Hohenstreet v. Segelhorst

Decision Date20 December 1920
Docket NumberNo. 20926.,20926.
Citation227 S.W. 80,285 Mo. 507
PartiesHOHENSTREET et al. v. SEGELHORST
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Franklin County; R. A. Breuer, Judge.

Suit by J. H. Hohenstreet and others against August Segelhorst. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Jesse H. Schaper, of Washington, Mo., and Jesse M. Owen, of Union, for appellant. James Booth, of Pacific, and Wm. L. Cole, of Union, for respondents.

WALKER, J.

This is a suit to set aside two deeds to different tracts of land in Franklin county. The first deed is from Herman H. Hohenstreet and wife to August Segelhorst, the defendant. It was executed March 16, 1905, and purported, for a consideration of $100, to convey 160 acres therein described and all of the personal property of the grantor. The second deed is to Segelhorst from Hohenstreet, then a widower, his wife having died in the meantime. This deed was executed March 2, 1917, and purported to convey 120 acres therein described. There was a judgment below for plaintiffs, from which defendant has appealed. The portions of these deeds varying from the conventional forms of conveyances, and necessary to an understanding and determination of the matters at issue, will appear in the abstract of the pleadings or the statement of the facts following.

The petition was in two counts. After a general allegation as to the ownership in fee by Hohenstreet of the land described in each count, and that he died intestate, and that the plaintiffs are his sole heirs at law, the first count alleges the invalidity of the deed of March 16, 1905, in that it is testamentary in character, and is not so framed and executed as to effect a conveyance of real estate, in that it provides for the care to be given the grantor and his wife during their lives and the payment of their burial expenses, but is not to take effect until after the death of the grantors; that it is to be placed in the recorder's office at Union for safe-keeping until after the death of the grantors; that it was never delivered to the grantee, and that he, without the knowledge and consent of the grantors, caused it to be filed and recorded; that it was executed without consideration, and was procured from the grantors by the grantee through fraud, covin, and undue influence exercised by the latter upon the minds of the former; that during the years that have elapsed since the making of said deed the grantee has been collecting the rents and profits from said lands amounting to many hundreds of dollars, and has converted the same to his own use without in any manner accounting for same. The usual prayer follows that the deed be set aside and declared void, that defendant grantee be required to account for the rents, and for costs.

The second count alleges that at the time of the execution of the deed of March 2, 1917, to Segelhorst by Hohenstreet, who was then a widower, his wife having died after the execution of the first deed, the grantor did not have sufficient mental capacity to make a deed; that same was obtained from him through fraud and undue influence exercised over his mind by the grantee; that the grantor was at the time an old and infirm man, in his dotage, and without sufficient mind to make and execute a deed, and was then under the influence, control, and domination of the grantee; that there was no adequate consideration for same, and that it was without consideration and void; that for several years the grantee has collected and converted to his own use the rents and profits from said land amounting to hundreds of dollars, and has cut and caused to be cut from said land a large amount of valuable timber without accounting to any one therefor. It is prayed that said deed be set aside and for naught held, and that the grantee be required to account for the rents and profits and for the timber taken from the land, for costs, and for other and proper relief.

The answer admits the execution of the deeds and avers their validity. Adverse, continuous, etc., possession of the lands described in each of the counts of the petition for more than 10 years next before the commencement of this action, and the consequent bar of the statute of limitations, is pleaded, as well as the agreement for support of the grantor by the grantee as a consideration for the transfer.

Affirmative relief is asked in the answer each count in the correction of errors in the description of the land in each deed, and that the phraseology of the first deed, that "this deed and writing shall not take any effect until after the death of the said parties of the first part," be changed so as to read as follows: "And this deed and writing shall not be fully performed on the part of said party of the second part until after the death of the said parties of the first part." That the changes in descriptions of the land, and the conditions under which the grantee was to take the property, as defined in the first deed, are alleged to be necessary to correctly present the true purpose and intention of the parties, and that the failure of the deeds so to do was through a mutual mistake of fact. The grantee alleges that he has fully performed his part of the agreement, asks a reformation of the deeds in the manner pleaded, and for other and further relief.

The reply is a general denial.

The court found that Hohenstreet died intestate in Franklin county, March 23, 1917, leaving as his sole heirs at law the plaintiffs herein; that on March 16, 1905, Hohenstreet and his wife were seized in fee as tenants by the entirety of the land described in the first deed, and that Hohenstreet was seized in fee of the land described in the second deed; that about 12 years ago the wife departed this life. After reciting the agreement pleaded by the grantee, the court further found that the first deed was testamentary in character, and that at the time it was made the grantor was an old man, easily influenced and of weak mind, and that the grantee at all times enjoyed, possessed, used, and exercised domination and control over his mind and will; that there was no consideration for the first deed, and that the purported consideration of $100 was wholly false, and that the grantor made said deed by and through the covin, fraud, and undue influence of the grantee exercised over the mind of the grantor at the time, and that the grantee has not been in the open, notorious, and adverse possession of the land for 10 years next before the commencement of this action; that the rents and profits of said land received by the grantee are equal to, or greater than, the value of the services mentioned in the answer as having been rendered by the grantee to the grantor. Wherefore the deed is adjudged and decreed to be void, and is set aside and for naught held.

