Hoffman v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 14 February 1914
• Citation: 138 P. 664,78 Wash. 118
• Parties: HOFFMAN v. WATKINS.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

138 P. 664

78 Wash. 118

HOFFMAN v. WATKINS.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 14, 1914

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Chehalis County; Ben Sheeks Judge.

Action by Robert Hoffman against I. R. Watkins. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

J. B Bridges and John C. Hogan, both of Aberdeen, for appellant.

Hugo Metzler, of Tacoma, and A. E. Cross, of Aberdeen, for respondent.

MORRIS J.

Respondent sought in this action to recover damages against appellant, a physician, for alleged malpractice in the treatment of an injury to one of respondent's shoulders. The complaint stated a cause of action in tort; the allegations being that appellant carelessly and negligently treated the shoulder, and carelessly and negligently failed to properly examine the shoulder and ascertain its true condition, that appellant improperly diagnosed respondent's injury as a sprain, and treated it accordingly, when as a matter of fact the shoulder was dislocated, and that, because of appellant's careless and negligent diagnosis and treatment, and his failure to use ordinary care and skill, respondent was obliged to seek other medical aid, and was finally compelled to undergo an operation to have his shoulder properly reset, which operation and the attendant loss of time, expense, suffering and permanent partial disability might have been avoided had appellant used ordinary care and skill in his diagnosis and treatment of the injured shoulder while respondent was under his care. The trial resulted in judgment for respondent in the sum of $5,350, the full amount demanded, from which this appeal is taken.

We shall not attempt to review all the errors claimed by appellant. Having found sufficient cause for awarding a new trial, it would be useless to discuss other assignments. The first assignment is based on the improper admission of testimony, to the effect that, at the time of his injury respondent was in the employ of the Slade Lumber Company, and paying $1 per month hospital dues, that appellant was under contract with the lumber company to treat its employés requiring either medical or surgical aid, and that notices had been posted by the lumber company on its premises notifying all employés of the charge for hospital fees, and that whenever medical treatment was desired appellant should be consulted, and other testimony based on these facts. No mention of these facts was made in any pleadings, and the evidence was clearly irrelevant. It was not necessary to establish a contractual relation between appellant and respondent, for it is clear that, whether the relation was that of physician and patient alone, or whether the services of appellant were engaged because of his contract with the lumber company, his duty to respondent would have been the same.

We are not prepared to say that, simply because evidence of these irrelevant facts was admitted over objection, we would reach a conclusion that the error was so prejudicial as to demand a new trial, a different situation is presented. Page after page of this record is taken up with testimony of this character over the objection of appellant. The respondent the appellant, and the officials of the lumber company were all called to testify to it, until it is apparent counsel for respondent had some purpose in mind in persisting in taking advantage of the court's favorable ruling in getting these facts before the jury. That purpose could only be to prejudice the jury outside of the issue in favor of the repondent's right of recovery, or against the appellant; it is immaterial which. The respondent was entitled to submit to the jury every fact within the issue whatever its purpose was; but he was not entitled to go outside of the issue and introduce facts not issuable, either to strengthen his own case, or weaken his adversary's. When litigants select the law and the courts to determine their differences, they must choose a triable issue, and, having chosen that issue, no party can have a fair and impartial trial upon that issue when other irrelevant issues are persistently and extensively gone into. Every fact submitted to the jury has greater or less weight in reaching a conclusion upon the ultimate fact, and because of this each litigant is entitled to have the ultimate fact determined upon evidence that is relevant to that fact and the issue as framed by the pleadings, without having the ultimate facts strengthened to the advantage of one party and weakened to the prejudice of the other by the introduction of irrelevant and immaterial matter. Especial reason is found for insisting upon such a rule in this case, where the record discloses that respondent submitted himself to the treatment of other physicians, and the...