Hogan v. Twin City Amusement Trust Estate

• Decision Date: 13 April 1923
• Docket Number: No. 23294.,23294.
• Citation: 155 Minn. 199,193 N.W. 122
• Parties: HOGAN v. TWIN CITY AMUSEMENT TRUST ESTATE et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

155 Minn. 199

193 N.W. 122

HOGAN

v.TWIN CITY AMUSEMENT TRUST ESTATE et al.

No. 23294.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 13, 1923.

Certiorari to Industrial Commission.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Grace Hogan, opposed by the Twin City Amusement Trust Estate, employer, and the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, insurer. From an order of the Industrial Commission denying compensation, claimant brings certiorari. Remanded.

Syllabus by the Court

An aggravation of an existing infirmity by an accident occurring in the course of employment, is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Gen. St. 1913, §§ 8195-8230).

The testimony in this case was in conflict on the question whether an injury received aggravated a dormant ailment. The determination of issues of fact is for the Industrial Commission.

Where the Commission applies an erroneous rule of law in the determination of this issue, the case may be remanded for a new hearing. The law requires that claimant's case be proven by only a preponderance of evidence. A rule followed by the Commission that it must be proven by clear and satisfactory evidence that will leave no doubt in the minds of the triers of fact is erroneous, since it imposes a greater burden than proof by mere preponderance of evidence. Drill & Drill, of St. Paul, for appellant.

Sexton, Mordaunt & Kennedy, of St. Paul, for respondent.

HALLAM, J.

On December 7, 1921, plaintiff was employed by defendant Twin City Amusement Trust Estate as a musician at its theater. While carrying a bundle of music rolls down a stairway on defendant's premises early one evening, she fell and sustained injuries. She worked the remainder of the evening and next day. The second day she laid off. Next day she worked. For the remainder of the month, she laid off from time to time, an aggregate of several days. On January 1st she consulted a physician. He found her suffering from inflammation of the Fallopian tubes, an inflammation of the right ovary, and one small fibroid tumor. After treating her for some days, the doctor removed both Fallopian tubes, the ovary, and the tumor. Plaintiff was disabled for nine weeks. She made claim for compensation which the referee allowed. On appeal, the Industrial Commission reversed the award of the referee and denied compensation. Plaintiff brings certiorari to review the action of the Commission.

1. It is not contended that any of plaintiff's ailments had their inception in the fall she sustained. It is not claimed that the tumor or the ailment of the ovary was in any manner affected by the fall. The claim is that the diseased condition of the Fallopian tubes was dormant, and that it was aggravated by the fall, and recovery is asked on the well-known principle, that ‘an actual aggravation of an existing infirmity by an accident occurring in the course of employment is compensable,’ even though the accident would have caused no injury to a perfectly normal person. See State ex rel. Jefferson v. District Court, 138 Minn. 334, 164 N. W. 1012. See Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034,16 L. R. A. 203. The Commission found that plaintiff's existing infirmity was not aggravated by the fall and the question before us is whether this finding can be sustained.

[2] 2. A careful examination of the evidence convinces us that it was ample to sustain a finding for plaintiff.

Plaintiff testified that she was never conscious of her ailment prior to the accident. Dr. Howard was her attending physician. He testified that the condition in which he found plaintiff could not result entirely from the accident, ‘but an injury can aggravate it.’ Asked whether he had an opinion as to whether or not there was any connection between the conditions which he found and the injury, he replied that he had. Then followed this:

‘Q. Will you express your opinion? A. My opinion is that such an accident might aggravate and cause an acute outbreak of a chronic dormant condition.

‘Q. That is your opinion in this case? A. Yes, sir.’

If this testimony is ambiguous, the following is not:

In answer to a question by the referee, he said:

‘I think it is reasonable to believe, in view of the fact that she had not laid off previously, that she had never had any trouble up to the time of the injury; it is entirely reasonable to believe, and it is my opinion that undoubtedly the fall had something to do with her disability-the fall brought it on to this acute stage or aggravated it. I have no way of knowing how long this process had been going on, but it seems reasonable to believe this, assuming she had always been well and suddenly having this fall she began to have trouble which got worse until the operation was performed.’

Asked by defendant's counsel, ‘Is it also reasonable to believe, in view of the conditions you found there,...