Hogan v. Atkins

• Decision Date: 23 May 1968
• Docket Number: No. 24632,24632
• Citation: 162 S.E.2d 395,224 Ga. 358
• Parties: Richard B. HOGAN v. E. R. ATKINS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 395

162 S.E.2d 395

224 Ga. 358

Richard B. HOGAN v. E. R. ATKINS.

No. 24632.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 23, 1968.

Syllabus by the Court

Code § 26-2701 is not unconstitutional for vagueness as violative of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

John H. Ruffin, Jr., Augusta, for appellant.

George Hains, Solicitor Gen., Augusta, E. Freeman Leverett, Elberton, for appellee.

ALMAND, Presiding Justice.

The main question presented in this habeas corpus case is whether Code § 26-2701, under which the appellant was convicted, is unconstitutional for vagueness as violative of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Code § 26-2701 provides: 'It shall be unlawful for any person to make or mend, or cause to be made or mended, or to have in his possession in the day or nighttime, any engine, machine, jimmy, tool, false key, pick-lock, bit, nippers, nitroglycerin, dynamite cap, dynamite, or other explosive, fuse, steel wedges, drills, tap-pins, or other implements or things adapted, designed, or commonly used for the commission of burglary, larceny, safe-cracking, or other crime, with the intent to use or employ or allow the same to be used or employed in the commission of a crime, or knowing that the same are intended to be so used. Any person guilty of a violation of this section shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than three years nor more than 10 years.'

Appellant contends that Code § 26-2701 makes possession alone the exclusive source of one's guilt and does not avail an opportunity to explain possession. With these contentions, we cannot agree. Very clearly, Code § 26-2701 requires two elements for conviction, viz.: (1) possession of the tools and implements and (2) intent to use these tools and implements in the commission of a crime or knowing that the same are intended to be so used. With proof of both of these elements being essential to a conviction, the appellant's contentions are without merit.

'A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties, and to guide the judge in its application and the lawyer in defending one charged with its violation. But few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols, most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity...