Hogan v. State Bar

Citation36 Cal.2d 807,228 P.2d 554
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Decision Date13 March 1951
PartiesHOGAN v. STATE BAR. L. A. 21711.

Frank I. Hogan, Huntington Park, in pro. per.

J. R. Vaughan, Los Angeles, and Jerold E. Weil, San Francisco, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This is a proceeding to review the recommendation of the Board of Governors of the State Bar that the petitioner be suspended from the practice of the law for a period of three months.

In a notice to show cause issued by the local administrative committee for the county of Los Angeles the petitioner was charged with violation of his oath and duties as an attorney. (Sections 6067, 6068 and 6106 of the State Bar act.) The disciplinary proceeding was initiated because of the petitioner's statements in an 'amended motion' for a new trial in a pending action and in a letter sent to the Los Angeles office of the State Bar. It was charged that on or about February 7, 1950, in the new trial proceedings he did not maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers, but engaged in offensive personality by referring in a disparaging way to the judge presiding in the case, charging him with being a petty judge, with acting as a prosecutor and attorney for the plaintiff in the case, and with being prejudiced against certain witnesses because of their religion. It was also charged that on or about March 14, 1950, in connection with the preliminary disciplinary hearing the petitioner sent to the State Bar a letter entitled 'Open Letter To The Right Honoriable Harry R. Simon, Recorder of Bell and Notary Public:', in which he engaged in a further disrespectful attack upon the same judge.

The petitioner filed an answer to the notice to show cause in which in the main he objected to the sufficiency of the charges. He later unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the charges upon the basis of his own affidavit explaining his conduct. The local administrative committee held hearings for three days, after which findings of fact, conclusions, and a recommendation were filed with the Board. The committee found that the charges made against the judge by the petitioner were false, and that the unrestrained and defamatory nature of the 'open letter' was a reflection upon the court and a conscious and intentional effort by the petitioner to defame and malign the court and the judicial office of the judge. It was condluded that the petitioner indulged in offensive personality within the meaning of section 6068(f) and violated his oath and duties as an attorney within the meaning of section 6103. The committee also concluded that the petitioner's conduct amounted to moral turpitude and dishonesty within the meaning of section 6106. The recommendation was for suspension from practice for one year.

The Board of Governors adopted the committee's findings and conclusions except the conclusion relating to moral turpitude and dishonesty. The Board reduced the recommendation to suspension for three months.

The petitioner's principal contention is that the evidence does not support the findings. An examination of the 'amended motion' for new trial and of the 'open letter' discloses that the findings and conclusion of the Board were justified. Extracts from the record on the amended motion will indicate its offensive nature: '* * * I want once and for all to raise the question of the jurisdiction of petty police judges raised up to the dignity of Municipal and Superior Judges: * * * How then can a petty police judge * * * assume jurisdiction in a case pending in the Municipal Court * * * These petty judges are not elected or appointed to the Municipal Court * * *. (H)ence I claim the sitting Judge in this case had absolutely no jurisdiction * * * Nice question, eh, what. Oh, yes. * * * (T)he court was also of the opinion that (three of the witnesses) lied; * * * with some attorneys everybody that does not agree with them lie and with some judges, they like to act as prosecutors and attorneys for the plaintiff and very often confuse the witness to such an extent that he does not know whether he is going or coming * * * I happen to know (two of the witnesses) and I have always found them * * * truthful. They are religious men. They do not attend a synagogue; but they are good Christians. Of course, Christians do not go to synagogues * * *.'

Short excerpts from the numerous disrespectful remarks in the thirteen page typewritten 'open letter' will demonstrate the equally improper tenor of the language employed in that document:

'My dear Harry and State Bar:

'* * * I noted * * * that you have an LLD from the Metropolitan Business College. Well I was offered one also for $250.00 but I did not buy it * * *. I am (writing a legal work) and when I am through * * * it will enable you to learn and study some more law.

'* * * I am not a picolo player. I know to do what you have done in the musical line one must have a lot of wind and as our mutual friend said to me that that is your chief characteristic wind * * * I have found out one thing and that is that in order to get a fair trial before you, one must have a jury and a court reporter; both, especially if you do not happen to like the lawyer. * * * And you also remember in the Pitchfork case that you tried to prosecute my client; but this time I had a jury and you did not suceed *...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Sprague v. Kekoa, A122018 (Cal. App. 12/8/2009)
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • December 8, 2009
    ...(1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Attorneys, § 500, pp. 620-621, citing Ramirez v. State Bar (1980) 28 Cal.3d 402; Hogan v. State Bar (1951) 36 Cal.2d 807; and Peters v. State Bar (1933) 219 Cal. 218.) Any further response by us to Kekoa's and his counsel's "demands" would accord the......
  • Rohan, In re
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • May 3, 1978
    ...... (26 U.S.C. § 7203.) We referred the matter to the State Bar for hearing and report as to whether the facts and circumstances surrounding commission of the offense involved moral turpitude or other ...State Bar (1975) 13 Cal.3d 253, 118 Cal.Rptr. 480, 530 P.2d 168; Moore v. State Bar (1964) 62 Cal.2d 74, 41 Cal.Rptr. 161, 396 P.2d 577; Hogan v. State Bar (1951) 36 Cal.2d 807, 228 P.2d 554; Christopher v. State Bar (1945) 26 Cal.2d 663, 161 P.2d 1.) This court possesses inherent powers to ......
  • Ramirez v. State Bar
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • November 10, 1980
    ...member attorneys for defamatory or disrespectful statements contained in pleadings or other court papers. (Hogan v. State Bar (1951) 36 Cal.2d 807, 810, 228 P.2d 554; In re Philbrook (1895) 105 Cal. 471, 477-478, 38 P. 511.) In Philbrook this court specifically rejected the argument that "o......
  • Crooks v. State Bar
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • October 29, 1970
    ...that the notice was not amended and that the board's finding did not follow the language of the notice. (Cf. Hogan v. State Bar, 36 Cal.2d 807, 811(5), 228 P.2d 554; Werner v. State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 611, 623--624, (9), 150 P.2d Petitioner's conversion of the remaining $790.30 was also a breac......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT