People v. Q.P. (In re Q.P.)

• Decision Date: 24 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 118569.,118569.
• Citation: 40 N.E.3d 9
• Parties: In re Q.P., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Q.P., Appellee).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

40 N.E.3d 9

In re Q.P., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v. Q.P., Appellee).

No. 118569.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 24, 2015.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Jerry Brady, State's Attorney, Peoria (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Lindsay Beyer Payne, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Terry A. Mertel and Laura E. DeMichael, of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona, Deputy Defender, and Mark D. Fisher, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice KILBRIDE

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The minor, Q.P., was found guilty of obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31–4(a)

(West 2012)), for knowingly furnishing false information to a police officer with the intent to prevent his own apprehension. The appellate court reversed the circuit court's judgment, holding that Q.P. was already apprehended when he gave the false information, and a person already apprehended cannot act with the intent to prevent his apprehension as required to sustain the charge of obstructing justice. 2014 IL App (3d) 140436, 386 Ill.Dec. 354, 20 N.E.3d 516. For the following reasons, we reverse the appellate court's judgment.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The State filed a juvenile delinquency petition in the circuit court of Peoria County charging Q.P. with obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31–4(a)

(West 2012)). The State alleged Q.P. knowingly furnished false information to a police officer with the intent to prevent his apprehension.

¶ 4 At the bench trial, police officer Jonathan Irving testified that he responded to a report of a vehicle burglary in progress. When he arrived at the scene, he observed a person matching the description given in the report. The person was later identified as Q.P. Officer Irving stopped Q.P., handcuffed him, patted him down, and placed him in the backseat of the squad car.

¶ 5 When Officer Irving asked Q.P. his name and date of birth, Q.P. replied his name was Antwan A. Ellis and his date of birth was September 22, 1997. Q.P. stated he was living with his mother and offered to direct Officer Irving to his residence. After they arrived, Irving went to the front door and spoke to a woman named Patricia. Patricia stated she did not know anyone named Antwan. They approached the squad car and Irving shined his flashlight on Q.P.'s face. Patricia stated she had dated Q.P.'s father and she knew him as “Q* * * P* * *.”

¶ 6 Officer Irving returned to the squad car and informed Q.P. that he knew he had given a false name. Q.P. then gave his correct name and stated his date of birth was August 30, 1997, but he misspelled both his first and last names. Officer Irving transported Q.P. to the police station and discovered from reports that Q.P. was a runaway from Quincy, Illinois. Irving also learned the correct spelling of Q.P.'s name. Q.P. admitted he had misspelled his name to prevent Officer Irving from locating the juvenile warrant for his arrest. Q.P. later told a police detective that he gave the false name because he knew there was a warrant for his arrest. The circuit court found Q.P. guilty of obstructing justice and committed him to the Department of Juvenile Justice for an indeterminate term not to exceed three years or until his twenty-first birthday.

¶ 7 On appeal, Q.P. argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove he intended to prevent his apprehension by giving the false statements because he was already apprehended when he gave those statements. The appellate court construed the term “apprehension” in the obstruction of justice statute as the equivalent of a seizure and concluded that Q.P. was apprehended when he was handcuffed and placed in the backseat of the squad car. 2014 IL App (3d) 140436, ¶¶ 20, 21, 386 Ill.Dec. 354, 20 N.E.3d 516

. The appellate court held that “a person already apprehended cannot act with the intent to prevent his own apprehension on other charges. The plain meaning of ‘apprehension’ or ‘seizure’ warrants this outcome: one who is presently seized by the police cannot be seized again.” 2014 IL App (3d) 140436, ¶ 26, 386 Ill.Dec. 354, 20 N.E.3d 516. The appellate court, therefore, reversed the circuit court's judgment, concluding that Q.P. could not have had the intent to prevent his apprehension because he was already apprehended when he gave the false name and date of birth. 2014 IL App (3d) 140436, ¶¶ 28, 30, 386 Ill.Dec. 354, 20 N.E.3d 516.

¶ 8 Justice Holdridge dissented, asserting that “apprehension” is by definition connected to a particular criminal charge or offense. 2014 IL App (3d) 140436, ¶ 33, 386 Ill.Dec. 354, 20 N.E.3d 516

(Holdridge, J., dissenting). Accordingly, a defendant, as here, may act to evade apprehension on one criminal charge after being apprehended on a different charge. 2014 IL App (3d) 140436, ¶¶ 33, 34, 386 Ill.Dec. 354, 20 N.E.3d 516 (Holdridge, J., dissenting). Justice Holdridge concluded that the circuit court did not err in finding that Q.P. acted with the intent to prevent his apprehension on the juvenile warrant after being seized on suspicion of committing the vehicle burglary. 2014 IL App (3d) 140436, ¶ 36, 386 Ill.Dec. 354, 20 N.E.3d 516 (Holdridge, J., dissenting).

¶ 9 We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315

(eff. May 1, 2013).

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 On appeal to this court, the State contends that “apprehension” has been defined consistently as the seizure or arrest of a person on a particular criminal charge. An “apprehension” is, therefore, necessarily tied to a specific crime or charge, and a defendant may act to evade apprehension on a criminal charge even after being apprehended on a different or unrelated charge. The State concludes that the circuit court did not err in finding Q.P. guilty of obstructing justice because he admitted he provided a false name with the intent to prevent his apprehension on the outstanding warrant.

¶ 12 Q.P. responds that the term “apprehension” includes arrests and seizures short of arrests, and he was certainly apprehended within the plain meaning of that term when he was handcuffed and placed in the backseat of the squad car. Q.P. maintains that he could not have intended to prevent his own apprehension by giving the false name and date of birth when he was already apprehended at that time.

¶ 13 This appeal turns on the construction of the term “apprehension” in the obstructing justice statute. That statute provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) A person obstructs justice when, with intent to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution or defense of any person, he or she knowingly commits any of the following acts:

(1) Destroys, alters, conceals or disguises physical evidence, plants false evidence, [or] furnishes false information[.]” 720 ILCS 5/31–4(a)(1)

(West 2012).

¶ 14 In construing a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512, ¶ 29, 388 Ill.Dec. 909, 25 N.E.3d 601

. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Easley, 2014 IL 115581, ¶ 16, 379 Ill.Dec. 829, 7 N.E.3d 667. A penal statute will be construed to afford lenity to the accused, but that rule applies only if the statute is ambiguous. People ex rel. Birkett v. Jorgensen, 216 Ill.2d 358, 363, 297 Ill.Dec. 289, 837 N.E.2d 69 (2005). When terms used in a statute are retained by the legislature without any change after they have acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction, we will presume that the legislature has acquiesced to the judicial construction of the terms. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512, ¶ 30, 388 Ill.Dec. 909, 25 N.E.3d 601. We review questions of statutory construction de novo.

People v. Perez, 2014 IL 115927, ¶ 9, 385 Ill.Dec. 41, 18 N.E.3d 41.

¶ 15 The term “apprehension” has been defined previously by this court and our appellate court. In Hogan v. Stophlet, 179 Ill. 150, 153, 53 N.E. 604 (1899)

, this court construed the term as being tied to a specific crime or charge. In that case, a reward was offered for the apprehension and conviction of the person who burned a store building. The person responsible for the crime was arrested, but a question arose about whether he was arrested on unrelated charges of burglary and larceny or for burning the store building. Hogan, 179 Ill. at 153–54, 53 N.E. 604. This court stated in pertinent part:

“Black, in his Law Dictionary, defines the word ‘apprehension’ as follows: ‘The seizure, taking or arresting of a person on a criminal charge. The term “apprehension” is applied exclusively to criminal cases, and “arrest” to both civil and criminal cases.’

If, therefore, the fact, that [the suspect] was arrested upon a charge of burglary and larceny, should be held to negative the idea that he was arrested upon a charge of burning the building, then appellant did not secure the apprehension of the guilty party; and, in such case, he would not be entitled to the reward, as the reward was offered both for the apprehension and the conviction.” Hogan, 179 Ill. at 154, 53 N.E. 604

.

¶ 16 Accordingly, this court adopted a definition of the term “apprehension” requiring the seizure, taking, or arrest to be connected to specific criminal charges. Under this court's reasoning in Hogan, the “ apprehension” was not viewed as applicable to all outstanding charges against the suspect. Rather, it was tied to particular charges and the apprehension of the suspect on specific criminal charges “negative[d] the idea” that he was apprehended on a separate, unrelated charge. Hogan, 179 Ill. at 154, 53 N.E. 604

.

¶ 17 In construing the obstruction of justice statute, our appellate court subsequently adopted the same definition of...