this action. The trial court submitted the question of negligence to the jury, upon the theory that properly constructed locomotives, with the most-approved spark arresters, will, of necessity, emit some sparks, and that, consequently, in periods of drought, the duty devolved upon the defendants of keeping their right of way free from combustible material which was liable to be ignited from sparks so emitted. We think the case is free from error in this respect.

The only question which requires consideration here is as to whether the damage to the plaintiff is the natural and proximate result of the negligence complained of, or is so remote that it would not be reasonably expected as a result of such negligence. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the defendants' counsel moved for a dismissal of the complaint, upon the grounds, among others, that the testimony showed that the fire had burned two days, and had crossed over more than two miles of country, before it reached the plaintiff's lands; that the fire which started on the defendants' right of way was not the probable or proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; and that such a result was not to be reasonably anticipated. This motion was denied, and an exception was taken by the defendants. It was again renewed at the close of the evidence, in substantially the same form, and met with a similar ruling, to which an exception was also taken.

At common law every master of a house or chamber was bound to so keep his fire as to prevent it from occasioning injury to his neighbors. If a fire broke out in a house and burned an adjoining dwelling, or did other damage, the master of the house in which the fire began was liable to make compensation. It was not necessary to prove negligence. The law presumed it. Y. B. 2 Hen. IV. pl. 18; 1 Bi. Comm. 431. This law was first changed by St. 6 Anne, c. 31, which provided that ‘no action shall be maintained against any person in whose house or chamber any fire shall accidentally begin, for their own loss is sufficient punishment for their own or their servants' carelessness.’ This statute was amended by 14 Geo. III. c. 78, which provided that ‘no action shall be brought against any person in whose house, chamber or other building, or whose estate any fire shall accidentally begin, any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.’ The provisions of these statutes have been limited to accidental fires, and not to those negligently set. Under the statute, however, negligence will no longer be presumed, but must be shown by the party asserting it. Filliter v. Phippard, 11 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 347. We thus call attention to the law of England for the purpose of better understanding our own authorities upon the subject.

The first case to which we call attention is that of Ryan v. Railroad Co., 35 N. Y. 210. In that case the defendant, through careless management of, or defects in, one of its engines, set fire to its woodshed, in the city of Syracuse, and the fire was communicated from such burning building to the plaintiff's house, which was consumed. An action was brought to recover from the railroad company the value of the building destroyed. A nonsuit was ganted at circuit, and the judgment entered thereon was affirmed in the general term and in this court, for the reason that the damages were too remote, and were not the natural and expected result of the firing of the woodshed. Hunt, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: ‘If, however, the fire communicates from the house of A. to that of B., and that is destroyed, is the negligent party liable for his loss? And if it spreads thence to the house of C., and thence to the house of D., and thence consecutively through the other houses, until it reaches and consumes the house of Z., is the party liable to pay the damages sustained by these twenty-four sufferers? The counsel for the plaintiff does not distinctly claim this, and I think it would not be seriously insisted that the sufferers could recover in such case. Where, then, is the principle upon which A. recovers and Z. fails? * * * In the destruction of the building upon which the sparks were thrown by the negligent act of the party sought to be charged, the result was to have been anticipated the moment the fire was communicated to the building,-that its destruction was the ordinary and natural result of its being fired. In the second, third, or twenty-fourth case, as supposed, the destruction of the building was not a natural and expected result of the first firing. That a building upon which sparks and cinders fall should be destroyed or seriously injured must be expected, but that the fire should spread, and other buildings be consumed, is not a necessary or a usual result. That it is possible and that it is not unfrequent, cannot be denied. The result, however, depends, not upon any necessity of a further communication of the fire, but upon a concurrence of accidental circumstances, such as the degree of the heat, the state of the atmosphere, the condition and materials of the adjoining structures, and the direction of the wind. These are accidental and varying circumstances. The party has no control over them, and is not responsible for their effects.’ In Webb v. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 420, the defendant's engine dropped a live coal upon a tie and set it on fire. Weeds, grass, and rubbish had been permitted to accumulate from that place to the fence of the defendant's right of way. The defendant's engine was defective, and the coal was negligently dropped. At the time a strong wind was blowing, and it was a season of extreme drought. The fire quickly ran through the grass and rubbish to the defendant's fence, and then spread upon the plaintiff's next adjacent woodland, destroying his timber and causing damages for which the action was brought. It was held in that case that the accumulation of the weeds, grass, and rubbish through which the fire was communicated to the plaintiff's premises was one of the elements of negligence with which the defendant was chargeable, and for that reason the defendant was liable; that it was in effect the same as if the defendant had thrown the coal which set the fire directly upon the plaintiff's lands, and there started the fire. Folger, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, enters upon a consideration of the rule at common law, and the Ryan Case, and discusses the question of proximate cause and results necessarily and reasonably to be expected, and approves the rule that the liability of a person extends to his immediate neighbor only for the damages caused to him by the spread of the fire upon his next adjacent or contiguous property. In commenting upon the Ryan Case, he says: ‘It announces no new principle. It recognizes the principle which it adopts as one before that established, and, applying it to the facts therein existing, holds the damages sued for was not the necessary and natural result of the negligent act.’ In Frace v. Railroad Co., 143 N. Y. 182, 38 N. E. 102, the action was brought to recover damages for the destruction of a barn and hotel. The evidence showed that the barn first caught fire, and it was a controverted question of fact upon the trial as to whether the hotel building took fire from coals emitted from the engine, or from fire communicated from the burning barn. The trial judge charged the jury that: ‘To justify a verdict covering or including the value of the hotel, you must find that the same was destroyed by reason of the fire being communicated thereto directly from the engine, or without the assistance of other agencies, and arising from other causes. This is a question for you to determine from the evidence.’ Peckham, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says with reference to this charge: ‘We think the charge of the learned judge upon this part of the case was as favorable to the defendant as it could properly ask. The question was left as one of fact, under all the circumstances, as to whether the burning of the hotel were not the natural and direct result of the sparks from the engine. In this case the court committed no error to the prejudice of the defendant.’ In Read v. Nichols, 118 N. Y. 224, 23 N. E. 468, the action was for damages caused by a fire which destroyed two of the plaintiff's buildings. A strong wind carried sparks from a smokestack belonging to the defendants to the roof of a building 280 feet distant, setting it on fire. After the building commenced to burn, the wind died down and...