Hoglund v. Meeks
| Decision Date | 24 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 34992-2-II.,34992-2-II. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | John A. HOGLUND, individually and as owner and agent of John A. Hoglund, P.S., Respondent, v. Steven MEEKS, Jay Goldstein and Sherrelle Willingham; Goldstein Law Office, Appellants. |
Steven Meeks, Olympia, WA, pro se.
John Michael Morgan, J. Michael Morgan PLLC, Olympia, WA, for Appellants.
Michael Wayne Johns, Davis Roberts & Johns PLLC, Gig Harbor, WA, for Respondent.
PUBLISHED IN PART OPINION
¶ 1 This case involves breach of a fee-sharing contract among attorneys who at various times served as a plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury lawsuit otherwise unrelated to this appeal. Defendants Steven Meeks, Jay Goldstein, and Sherelle Willingham appeal the trial court's liquidated damages award and bench trial finding that they breached their contract with Plaintiff John Hoglund in failing to share the contingent attorney fee when their mutual client settled, with the insurance company. Defendants argue that (1) Willingham did not have apparent authority to contract on behalf of their law firm, the Goldstein Law Office, where she worked as an attorney; (2) there was no agreement between Hoglund and Willingham forming the basis of a contract to share the contingent attorney fee for the personal injury client; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the personal injury client's settlement; (4) the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest; and (5) Willingham did not receive proper service. In addition, Defendant Meeks individually argues that even if there was a valid contract between Willingham and Hoglund, there was not substantial evidence of a contract between him (Meeks) and Hoglund.
¶ 2 Holding that Willingham had apparent authority to enter into a fee-sharing contract with Hoglund, we affirm.
¶ 3 Following an automobile accident in June 2000, in which he was injured, Robert Bostwick entered into a contingent fee agreement with Olympia attorney F. Daniel Graf. Graf agreed to represent Bostwick in his personal injury case with the understanding that Graf could associate outside counsel to assist in Bostwick's representation. Their fee agreement provided for a one-third contingent attorney fee on any recovery from the litigation. Paragraph 10 of the fee agreement stated that an attorney withdrawing from Bostwick's representation would receive no fee.
¶ 4 Sherelle Willingham, an associate attorney at Graf's law firm, was the primary contact and lead attorney for Bostwick. In June 2001, Graf entered into an association of counsel agreement with attorney John Hoglund. Under the agreement, Hoglund was the lead attorney; he undertook the primary representation of Bostwick and, in return, he was entitled to 80 percent of the contingent fee if he recovered damages for Bostwick. Once Hoglund obtained Bostwick's file, Willingham's involvement was "limited to periodic, regular conferences" with Hoglund's paralegal. Hoglund and Willingham had very limited contact concerning the Bostwick litigation.
¶ 5 Between June 2001 and July 2003, Hoglund provided most of the legal assistance on Bostwick's case. Hoglund filed the complaint, engaged in discovery, and retained expert witnesses. He also attended a mediation with Bostwick and the tortfeasor's insurance company and procured and rejected a $150,000 settlement offer as too low, telling Bostwick that the offer would increase once the insurance company had an opportunity to evaluate the claim fully.
¶ 6 While Hoglund was working on Bostwick's case, in July 2001, Willingham left the Graf law firm to work part-time at the Goldstein Law Office. Graf allowed Willingham to take her personal injury cases to Goldstein, one of which was Bostwick's case.
¶ 7 At the Goldstein firm, Willingham handled several cases that had originated with the Graf firm and contained a fee arrangement with Hoglund similar to their fee agreement in the Bostwick litigation. When Hoglund settled or resolved a case that had originated at the Graf law firm, he would send a portion of the attorney's fee to Willingham at the Goldstein Law Office. Willingham would then, in turn, forward a portion of this check to Graf. This relationship continued for two years with no problems. Hoglund and Willingham split fees on cases without a written agreement.
¶ 8 In September 2003, Hoglund downsized his practice, associated with another law firm,1 and explained to Bostwick that he wanted to bring in another lawyer from his new firm to assist with the litigation. Bostwick refused and asked Hoglund to bring Willingham back into the litigation and to transfer his file to her.
