Hogan v. Twin City Amusement Trust Estate
Decision Date | 13 April 1923 |
Docket Number | 23,294 |
Citation | 193 N.W. 122,155 Minn. 199 |
Parties | GRACE HOGAN, EMPLOYE v. TWIN CITY AMUSEMENT TRUST ESTATE, EMPLOYER, AND HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, INSURER |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Upon the relation of Grace Hogan the supreme court granted its writ of certiorari directed to the Industrial Commission of Minnesota to review the action of the commission reversing the award of the referee in proceedings brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act by relator, employe, against Twin City Amusement Trust Estate, employer, and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, Insurer. Remanded for a new hearing.
Aggravation of existing infirmity compensable under compensation act.
1. An aggravation of an existing infirmity, by an accident occurring in the course of employment, is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Testimony being in conflict, decision of question of fact for the Industrial Commission.
2. The testimony in this case was in conflict on the question whether an injury received aggravated a dormant ailment. The determination of issues of fact is for the Industrial Commission.
Case may be remanded for new hearing when commission follows erroneous rule of law.
3. Where the commission applies an erroneous rule of law in the determination of this issue, the case may be remanded for a new hearing. The law requires that claimant's case be proven by only a preponderance of evidence. A rule followed by the commission that it must be proven by clear and satisfactory evidence that will leave no doubt in the minds of the triers of fact, is erroneous, since it imposes a greater burden than proof by mere preponderance of evidence.
Drill & Drill, for appellant.
Sexton Mordaunt & Kennedy, for respondents.
On December 7, 1921, plaintiff was employed by defendant Twin City Amusement Trust Estate as a musician at its theatre. While carrying a bundle of music rolls down a stairway on defendant's premises early one evening, she fell and sustained injuries. She worked the remainder of the evening and next day. The second day she laid off. Next day she worked. For the remainder of the month, she laid off from time to time, an aggregate of several days. On January 1 she consulted a physician. He found her suffering from inflammation of the Fallopian tubes, an inflammation of the right ovary and one small fibroid tumor. After treating her for some days, the doctor removed both Fallopian tubes, the ovary and the tumor. Plaintiff was disabled for nine weeks. She made claim for compensation which the referee allowed. On appeal, the Industrial Commission reversed the award of the referee and denied compensation. Plaintiff brings certiorari to review the action of the commission.
1. It is not contended that any of plaintiff's ailments had their inception in the fall she sustained. It is not claimed that the tumor or the ailment of the ovary was in any manner affected by the fall. The claim is that the diseased condition of the Fallopian tubes was dormant, and that it was aggravated by the fall, and recovery is asked on the well-known principle, that "an actual aggravation of an existing infirmity by an accident occurring in the course of employment is compensable," even though the accident would have caused no injury to a perfectly normal person. See State ex rel. Jefferson v. District Court, 138 Minn. 334, 164 N.W. 1012. See Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034, 16 L.R.A. 203. The commission found that plaintiff's existing infirmity was not aggravated by the fall and the question before us is whether this finding can be sustained.
2. A careful examination of the evidence convinces us that it was ample to sustain a finding for plaintiff.
Plaintiff testified that she was never conscious of her ailment prior to the accident. Dr. Howard was her attending physician. He testified that the condition in which he found plaintiff could not result entirely from the accident, "but an injury can aggravate it." Asked whether he had an opinion as to whether or not there was any connection between the conditions which he found and the injury, he replied that he had. Then followed this:
If this testimony is ambiguous, the following is not: In answer to a question by the referee, he said: ...
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