Hogan v. Smith

• Decision Date: 20 December 1881
• Citation: 11 Mo.App. 314
• Parties: ALICE HOGAN, Appellant, v. JAMES A. SMITH ET AL., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

11 Mo.App. 314

ALICE HOGAN, Appellant,

v.JAMES A. SMITH ET AL., Respondents.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Dec. 20, 1881.

1. That the defendant, in an action to enforce the lien of the state for taxes, is merely the owner of a life estate in the land, and that the remaindermen are not made parties, does not make void a judgment rendered therein.

2. Such a judgment is entitled to the usual presumptions in its favor, and cannot be collaterally attacked in a proceeding by the defendant in the taxsuit to recover possession from the purchaser at the tax-sale.

3. A judgment in ejectment is not conclusive upon the parties, and is not a bar to a subsequent action between the parties, involving the same titles and defences.

APPEAL from the St. Louis Circuit Court, BOYLE, J.

Affirmed.

H. A. & A. C. CLOVER, for the appellant.

W. F. ROGERS, for the respondents.

BAKEWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action of ejectment. The cause was tried by the court, a jury being waived. There was a finding and judgment for defendants.

It appears that Michael A. Hogan died owning real estate in St. Louis, and leaving a widow, the plaintiff, and seven children. The property in controversy was set apart to the widow in partition as dower. At the October term, 1878, the tax collector brought suit against Alice Hogan as owner, and the city of St. Louis as holder, of a lien on the property to enforce payment of delinquent taxes for 1876. Judgment was rendered in this proceeding for taxes and costs, and the property ordered to be sold. Defendant, James A. Smith, bought at this sale under the execution, and the sheriff executed to him a deed for the property. Smith brought ejectment against Alice Hogan, obtained judgment, and was put in possession.

This suit was begun in 1880. Plaintiff introduced the proceedings in partition, the commissioner's deed to her, and showed that the children of Hogan, deceased, were alive when the tax-suit was begun. Defendant offered the sheriff's deed to him, and the record and judgment in the former proceeding in ejectment, and these were admitted against plaintiff's objection.

Defendant contends that the first judgment in ejectment was conclusive between the parties. At common law such a judgment was never conclusive as to the title of either party. Its only effect was to put plaintiff in possession according to his right and title in the premises. Either party might bring a new action. And so it has always been held in Missouri. The judgment in ejectment is not a bar, though the parties, titles, and defences are the same. There seems to be a dictum of Judge Adams to the contrary, in Foster v. Evans (51 Mo. 39), to which defendant refers. But the law as to this is well settled. Dunn v. Miller, 8 Mo. App. 467; Kimmel v. Benna, 70 Mo. 52.

The sheriff's deed was prima facie evidence of title, and that the matters stated in it were true. Rev. Stats., sect. 6839. The deed, however, recites that the proceedings under which the sale to defendant was made, were only against Alice Hogan and the city. It is contended that the statute contemplates a proceeding against the owner of the fee only; that the heirs who were remainder-men should have been made parties; that the...