Hoheimer v. Hoheimer
| Citation | 30 S.W.3d 176 |
| Decision Date | 26 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 1999-SC-0329-DG.,1999-SC-0329-DG. |
| Parties | Sue Ellen HOHEIMER, Appellant, v. Kenneth R. HOHEIMER, individually and as Executor of the Estate of Penelope Ann Hoheimer, deceased, Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky) |
Harry Mathison, King, Deep and Branaman, Henderson, for Appellant.
Stephen M. Arnett, Ruark, Hulette Arnett, Morganfield, for Appellee.
This appeal is from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming a judgment by the circuit court which denied a partition of real estate.
The questions presented are whether extrinsic evidence can be used to vary the terms of an unambiguous deed; whether a resulting trust can be implied from a voluntary conveyance in the absence of an expression of intent and whether the finding by the trial court was clearly erroneous.
This matter involves a family dispute between a daughter and her parents over the ownership of a farm known as "The McCoughtery Farm ." The daughter, who was 47 years of age at the time of trial, is the only child of the elder Hoheimers. Through a series of deeds, beginning on December 28, 1976, the Hoheimers conveyed various interests in the farm to their daughter for no consideration other than "love and affection." All the deeds were prepared by an attorney for the parents. The parents testified that the deeds were prepared for the purpose of reducing the amount of estate or inheritance taxes that could be payable at death. The deeds conveyed an undivided fee interest without reservation; there is no language in any of the instruments reserving a life estate or otherwise limiting the conveyance to a remainder interest.
Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, the daughter and the parents engaged in a farming operation pursuant to which they equally divided the net income generated by the farm. As a result of the execution of the deeds, the daughter accumulated a 77.3 percent ownership interest in the farm, leaving the parents with the remaining 22.7 percent interest. The parents did not discuss the deeds with the daughter except to tell her that the first instrument had been executed and placed of record. There was no discussion of the deeds with the daughter before their execution and the parents indicated that the daughter did nothing to induce them to execute any of the deeds.
The relationship of the parties deteriorated sometime in 1989 as a result of the living arrangements of the daughter which displeased the parents. In 1995, the parents sought an informal division of the property, but an agreement was not reached. The daughter then instituted a partition action against her parents. The trial judge permitted extrinsic evidence as to the intentions of the parties concerning the transfer. He found that the parents never intended to give up control of the farm and that the daughter never expected to receive control or ownership of the farm until the death of her parents. The circuit judge concluded that a constructive or resulting trust was created by the conveyance to the daughter. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court but rejected the constructive trust theory and instead held that a resulting trust was created. This appeal followed.
During the pendency of the appeal, Penelope Ann Hoheimer, the mother, died. Kenneth R. Hoheimer, her husband, has been named executor of her estate and has been substituted as a party pursuant to CR 76.24(a).
The trial judge was clearly erroneous in admitting extrinsic evidence to vary the terms of a series of unambiguous deeds of conveyance. An examination of the deeds in question does not indicate any intent other than to convey a fee simple interest. There is nothing in any of the deeds that could be considered ambiguous. Extrinsic evidence cannot be admitted to vary the terms of a written instrument in the absence of an ambiguous deed. Sword v. Sword, Ky., 252 S.W.2d 869 (1952). Thus, it was improper for the trial judge to consider any evidence to vary the clear language of the deeds.
There is no language in the deeds indicating the reservation of a life estate. Clearly, there is nothing in any of the deeds to suggest any intention other than the conveyance of a fee simple interest. The intention of parties to a written instrument must be gathered from the four corners of that instrument. Cf. Riley v. Riley, Ky., 266 S.W.2d 109 (1954). The interpretation by the trial judge of the intention of the parents/grantors is not supported by any competent evidence.
A resulting trust cannot be implied from the voluntary conveyance in the absence of an express intent in such conveyance. The Court of Appeals correctly distinguished between a constructive trust and a resulting trust and rejected the theory that a constructive trust had any application in this case. Consequently, we are left with a question as to whether a resulting trust could be found on the basis of this record. The Court of Appeals found that it could but we must disagree.
The creation of a resulting trust requires a finding of an intention to create a trust. There is no such evidence in this record. There is nothing in any of the documents to indicate an intention to hold the property in trust. There is no designation of a trustee, no recitation of authority or powers, and no limitations are placed on the use of the property by the grantee, the daughter.
In this situation, there is nothing in the deeds from which an intention to create a trust can be ascertained, and the law should...
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