Hogue v. Sparks

• Decision Date: 22 November 1920
• Docket Number: 2
• Citation: 225 S.W. 291,146 Ark. 174
• Parties: HOGUE v. SPARKS
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

225 S.W. 291

146 Ark. 174

HOGUE v. SPARKS

No. 2

Supreme Court of Arkansas

November 22, 1920

Appeal from Garland Circuit Court; Scott Wood, Judge; reversed.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

Robert D. Lee, for appellant.

1. The court erred in sustaining the demurrer. According to the allegations of the complaint, the clients of appellant were under a duty to permit him to collect their judgment in order that he might receive one-half of the proceeds thereof, and appellee with knowledge of the fact did maliciously unlawfully and fraudulently cause, induce and procure appellant's clients to break their contract in order that he might control the litigation and render appellant's efforts to collect the judgment futile and deprived him of his right to collect his half of the judgment. 76 Kan. 49 58-9; 90 N.Y. 208-12; 27 Ill. 149-51; 8 S.C. 100; 152 N.Y 166. The demurrer admits the allegations of the complaint and they stated a good cause of action against appellee.

2. One who interferes between two contracting parties and causes one of them to breach a contract is guilty of a tort and liable in damages. 86 Ark. 130; 64 Id. 221; 151 U.S. 1, 14, 15; 70 N.C. 601; 76 Id. 355; 119 Ark. 508; 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 746-754; 66 Ark. 190; 38 Id. 385; 13 Id. 193; 11 Id. 736.

C. Floyd Huff, for appellee.

In view of the facts that the claim for damages was problematical and wholly dependent upon the success of the suit in chancery to set aside the conveyances by Mrs. Horner of real estate in no wise involved in this litigation and that appellant could not have sustained any damages, occasioned by the compromise of the suit by appellant here by the Rushings prior to the termination of that action, it follows that appellant could not have established any damages sustained by him in the action by the Rushings, for the reason that unless appellant would have been successful in chancery suit in setting aside the conveyances involved and subjecting the property to the payment of the judgment against Mrs. Horner, and that the judgment would have been realized in full we are unable to see how appellant could establish damages in one-half the amount of the judgment.

In view of the assignment to Rix, appellant had no personal or pecuniary interest whatever in the judgment against Mrs. Horner. This opinion was shared by appellant at the time he brought the chancery suit, as he did not make himself a party thereto, although a long time prior thereto he had by record established his ownership of a one-half interest in the judgment. The cases cited by appellant do not apply. It is nowhere alleged that Sudie A. Horner is insolvent, and, if appellant is the owner of a one-half interest in the judgment against Mrs. Horner, the courts are open to him to enforce his remedy against Mrs. Horner.

Appellee, having been sued by the Rushings and called upon to defend his title to real estate, purchased from Mrs. Horner long before any judgment lien existed against Mrs. Horner, and knowing, as the complaint alleges, that the Rushings had but one-half interest in said judgment, and that no act of the Rushings could in any wise affect the interests of appellant in that part of the judgment he had recovered for his clients, and which by appellant's own act had been segregated and set apart from the interests of his clients. Appellee was wholly within his rights in settling the litigation by the purchase from the Rushings of the basis or subject-matter of the suit, and his act in so doing did not prevent appellant from enforcing any rights he may have had. The act of appellant himself in establishing in the chancery court his ownership of one-half of the judgment and decree he had obtained for his clients and the sale and transfer of that interest terminated the relation of attorney and client between him and his clients. The judgment for rents and profits had been recovered; the conveyance had been set aside and title vested in appellant's clients, and there was nothing further to be done, and there was no error in sustaining the demurrer as the relation of attorney and client had terminated, and the ownership of a one-half interest duly assigned to Rix.

OPINION

WOOD, J.

The appellant filed in the Garland Circuit Court the following complaint:

"Comes the plaintiff, James E. Hogue, and states that he is, and that on and before and at all times since the 13th day of December, 1917 has been, a regularly licensed attorney at law, and was and is actively engaged in the practice.

"That on the 13th day of December, 1917, the plaintiff obtained a judgment in the chancery court of Garland County, in the State of Arkansas, against Sudie A. Horner, and in favor of Taylor Rushing, and James Rushing for five thousand nine hundred fifty-four dollars and ninety-two cents.

"That the plaintiff obtained said judgment while acting as an attorney for the said Taylor Rushing and James Rushing, under a contract of employment with his said clients by the terms of which contract the plaintiff was to have and receive one-half of any and all sums which might be collected on said judgment as a compensation for his services in securing said judgment and in the collection thereof.

"That, acting under his contract of employment with his clients, the said Taylor Rushing and James Rushing, and with their knowledge, consent, and approval, the plaintiff on the 6th day of January, 1919, brought a suit in the chancery court of Garland County, against the said Sudie A. Horner and others and against the defendant, Charles C. Sparks, and the Hot Springs Savings, Trust & Guaranty Company, for the purpose of setting aside certain conveyances of valuable property which had been made to the defendant, Charles C. Sparks, by the said Sudie A. Horner, and for the purpose of setting aside certain mortgages and deeds of trust to other valuable property which the said Sudie A. Horner had made to the Hot Springs Savings, Trust & Guaranty Company.

"That the defendant, Charles C. Sparks, is an attorney at law, and at that time was, and now is, a stockholder and officer in the Hot Springs Savings, Trust & Guaranty Company, which is a corporation, and that said corporation then was and now is engaged in the business of lending money as a bank and trust company.

"That the defendant, Charles C. Sparks, in addition to being a stockholder and officer in said corporation, is also an attorney for same, and that he appeared as the attorney for said corporation in said suit.

"That in his complaint the plaintiff herein, acting for his said clients, alleged that the property conveyed to the defendant, Charles C. Sparks, and the property mortgaged to the said Hot Springs Savings, Trust & Guaranty Company by the said Sudie A. Horner, was subject to the payment of his clients' judgment for the reason that said lands belonged to the estate of John J. Horner, deceased, at the time of his death, and that the demand upon which said judgment had been rendered constituted a lawful demand against the estate of the said John J. Horner, deceased.

"That the purpose of said suit was to subject said property to the payment of his said clients, and under his contract of employment it was the right and duty of the plaintiff to prosecute said suit to judgment and to a final and successful termination, and to collect said judgment and to receive one-half of the proceeds therefrom for his own use and benefit, and that the reciprocal duty of his clients, Taylor Rushing and James Rushing, was to permit him to do so without let or hindrance.

"That on or some time before the 13th day of May, 1919, the defendant, Charles C. Sparks, while said suit was still pending and with full knowledge of the plaintiff's interest in said judgment and of his rights and duties as herein stated, maliciously and with a design and intent to oppress, annoy, and harass the plaintiff and...