Holbert v. Holbert
| Citation | 762 S.E.2d 298 |
| Decision Date | 05 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. COA13–951.,COA13–951. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US) |
| Parties | Margarita Belila HOLBERT, Plaintiff v. Larry R. HOLBERT, Defendant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal by defendant from orders entered 18 March 2013 and 4 June 2013 by Judge Peter Knight in Henderson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 January 2014.
Prince, Youngblood & Massagee, PLLC, Hendersonville, by Boyd B. Massagee, Jr., for Plaintiff–Appellee.
F.B. Jackson & Associates Law Firm, PLLC, Hendersonville, by Frank B. Jackson and Angela S. Beeker, for Defendant–Appellant.
Defendant Larry R. Holbert appeals from orders denying his motion for summary judgment directed to Plaintiff's equitable distribution claim and granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with respect to one of the grounds upon which Defendant sought to challenge the validity of her equitable distribution claim, with the relevant issue being the validity of Defendant's contention that his marriage to Plaintiff Margarita Belila Holbert had been performed by an individual who was not authorized to perform marriage ceremonies and the extent to which the trial court was precluded from considering that contention on the merits in light of an earlier consent judgment, and denying Defendant's motion for relief from that earlier consent judgment predicated on the theory that the consent judgment failed to accurately reflect the agreement between the parties that it was supposed to memorialize. After careful consideration of Defendant's challenges to the trial court's orders in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that Defendant's appeal should be dismissed as having been taken from unappealable interlocutory orders.
Plaintiff came to the United States from the Philippines on or about 10 December 2000 as Defendant's fiancée. The parties were married on 9 February 2001 by an individual named Earl R. Jones, who was selected to perform that role by Defendant. Although he was “licensed in the Gospel Ministry” at the time that he conducted the parties' marriage ceremony, Mr. Jones had not been “ordained” by the church with which he was affiliated at that time. Mr. Jones was, however, “ordained” on 30 March 2008.
After the performance of the marriage ceremony, Plaintiff and Defendant held themselves out to be husband and wife. The parties' relationship began to deteriorate when Defendant began to curse Plaintiff, state that it would have been cheaper to have her killed, and offer to pay others to marry her. At approximately the time that the parties separated on 16 September 2009, Defendant locked Plaintiff out of the marital residence and changed all of the locks.
On 6 October 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint in which she claimed that she had been abandoned by Defendant and sought a divorcefrom bed and board, post-separation support, alimony, equitable distribution, and an award of attorney's fees. On 20 October 2009, Defendant filed a motion seeking to have Plaintiff's complaint dismissed in reliance upon the parties' premarital agreements and to enforce the provisions of their premarital agreements. On 6 April 2010, the parties filed a memorandum of decision in which Defendant “waive[d] any defense to any cause of action set out in the complaint on the basis of any premarital agreement” and “any defense by virtue of any other premarital agreement not identified in his answer.” In return for this commitment and the payment of $50,000, Plaintiff waived all of the claims that she had asserted against Defendant except for the right to have marital and divisible property equitably distributed. As part of this process, the parties agreed that it would be unnecessary for their signatures to appear on the formal consent judgment. On 6 May 2010, Judge Athena Fox Brooks entered a consent judgment that provided, in pertinent part, that “[b]oth parties agree that [Plaintiff] is entitled to proceed with her claim of equitable distribution against [Defendant] without any defense thereto”; that Defendant's dismissal motion should be denied; and that the only issue remaining between the parties involved the equitable distribution of their marital and divisible property.1
On 6 October 2010, Defendant filed a complaint in a separate action seeking an absolute divorce. On 23 November 2010, the court granted Defendant an absolute divorce.
