Hogan v. Q. T. Corp.
| Citation | 185 A.2d 491,230 Md. 69 |
| Decision Date | 16 November 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 58,58 |
| Parties | Earl V. HOGAN v. Q. T. CORPORATION. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Lansdale G. Sasscer, Jr., Upper Marlboro, (Sasscer, Clagett & Powers, Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellant.
Cary M. Euwer, Upper Marlboro, (Mitchell, Clagett & Euwer, Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellee.
Before HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT, HORNEY and MARBURY, JJ.
In this action by a broker for commissions claimed to have been earned in bringing about the lease of a store property in or near the Queenstown Shopping Center in Prince George's County to the Southland Corporation for a 'Seven-Eleven Store,' the jury rendered a verdict for the broker (Earl V. Hogan) against the owner of the leased property (Q. T. Corporation). But the lower court granted the motion of the owner for judgment n.o.v., and entered a judgment in its favor against the broker. And the broker appealed.
On appeal, the only question presented by the broker is whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that he was acting for the owner and hence entitled to commissions. On the other hand, the owner, claiming that the applicable law was that of the District of Columbia, contends that under that law, the broker failed to establish a prima facie case.
In October of 1958 the broker telephoned the attorney for the owner corporation at the office of the attorney in Washington, D. C., and told him his name and that he was a real estate broker. He further told the attorney he had been in touch with a Texas 'firm' that wanted to establish a chain of stores in the Washington area and that he would like the prospect to consider an unimproved part of the shopping center as a location. The broker further informed the attorney of the amount of rent usually paid by the prospective purchaser or lessee and as to the terms of the leases and options it usually entered into. And, according to the broker, the attorney advised him that the owner would not be interested in selling the property but would allow the broker to try to interest his prospect in a store to be built and leased to it. But, according to the attorney, the broker told him that he was scouting for locations for Seven-Eleven Stores; the broker did not say that he was seeking employment by the owner corporation; and he (as attorney for the corporation) never requested the services of the broker.
The broker promptly contacted a representative of Southland and, having ascertained that it was interested in leasing the property, went to the office of the attorney and conferred with him in person. After further discussing the details of the lease, a form of lease used by Southland was left with the attorney, together with a business card showing that the broker was a 'real estate and business chance broker,' but the attorney claimed that the card was not given to him until long after the lease had been executed. On this occasion, according to the broker, he informed the attorney that he had other properties he could offer the prospective lessee, and the attorney agreed that he could offer the store building for lease to be occupied after it had been built.
About a week later, the broker arranged for another meeting in the office of the attorney at which the officers and directors of the owner corporation were to be present. On this occasion, the broker brought a representative of Southland with him to the meeting and, acting as a go-between, explained that he was a real estate broker and was there for the purpose of introducing the representative of the prospective lessee to the directors and officers. At that meeting, the parties agreed on a form of lease and the notes taken by the representative of Southland were submitted to the attorney for the lessee corporation for the purpose of preparing a lease. According to the representative of the lessee, the purpose of this meeting was to 'discuss the possibility of a lease' of property that the broker 'had shown us' after the broker 'had previously spoken with' the attorney for the owner corporation. But, according to the attorney for the owner corporation and some of its directors or officers, the broker did not make a statement at this meeting as to 'whom he was representing in connection with the leasing.' The attorney also stated that the broker took no part in the negotiations concerning the lease. The attorney admitted, however, that he knew the broker did not have authority to bind the lessee corporation. According to the broker, he continued to act as a go-between with respect to the wording of the lease at the request of the attorney for the owner corporation while the lease was being prepared. After the lease had been prepared it was executed by the lessee in Texas and by the lessor in Washington, D. C., where all of the negotiations with respect to it took place.
The attorney for the owner corporation never asked the broker for whom he was working, and the broker, because he had told 'them' that he was in the brokerage business and because he 'understood they knew what a real estate broker was,' did not seek payment of commissions until after the leased premises were accepted by the lessee. At that time, according to the attorney for the owner corporation, the broker telephoned and inquired 'whether he had been counted in for a commission.' And it was not until some eight months after the lessee corporation began making payments under the terms of the lease that a demand was made for the customary commissions. Payment was refused and this action was brought.
At the trial it was stipulated that the owner corporation had received rent and its percentage of the sales aggregating $11,151 over a period of twenty-seven months before the day of trial. The verdict of the jury was for $278.77.
It is conceded that the owner failed to give the broker notice either in the pleadings or otherwise of its intention,--pursuant to the provisions of Code (1957), Art. 35, § 50,--to offer evidence of, or to ask that judicial notice be taken of,...
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