¶ 9 Graf was disbarred. For this reason, on September 26, Willingham sent a letter from the Goldstein Law Offices to Bostwick explaining that they needed to terminate their legal services agreement with Graf and to enter into a new agreement with the Goldstein firm and a new association of counsel agreement with Hoglund. Hoglund received a copy of this letter.
¶ 10 On September 29, Hoglund told Willingham that he no longer wished to be the lead trial attorney for the Bostwick litigation but he would continue to handle strategy issues and to assist in managing the file. Willingham told Hoglund she wanted him to remain on the case and that she had reservations about taking over as the lead trial attorney herself.
¶ 11 Hoglund and Willingham discussed the future fee arrangement for the Bostwick litigation. Hoglund suggested that he receive: 80 percent of the contingent fee on the first $150,000 of recovery, because he had already negotiated a settlement offer in that amount for Bostwick; 50 percent of any additional contingent fee if the case settled at a future mediation; and 10 percent of any additional contingent fee if the case went to trial. Not reaching a definitive agreement on the exact breakdown of the fee split, they decided to revisit the issue. Hoglund knew, however, that Willingham needed the Goldstein firm's assent before any agreement on future fees became final.
¶ 12 Hoglund continued to work on the Bostwick litigation. He revised and finalized interrogatory answers, met with the case's expert physician, and advanced the associated expenses.
¶ 13 By early October, Willingham confirmed that she had filed a co-counsel association document in the Bostwick litigation. She told Hoglund that she was finalizing a draft association agreement with the Goldstein firm for him to sign. Hoglund turned over all of his work product to Willingham, including his correspondence and notes, interrogatory answers, analysis of previous medical care, analysis of medical diagnoses, evaluation of the case's weaknesses and strengths, trial preparation, and a "complete mediation preparation and presentation materials." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1116-17. The record does not show whether Willingham ever finalized the Goldstein association agreement for Hoglund to sign.
¶ 14 Uncomfortable acting as Bostwick's lead trial attorney, Willingham contacted Steven Meeks, who leased office space from the Goldstein firm. Meeks agreed to substitute for Hoglund as lead counsel in the Bostwick litigation. Bostwick agreed to Meeks' serving as the lead trial attorney. Meeks never entered into a written fee agreement with Goldstein, Willingham, or Bostwick.
¶ 15 Hoglund, Willingham, and Meeks arranged to meet to discuss the Bostwick litigation on December 2 and 17. The parties did not reach an agreement on Hoglund's future role in the litigation or Hoglund's final compensation.
¶ 16 Hoglund still believed he was assisting with Bostwick's case by working on the medical issues, trial strategy, and preparing for the second mediation. He was willing to attend depositions, but he did not want to be involved in the actual trial. At this point, neither Meeks nor Willingham had performed any significant work on the case, and neither expressly told Hoglund that they no longer wished for him to be involved in the case. Although Meeks was convinced that Hoglund would no longer be useful if he was unwilling to appear in court at trial, Meeks did not tell Hoglund that Meeks saw no role for Hoglund in the Bostwick litigation or that Meeks did not believe Hoglund was entitled to any portion of the contingent fee.
¶ 17 January 2004 passed with no contact among the attorneys. On February 4, 2004, Willingham informed Hoglund that it was too early to discuss his final fee but that she was still working on the agreement. Later in the month, Willingham informed Hoglund that Meeks agreed with Hoglund's assessment of the case and that Willingham and Meeks would attempt another mediation.
¶ 18 At the end of February, Hoglund received a phone call from Defendant attorneys informing him that they wished to organize another mediation for the Bostwick litigation. Hoglund referred the call to Willingham. In March, Willingham sent Hoglund an order substituting Meeks as counsel of record for Bostwick. No explanation accompanied the substitution of counsel order. Hoglund, however, assumed that the substitution order was necessary for Meeks and Willingham to take over his (Hoglund's) role as the primary lead attorney in the mediation while Hoglund's role diminished, but did not disappear.
¶ 19 Willingham and Meeks prepared for the second Bostwick mediation by producing a detailed medical history to refute any defense claims of a pre-existing injury and lack of causation. Neither Meeks nor Willingham supplemented Hoglund's previous submissions with any additional...
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