Hogan v. Borough of Brentwood

• Decision Date: 25 October 2021
• Docket Number: 2:19-cv-1016-NR
• Parties: KRISTEN HOGAN and OCEANA ORTH, Plaintiffs, v. BOROUGH OF BRENTWOOD, CARL RECH, as an individual, FARRELL WAGNER, as an individual, ANDREW TOTH, as an individual, STEPHANIE CHUPKA, as an individual, DANIEL JENA, as an individual, RONALD SEPIC, JR., as an individual, FNU CATANZARO, as an individual, and FNU ROURKE, as an individual, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

KRISTEN HOGAN and OCEANA ORTH, Plaintiffs, v. BOROUGH OF BRENTWOOD, CARL RECH, as an individual, FARRELL WAGNER, as an individual, ANDREW TOTH, as an individual, STEPHANIE CHUPKA, as an individual, DANIEL JENA, as an individual, RONALD SEPIC, JR., as an individual, FNU CATANZARO, as an individual, and FNU ROURKE, as an individual, Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-1016-NR

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

October 25, 2021

OPINION

Nicholas Ranjan United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Kristen Hogan and Oceana Orth bring this suit as the result of an allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Officer Carl Rech, Agent Andrew Toth, Officer Farrell Wagner, Officer Daniel Jena, and Officer Ronald Sepic, Jr. (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”)^[1] entered Ms. Hogan's home without a valid search warrant. They say the warrant the Individual Defendants obtained was not properly supported by probable cause. Additionally, according to Plaintiffs, when the Individual Defendants executed their warrant, Officer Jena pushed Ms. Hogan into her front door as he entered. Ms Hogan says that the force of that push caused her head to come into “forceful contact” with the glass panes on the front door, resulting in a concussion.

The Individual Defendants tell a different story. They were part of a narcotics investigation task force overseen by the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General that was investigating Raymond Erfort, a suspected cocaine trafficker. During that investigation, the task force arrested Mr. Erfort and searched his home, vehicle, and bank accounts. While searching his vehicle, the task force recovered several financial documents, including two checks and an insurance policy. One of the checks and the insurance policy were linked to businesses owned by Ms. Hogan. One of those businesses had Ms. Hogan's home listed as its address. After continuing to investigate, the task force uncovered additional connections between Ms. Hogan and Mr Erfort. Based on this information, the task force obtained a warrant to search Ms. Hogan's home for evidence of money laundering. The Individual Defendants claim this warrant was supported by probable cause and that they acted appropriately while executing it.^[2]

Based on these core facts, Plaintiffs bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful search and seizure, excessive force, and violation of their equal-protection rights. They also bring a Monell claim against the Borough of Brentwood because at the time of the search and seizure, several of the Individual Defendants were members of the Brentwood Police Department who were assigned to work for the Attorney General's task force. Plaintiffs allege that Brentwood failed to appropriately train these officers about probable-cause determinations before their assignment, and that this failure led to the alleged constitutional violations.

Defendants now move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims. Applying the familiar standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, ^[3] the Court will grant summary judgment in part and deny it in part as to the Individual Defendants. The Court will grant Brentwood's motion in full.

DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs bring two types of claims in this case: claims related to the warrant (counts I, II, and III of the second amended complaint) and an excessive-force claim (count IV).

With respect to the warrant claims, they all fail as a matter of law. Plaintiffs have not offered sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that probable cause supported the warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. And since there is no underlying unconstitutional search and seizure, Brentwood cannot be derivatively liable under Monell. Plaintiffs' equal-protection claim also fails, since there was a rational basis for the officers to target Plaintiffs, as opposed to another commercial entity.

With respect to the excessive-force claim, the Court finds that there are material disputes of fact that preclude summary judgment, and that Ms. Hogan's claim against Officer Jena is otherwise not barred by the statute of limitations.

The Court more thoroughly addresses the respective claims, in turn, below.