On 4 February 2011, Defendant filed a motion seeking to have the 6 April 2010 memorandum of decision and the 6 May 2010 consent judgment set aside pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60(b)(1), (4) and (6). In support of this request, Defendant contended that he had entered into the agreement memorialized in these documents at a time when his cognition was impaired and that he had been unable to understand the contents of the 6 April 2010 memorandum of decision when he signed it. On 11 May 2011 and 8 June 2011, respectively, the trial court entered an order and an amended order denying Defendant's motion on the grounds that he was presumed to be competent when he consented to the agreement memorialized in the 6 April 2010 memorandum of decision and the 6 May 2010 consent judgment and that he had failed to present substantial evidence tending to show that he was incompetent at the time that he entered into this agreement.
On 11 October 2012, Defendant, who was now represented by new legal counsel, filed an answer and counterclaim in which he asserted, among other things, that he was entitled to rely on the provisions of the parties' premarital agreement as a defense to Plaintiff's equitable distribution claim, with this assertion resting upon his recent discovery that Mr. Jones was not authorized to conduct marriage ceremonies under North Carolina law, and that he was entitled to have his marriage to Plaintiff annulled, with this assertion resting on a contention that Mr. Jones had not been legally authorized to perform their marriage ceremony and that the parties had never consummated their marriage. In addition, Defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60(b) in the action in which he had been divorced from Plaintiff on 16 October 2012 in which he alleged that he had recently learned that Mr. Jones had not been authorized to conduct the parties' marriage ceremony. On 8 November 2012, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's filings in the equitable distribution and divorce proceedings in which she asserted a number of affirmative defenses to Defendant's contentions, including, but not limited to, ratification, collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, waiver, fraud, and statute of limitations.
On 3 December 2012, Defendant filed a motion seeking the entry of summary judgment in his favor with respect to Plaintiff's equitable distribution claim on the grounds that there “was no valid marriage between the parties” given the fact that Mr. Jones had not been “ordained” at the time of the parties' marriage ceremony. On 6 February 2013, Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment with respect to the issue of whether (1) the parties' premarital agreements barred her equitable distribution claim; (2) Plaintiff had waived her right to assert an equitable distribution claim by executing the parties' premarital agreements, (3) Plaintiff was estopped by the parties' premarital agreements from asserting an equitable distribution claim, (4) the fact that Plaintiff took a salary from Defendant barred her from asserting an equitable distribution claim, and (5) Plaintiff had misappropriated money from Defendant. After a hearing held on 18 February 2013, the trial court entered an order on 18 March 2013 granting Plaintiff's partial summary judgment motion and specifically determining, among other things, that Defendant was barred from asserting the parties' premarital agreement as a defense to Plaintiff's equitable distribution claim by the 6 April 2010 memorandum of decision and 6 May 2010 consent judgment. In addition, the trial court entered another order on the same date denying Defendant's request for an annulment of his marriage to Plaintiff given that he had elected the remedy of absolute divorce rather than annulment with full knowledge of the facts underlying his contention that the parties' marriage had never been consummated; denying Defendant's request for the entry of summary judgment in his favor with respect to Plaintiff's equitable distribution claim on the grounds that the record reflected the existence of genuine issues of material facts concerning the extent to which Mr. Jones had the authority to conduct the parties' wedding ceremony; and granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff with respect to the issue of whether Defendant was entitled to assert any defense, including the invalidity of the parties' marriage, in opposition to Plaintiff's equitable distribution claim given the provisions of the 6 April 2010 memorandum of decision and the 6 May 2010 consent judgment. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the second 18 March 2013 order on 17 April 2013.
On 16 April 2013, Defendant filed a motion for relief from the 6 May 2010 consent judgment and the second 18 March 2013 order pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60(b)(3) and (4), or, in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 59, with both requests for relief predicated on the theory that the language concerning Defendant's waiver of the right to assert any defenses to Plaintiff's equitable distribution claim contained in the 6 May 2010 order was inconsistent with the equivalent provision of the 6 April 2010 memorandum of decision and that this inconsistency between the relevant provisions of the two documents indicated that Judge Brooks lacked jurisdiction to enter the 6 May 2013 order to the extent that it precluded him from asserting any defense to Plaintiff's equitable distribution claim. On 4...
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