Hogan v. Stophlet

• Citation: 179 Ill. 150,53 N.E. 604
• Parties: HOGAN v. STOPHLET.
• Decision Date: 17 April 1899
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

179 Ill. 150

53 N.E. 604

HOGAN

v.STOPHLET.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 17, 1899.

Appeal from appellate court, Fourth district.

Action by Daniel Hogan against Loren D. Stophlet. From a judgment of the appellate court reversing a judgment for plaintiff (74 Ill. App. 631), he appeals. Affirmed.L. M. Bradley and Wall & Bristow, for appellant.

Lonsden & Leek, for appellee.

This is a suit originally brought by appellant against appellee before a justice of the peace of Pulaski county to recover a reward offered for the apprehension and conviction of a criminal. The justice of the peace rendered a judgment against appellee for $50 (the amount of the reward offered by him) and costs. Appellee appealed from this judgment to the circuit court of Pulaski county, and the venue was changed to the circuit court of Alexander county. In the latter court the case was tried before the court, by agreement, without a jury; resulting in judgment against appellee for $50 and costs. An appeal was taken from this judgment to the appellate court; and the latter court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, with a finding of facts, and refused to remand the case to the circuit court. The appellate court has granted a certificate of importance. The present appeal is from the judgment of the appellate court.

The facts are substantially as follows: On the night of January 6, 1896, the storehouse of appellee, in Mound City, was burned by an incendiary fire. On the next day appellee and several other citizens, including appellant, signed a paper publicly offering the amounts set opposite their respective names as a reward for the apprehension and conviction of the person who burned the building. In March or April, 1896, one Harry Howard, who then and at the time of the burning was, and ever since has been, a resident of Pulaski county, was arrested in said county by one Lafayette Collins, a deputy sheriff of said county, on a warrant issued by a justice of the peace of the county, sworn out by one Mrs. Newman, charging Howard with burglary and larceny in breaking and entering her storehouse, in said county. At the time the reward was offered and the arrest was made, and at the time of the conviction hereinafter mentioned, appellant was the sheriff of said Pulaski county, and Collins was his deputy. While Howard was in jail under the charge of burglary and larceny, he was indicted by the grand jury of Pulaski county for burning appellee's storehouse, and at the April term, 1896, of the circuit court of said county he was convicted of the crime of arson, and sentenced to the penitentiary therefor. After Howard was arrested and imprisoned in jail on the warrant charging him with burglary and larceny, appellant claims to have expended certain moneys for traveling expenses, and fees paid to witnesses to procure their attendance from the state of Missouri, for the purpose of indicting and convicting Howard of burning appellee's building.

The following is the finding of facts made by the appellate court, as embodied in their judgment: ‘On the night of January 6, 1896, appellant's store building at Mound City, Pulaski county, in this state, was feloniously set on fire and burned. The day following the fire, appellant publicly, and in writing, offered a reward of $50 for the apprehension and conviction of the person or persons who committed the offense. About two months thereafter, appellee, who was the sheriff of Pulaski county, through one of his deputies, arrested Harry Howard, in said county (and who resided there), for the offense; and at the April term, A. D. 1896, of the circuit court of said county, Howard was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced for the crime.’ In the statement of facts which precedes their opinion, the appellate court say: ‘The arrest was made under and by virtue of a warrant issued by a justice of the peace of Pulaski county, on the complaint of a Mrs. Newman, charging Howard with the crime of burglary and larceny, and Howard was committed to jail on this charge. The charge was mainly, if not entirely, for the purpose of holding Howard until the matter of the burning of appellant's store could be investigated.’ Upon the trial, appellant, when on the witness stand, was asked the following question, and made the following answer: ‘State whether or not you did anything towards the apprehension or the conviction of any one in pursuance of the offering of this award?’‘Yes, sir; after considerable effort on my part, I caused the arrest of this Harry Howard.’

On the trial, defendant requested the court to hold the following proposition as the law of the case: ‘The defendant requests the court to hold the law of this case to be, under the evidence in this case, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and the finding should be for the defendant.’ But the court refused to so hold, and the defendant took an exception.

MAGRUDER, J. (after stating the facts).