I. The claims related to the warrant fail.

A. The Individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' unlawful search-and-seizure claim.

Plaintiffs allege that they were subject to an unlawful search and seizure when the Individual Defendants entered Ms. Hogan's home under a judicially approved search warrant. ECF 43, ¶¶ 64-78. According to Plaintiffs, this warrant was defective because it “lacked any indicia of probable cause.” ECF 81, p. 3 (emphasis in original). The Individual Defendants, on the other hand, claim they are entitled to summary judgment because the “record fails to reflect any evidence which would support the conclusion that the affidavit…lacked sufficient indicia of probable cause.” ECF 75, p.16. The Court agrees with the Individual Defendants.

“The Fourth Amendment, which is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Swope v. City of Pittsburgh, 90 F.Supp.3d 400, 409 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (Cercone, J.) (cleaned up). “Where the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, ” as is the case here, “the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner[.]” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (cleaned up). That said, “the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant authorizing the allegedly unconstitutional search or seizure does not end the inquiry into objective reasonableness.” Id. at 547. “The shield of immunity otherwise conferred by the warrant will be lost, for example, where the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Id. (cleaned up).

This standard sets a high bar that is not easy to clear. See id. Indeed, it “gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995). When evaluating whether this high bar has been cleared, the Court must focus “on the information the officers had available to them, not on whether the information resulted from exemplary police work.” Id. Meaning that, here, “[e]ven if, in hindsight, the affidavit to search the house might have been somewhat questionable, ” that will not be enough. Handy v. Palmiero, No. 17-3107, 2019 WL 3973711, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2019) (cleaned up), aff'd, 836 Fed.Appx. 116 (3d Cir. 2020). “[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require perfection.” Id.

Applying this standard, the Court finds that the warrant did not lack any indicia of probable cause. The undisputed material evidence reveals that documents recovered from Mr. Erfort's vehicle established a connection between Mr. Erfort and businesses owned by Ms. Hogan. ECF 74-1, PDF p. 29. One of those businesses had Ms. Hogan's home as its address. Id. The task force also obtained a report from a confidential law enforcement database (“CLEAR”) that confirmed a connection between Mr. Erfort and Ms. Hogan. ECF 74-2, Ex. J-7; ECF 74-3, 22:12-22. Based on this information and his years of experience in narcotics investigations, Officer Rech, who applied for the warrant, believed that Ms. Hogan was involved in Mr. Erfort's efforts to launder money obtained through his alleged drug-dealing activity. E.g., ECF 74-2, Ex. J-7; ECF 74-3, 24:15-20, 36:15-24. A neutral magistrate found this information sufficient to establish probable cause.^[4]

This magistrate approval is critical because “[i]n the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination because it is the magistrate's responsibility to determine whether the officer's allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 547 (cleaned up). And based on the above facts, Plaintiffs cannot establish that the warrant to search their home was so baseless that “no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should not issue.” Id.

The Court will therefore grant summary judgment for the Individual Defendants on Plaintiffs' illegal-search-and-seizure claim in count I of the second amended complaint.

B. Plaintiffs' failure-to-train claim against Brentwood fails.

Relatedly, Plaintiffs bring a Monell claim against Brentwood based on its “failure to train [its] officers in the necessary procedures regarding constitutional searches and seizures in investigations relating to drug activities.” ECF 80, p. 6. According to Plaintiffs, because of this failure to train, Officer Rech's warrant “lacked the requisite probable cause” and “resulted in a constitutionally deficient investigation and an illegal search and seizure, conducted by both [Officers] Rech and Wagner.” Id. Importantly, however, if Plaintiffs have “not first established a violation by an individual, then there can be no derivative claim against the municipality.” D.C. v. Pittsburgh Pub. Schs., 415 F.Supp.3d 636, 662 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (Horan, J.) (citation omitted).

As discussed above, Plaintiffs failed to establish a violation stemming from the search and seizure conducted by Officers Rech and Wagner, and they have offered no argument or evidence to support a claim for failure to train...