Hogan v. Bangor and Aroostook R. Co.
Decision Date | 01 August 1995 |
Docket Number | 95-1169,Nos. 95-1168,s. 95-1168 |
Citation | 61 F.3d 1034 |
Parties | , 4 A.D. Cases 1251, 11 A.D.D. 1, 7 NDLR P 134 Donald HOGAN, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. BANGOR AND AROOSTOOK RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant, Appellant. Donald HOGAN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. BANGOR AND AROOSTOOK RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
James E. Howard, with whom M. Katherine Willard and Phoebe S. Gallagher, Boston, MA, were on brief, for Bangor and Aroostook Railroad Company.
William J. Kelleher, Augusta, ME, for Donald Hogan.
Before SELYA, CYR, and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
An employer's refusal to let an employee return to work out of a difference of medical views as to whether the employee was fit gave rise to this discrimination action brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101 et seq., and the Maine Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 5, Sec. 4561 et seq. (West 1989). A jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff Donald Hogan of $400,000, reduced by the district court to $200,000, gives rise to a case of first impression in this Circuit on the meaning of the cap on ADA damages imposed by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981a(b)(3). Because the language of the statute is clear, the reduction of the jury award of damages to $200,000 is affirmed. The challenges of the defendant Bangor and Aroostook Railroad ("BAR") to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the $200,000 award and to the additional back pay award of $70,684.29 are rejected, as is Hogan's challenge to the denial of his motion for prejudgment interest.
Hogan, a trackman for BAR since 1970, suffered a collapsed lung while at work in February 1992. After surgery to remove a lobe of his lung, Hogan was told on May 20, 1992 by Dr. Cabot that he was fit to return to work. Dr. Sagall, BAR's Chief Medical Officer and a family practitioner, examined Hogan and, based on what he professed to be abnormal pulmonary function tests, concluded Hogan was not able to return to his physically demanding job. Dr. Sagall believed that Hogan suffered from bullous disease and emphysema, and that this increased Hogan's risk of lung collapse.
Despite mounting medical evidence to the contrary, Dr. Sagall clung to his belief for more than two and a half years. Hogan's physician, Dr. Cabot, based on later examination again repeated that Hogan was fit. Dr. Sagall, feeling Dr. Cabot did not understand how strenuous Hogan's job was, again told Hogan he could not return to work. Dr. Sagall, however, failed to discuss Hogan with Dr. Cabot, failed to ascertain if Dr. Cabot did misunderstand the nature of the job, and failed to have x-rays done which would have revealed whether Hogan in fact suffered from emphysema and bullous disease. Indeed, Dr. Sagall did not request x-rays until January 1993, after Hogan had brought suit, when directed to do so by the Railway Retirement Board. In addition, CAT-scan results available to Dr. Sagall in March 1992 would have disclosed, if reviewed, that Hogan did not suffer from emphysema.
By January 1993 BAR had been given an opinion from an acknowledged pulmonary specialist, Dr. Oldenburg, that Hogan could return to work. This opinion fared no better in swaying BAR than did Dr. Cabot's opinion. Dr. Sagall again felt no need to contact Dr. Oldenburg and discuss Hogan.
In October 1993, BAR requested that Hogan undergo a Functional Capacity Test prepared specifically for him. There was no guarantee that if Hogan passed the test he would be allowed to return to work. Hogan refused to take the test.
In November 1994, after trial had started and after examinations by both Dr. Oldenburg and Dr. Sagall, BAR reinstated Hogan to his job as trackman.
In the period that Hogan was kept out of work despite his doctors' opinions that he was fit, Hogan and his family were forced to live on a fraction of his former income as family breadwinner. Dr. Sagall's repeated statements to him that he was disabled and the disability was probably permanent exacerbated Hogan's depressed state.
The jury found in Hogan's favor under the ADA and awarded him $200,000 each in punitive and in compensatory damages. The district court then reduced Hogan's award to $200,000 ($100,000 compensatory and $100,000 punitive) pursuant to the statutory cap imposed by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981a(b)(3). In addition, Hogan was awarded $70,684.29 in back pay. As an alternative recovery under the MHRA, the district court awarded Hogan the same back pay award of $70,684.29 plus $5,000 in civil penal damages.
Hoping to retain the $400,000 award, Hogan argues, based solely on an improbable reading of the statute, that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981a(b)(3) imposes a cap of $200,000 on each type of damage award, and not on the sum of the two. The language of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981a(b)(3) provides:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed ... $200,000.
The district court correctly read the provision as "[t]he sum of the amount of compensatory damages ... and the amount of punitive damages ... shall not exceed ... $200,000." The only other court to have considered the issue thus far has reached the same conclusion. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 823 F.Supp. 571, 576 (N.D.Ill.1993), rev'd in part on other grounds, 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir.1995).
The statute is clear on its face that the sum of compensatory damages (including its various components) and punitive damages shall not exceed $200,000. "The task of statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute, and statutory language must be accorded its ordinary meaning." Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1228 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1832, 128 L.Ed.2d 461 (1994). "[W]hen a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished." Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2594, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992).
The reduction of the jury award from $200,000 to $100,000 on each type of damage award was done by the district court simply to accommodate the cap. The original jury award of $200,000 for compensatory damages alone would also satisfy the...
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