The submission by the defendant to the trial court, to be marked ‘Held’ or ‘Refused,’ of the proposition that the finding in this case should be for the defendant, was in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, and preserved for the court of review the question of law, whether the evidence tended to show a right to recover. First Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 152 Ill. 296, 38 N. E. 739;Smith v. Billings, 169 Ill. 294, 48 N. E. 683.

The appellate court has found in its finding of facts, as embodied in its judgment, that the Harry Howard who was arrested was so arrested for the offense of setting on fire and burning the store building of appellee, and for the apprehension and conviction of the party committing this offense the reward was offered. The finding for facts thus made by the appellate court is binding upon this court; and whether the appellate court found the facts correctly, or not, cannot be considered on appeal in this court. Hawk v. Railroad Co., 147 Ill. 399, 35 N. E. 139;Everts v. Lawther, 165 Ill. 487, 46 N. E. 233. We deem it immaterial, however, whether Howard was originally arrested by the appellant and imprisoned upon a charge of burglary and larceny, or whether he was arrested for the burning of appellee's store building, so far as the determination of the questions involved in this case is concerned. The reward was offered for the apprehension and conviction of the person or persons who burned or caused the building to be burned. It thus appears that the reward was offered, not for the conviction alone, but for the apprehension and conviction of the guilty party. Appellant is entitled to recover for both, or he cannot recover at all. The reward cannot be apportioned; that is to say, there can be no apportionment of it between what is due for the apprehension and what is due for the conviction. The offer must be enforced as an entirety, or not at all. In Pool v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 219, it was said: ‘The principal object of the reward offered was to obtain in detection of the offender. The conviction was required, to ascertain who was the offender. But, to entitle the plaintiff to the reward, he must show that he is so entitled, as well for the detection as for the conviction of the offender. The reward cannot be apportioned.’ Jones v. Bank, 8 N. Y. 228;Blain v. Express Co., 69 Tex. 74, 6 S. W. 679; Furman v. Parke, 21 N. J. Law, 310. The word ‘arrest’ has been defined as ‘the apprehension or detaining of the person in order to be forthcoming to answer to an alleged or suspected crime. The word ‘arrest’ is more properly used in civil cases, and ‘apprehension’ in criminal.' Montgomery Co. v. Robinson, 85 Ill. 174. Black, in his Law Dictionary, defines the word ‘apprehension’ as follows: ‘The seizure, taking, or arresting of a person on a criminal charge. The term ‘apprehension’ is applied exclusively to criminal cases, and ‘arrest’ to both civil and criminal cases.' If, therefore, the fact that Howard was arrested upon a charge of burglary and larceny should be held to negative the idea that he was arrested upon a charge of burning the building, then appellant did not secure the apprehension of the guilty party; and in such case he would not be entitled to the reward, as the reward was offered both for the apprehension and the conviction. If, however, the appellant is to be regarded as having secured the apprehension of Howard for the offense of burning the building, in that case, also, he would not be entitled to the reward, for the reasons hereinafter stated.

The appellant was the sheriff of Pulaski county. The arrest of Howard was made in Pulaski county, and for a felony committed by Howard in that county; Howard also being a resident of that county. It was, therefore, appellant's duty to make the arrest. That such was his duty will appear by reference to sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of division 6, and sections 3 and 6 of divison 7, of the Criminal Code, and sections 15, 16, 17, and 18 of chapter 125 of the Revised Statutes, in regard to sheriffs. 1 Starr & C. Ann. St. (2d Ed.) pp. 1374-1377; 3 Starr & C. Ann. St. (2d Ed.) p. 3769. In addition to this, section 211 of division 1 of the Criminal Code provides that ‘if any judge, justice of the peace, sheriff, coroner, constable, police officer, clerk or other officer, state, county, town or municipal, executive, ministerial or judicial, shall willfully or corruptly receive or take any fee or reward to execute or do his duty as such officer, except such as is or shall be allowed by law, or if any such officer shall willfully or corruptly ask or demand as a condition precedent to the performance of his duty as such officer any fee or reward, except such as shall be allowed by law, evey such officer so offending shall be fined not exceeding $200, and may be removed from office.’ Section 213 of division 1 provides that ‘if any officer authorized by law to charge or receive fees, salary or pay, shall charge, claim, demand or take any greater fee, salary, or pay, than...