As to the second cause of action, the court found that Hohenstreet was the owner in fee of the land described in the deed made by him to Segelhorst on March 2, 1917; that at the time of said conveyance, and for many years prior thereto, the grantor was an old man, infirm, weak of mind, and mentally incapable, and was under the care and custody of the grantee, who during all of said time was the trusted agent and adviser of the grantor in and concerning his business affairs, and at all times looked after, or pretended to look after and guard, the business interests of the grantor; that the latter was easily influenced, and subject to the domination and control of the grantee; that the grantor received no consideration for the making of the deed, and that the consideration of $100 expressed therein was false and untrue; that the execution of the deed was procured by fraud, covin, and undue influence of the grantee exercised and exerted over the mind of the grantor at the time; that the grantee has not been in the adverse, open, etc., possession of said land for more than 10 years next before the commencement of this action, and that the grantor never had any agreement concerning said land except as herein stated; that the rents and profits received by the grantee from the land, and the value of the timber removed by him from same, are equal to or greater than the sum of all taxes paid by the grantee on said land and the reasonable value of any services that might have been rendered by him to the grantor. Wherefore it is adjudged and decreed that said deed be, and the same is, declared null and void, and it is set aside and for naught held.

In March, 1905, Henry H. Hohenstreet and his wife, who were elderly people, each aged about 75 years, lived on, and were the owners by the entirety of, 160 acres of land in Franklin county in the immediate neighborhood of the appellant Segelhorst. This land they conveyed to Segelhorst March 2, 1905, by what is designated here as the first deed. Hohenstreet owned another tract of land of 120 acres not adjacent to, but in the neighborhood of, the home tract, which was conveyed to Segelhorst by the second deed, dated March 16, 1917. At the time of the making of each of the deeds Hohenstreet was frail and infirm physically, and had been possessed for many years of vagaries and delusions, among others that his father was or had been the king of Germany; that he himself had fabulous wealth, not only in money, but in precious metals and landed possessions; that the governments of Germany and the United States were indebted to him in the amount of millions of dollars; that his neighbors ruined his timber by bewitching his trees; that if a tree on his land was felled it would explode and kill those near by; that the taxes he was required to pay on his land was robbery; that he dug holes on his land and called the yellow clay which he unearthed gold, of which he claimed to have an abundance; that he had lived in Arkansas, and witnessed an earthquake there throwing up rocks pretty near as big as a house, that...

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14 cases
  • Wahl v. Wahl
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 8 Diciembre 1947
    ...166 Mo. 596, 66 S.W. 536; Thorp v. Daniel, 339 Mo. 763, 99 S.W. (2d) 42; Dunn v. Bank, 109 Mo. 90, 188 S.W. 1139; Hohenstreet v. Segelhorst, 227 S.W. 80, 285 Mo. 507. (9) The attempted transfers were void as an attempt to deprive the appellant of her dower rights in the stock. Davis v. Davi......
  • Wahl v. Wahl
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 8 Diciembre 1947
    ...166 Mo. 596, 66 S.W. 536; Thorp v. Daniel, 339 Mo. 763, 99 S.W.2d 42; Dunn v. Bank, 109 Mo. 90, 188 S.W. 1139; Hohenstreet v. Segelhorst, 227 S.W. 80, 285 Mo. 507. (9) The attempted transfers were void as an attempt deprive the appellant of her dower rights in the stock. Davis v. Davis, 5 M......
  • Tillman v. City of Carthage
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 30 Diciembre 1923
    ...252 Mo. 53, 158 S. W. 624; Priest v. McFarland, 262 Mo. 229, 171 S. W. 62; Dawson v. Taylor (Mo. Sup.) S. W. 852; Hohenstreet v. Segelhorst, 285 Mo. 507, 227 S. W. 80; Wimpey v. Ledford (Mo. Sup.) 177 S. W. 302, 11 A. L. R. But it is contended that the deeds were not delivered to the city, ......
  • Goins v. Melton
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 19 Noviembre 1938
    ...by reason of such provisions the deed has been held testamentary in character. Lanphere v. Affeld, 99 S.W. (2d) 39; Hohenstreet v. Segelhorst, 285 Mo. 521, 227 S.W. 80; Wimpey v. Ledford, 177 S.W. 304; Dawson v. Taylor, 214 S.W. 853; Priest v. McFarland, 262 Mo. 239; Christ v. Kuehne, 172 M......
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