Swope v. City of Pittsburgh

• Decision Date: 05 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2:14cv939.,2:14cv939.
• Citation: 90 F.Supp.3d 400
• Parties: ROBERT SWOPE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH; Detective John Johnson in his individual and Official capacity; Detective Leonard Duncan in his individual and official Capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

90 F.Supp.3d 400

ROBERT SWOPE, Plaintiff

v.CITY OF PITTSBURGH; Detective John Johnson in his individual and Official capacity; Detective Leonard Duncan in his individual and official Capacity, Defendants.

No. 2:14cv939.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed Feb. 5, 2015.

Robert Swope, Pittsburgh, PA, pro se.

Michael E. Kennedy, Lourdes Sanchez Ridge, Matthew S. McHale, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

DAVID STEWART CERCONE, District Judge.

AND NOW, this 4th day of January, 2015, after Plaintiff Robert Swope, filed an action in the above-captioned case, and after a Motion to Dismiss was submitted on behalf of Defendants, and after a Report and Recommendation was filed by the United States Magistrate Judge and Plaintiff was given until January 14, 2015, to file written objections thereto, and upon consideration of the objections filed by Plaintiff, ECF No. 18, and the response to those objections filed by Defendants, ECF No. 21, and upon independent review of the record, and upon consideration of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 17, which is adopted as the opinion of this Court,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 7, is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, if any party wishes to appeal from this Order a notice of appeal, as provided in Fed. R.App. P. 3, must be filed with the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, at 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219, within thirty (30) days.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MAUREEN P. KELLY, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.

I. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Robert Swope, a pro se litigant, was the subject of what appears to have been a rather dramatic and frightening arrest for crimes that he did not commit. Justifiably upset, Mr. Swope has brought this civil rights action against Defendants Detective John Johnson (“Johnson”), Detective Leonard Duncan (“Duncan”) and the City of Pittsburgh (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants violated his rights provided by the Fourth and Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution relative to his arrest and subsequent search of his residence.

Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (“the Motion”) submitted on behalf of Defendants. ECF No. 7. Although the Court is sympathetic to Mr. Swope's complaints, for the following reasons, it is nevertheless respectfully recommended that the Motion be granted.

II. REPORT

A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to the Complaint, Mr. Swope was arrested at his home in the early morning hours on July 19, 2012, by a team of armed United States Marshals. Mr. Swope claims that the Marshals dragged him out of his house, handcuffed and shackled him without any explanation of why he was being arrested, and transported him to Police Headquarters on Allegheny Avenue. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 7–10. Mr. Swope was then placed in an interrogation room and informed by unnamed detectives that he was being arrested for armed robbery. Mr. Swope alleges that, in order to force him to confess to various armed robberies in the Pittsburgh area, these detectives subjected him to a variety of interrogation tactics including being offered a “package deal” if he confessed and being threatened with consecutive charges of robbery so that “he would ‘never get out’ of jail.” Mr. Swope also alleges that the detectives threatened to inform the judge that Mr. Swope was uncooperative so as to get an extra high bond set and to seize his rescue dogs and have them euthanized. Id. at ¶¶ 10–14. Despite Mr. Swope's protestations that he was a responsible business man in the area, a property owner, a licensed real estate agent, and that he could verify his whereabouts through receipts, phone records and e-mails, he was transported to the Allegheny County Jail where he remained for over twelve hours before being arraigned. Id. at ¶ 15.

Mr. Swope further alleges that when he was able to make a telephone call later that night he was informed by his fiance that his house had been searched and that all of his money and personal belongings had been confiscated. Id. Mr. Swope alleges that on the morning of July 20, 2012, after his future father-in-law purchase a bail bond from Liberty Bail Bond for $2500, he was freed but was immediately escorted back to “holding” and charged with a second count of armed robbery.¹

Id. at ¶ 16. Mr. Swope's fiance's family posted a second bond at the cost of $1250 that night. The first bond, however, had to be reposted and Mr. Swope was not released from the Allegheny County Jail until the morning of July 21, 2012. Id. at ¶¶ 16–17.

Mr. Swope also claims that when he appeared for the preliminary hearing on July 26, 2012, he was informed by Defendant Johnson that a witness was on vacation and that the preliminary hearing would be rescheduled for August 16, 2012. Id. at ¶ 20. Mr. Swope apparently told Johnson at that time that he had irrefutable evidence proving that he was not in the state at the time of the alleged robberies and, over the course of the next two weeks, Mr. Swope met with his attorney and Defendants and provided that evidence. Id. at ¶¶ 21–22. Mr. Swope complains that, this notwithstanding, he still had to wait until the August 16th preliminary hearing for the charges to be withdrawn and that during those three weeks he was unable to travel and/or conduct business as usual. Id. at ¶ 23.

Mr. Swope claims that as a result of his arrest he lost $3250 in bond fees that he reimbursed to his fiance's family; $1000 in legal fees to retain a lawyer; $1100 in missing cash; and actual and potential business as a licensed real estate agent. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 18–19; pp. 12–13, ¶¶ 2–8. Mr. Swope also claims that he has suffered emotional damages, including embarrassment, humiliation, nightmares and anxiety. Id. at p. 13, ¶ 9.

Mr. Swope filed the instant Complaint on July 14, 2014, bringing claims pursuant to the Fourth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution for false arrest and false imprisonment (Count I); unreasonable search and seizure (Count II); excessive bail (Count III); malicious prosecution (Count IV); and municipal liability (Count V). ECF No. 1. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on August 6, 2014, to which Mr. Swope filed a Brief in Opposition on September 8, 2014. ECF Nos. 7, 13. Defendants filed a Reply Brief to Plaintiff's Opposition on September 22, 2014, and on October 2, 2014, Mr. Swope filed a Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion. ECF Nos. 15, 16. As such the Motion is ripe for review.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of a complaint, not to resolve disputed facts or decide the merits of the case.” Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 197 F.Supp.2d 42, 53 (D.Del.2002), citing Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993). In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir.2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See California Publ. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir.2004), citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Rather, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id., citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, or where the factual content does not allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008) (finding that, under Twombly, “labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not suffice but, rather, the complaint “must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct” and that are sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim”). The question is not whether the plaintiff will prevail in the end but, rather, is whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his or her claims. See Oatway v. American International Group, Inc., 325 F.3d 184, 187 (3d Cir.2003).

C. DISCUSSION

Mr. Swope has brought his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983 ”), which provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 provides remedies for deprivations of rights established in the Constitution or federal laws. It does not, by its own terms, create substantive rights.” Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir.2006), citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, ...