Holcomb v. State, A95A0204
Decision Date | 25 May 1995 |
Docket Number | No. A95A0204,A95A0204 |
Citation | 217 Ga.App. 482,458 S.E.2d 159 |
Parties | HOLCOMB v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Steven E. Lister, Jonesboro, for appellant.
Keith C. Martin, Sol., Evelyn Proctor, Asst. Sol., Jonesboro, for appellee.
Defendant was tried before a jury and found guilty of alternative counts of driving under the influence of alcohol. The counts were merged for sentencing, so that defendant was "[s]entenced on Count II only." His motion for new trial was denied and this appeal followed. Held:
1. In his seventh enumeration, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of the State-administered breath test. He argues the implied consent warning he received is deficient because it did not advise him that he had the right to an independent chemical test by a "qualified person of his own choosing." We agree.
The transcript of the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress shows that defendant stopped his automobile at a roadside check for driver's licenses and insurance papers. Officer J.W. Greer of the College Park police spoke with defendant and detected alcohol on his breath. When defendant exited his car, he was Defendant failed field sobriety tests for finger dexterity and balance. A preliminary breath test was positive for the presence of alcohol. Defendant was placed under arrest and read an implied consent warning that informed defendant, in part: Defendant was transported to the College Park police station, where he submitted to a breath test. After that test was given, defendant never asked for an additional test of his blood, breath, or urine. If defendant had requested an independent test, he would have had a "choice of Grady or South Fulton [hospitals]." Defendant testified that, while he was at the roadside, he twice demanded a blood test when Officer Greer asked him to take the preliminary breath test. However, he affirmed that he never demanded any additional testing after taking the State test at the police station.
State v. Causey, 215 Ga.App. 85, 449 S.E.2d 639. In the case sub judice, since State v. Causey, 215 Ga.App. 85, 86, 449 S.E.2d 639, supra. Accord Moore v. State, 217 Ga.App. 536(1), 458 S.E.2d 479 (1995). The trial court erred in failing to suppress this inadmissible evidence. Exclusion of the results of this breath test means that there is no competent evidence that defendant operated a moving vehicle at a time when his blood alcohol level was 0.10 grams percent or greater, as alleged in Count II of the accusation. Consequently, the judgment of conviction and sentence for Count II, alleging a violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(4) must be reversed. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560. This disposition renders defendant's sixth enumeration moot.
2. In his first enumeration, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing Officer Greer to testify that defendant was a less safe driver. He argues this opinion testimony was without adequate foundation because it was "based solely upon the result of [an] alcosensor test...."
At trial, Officer Greer testified that defendant was given a roadside test with a hand-held alcosensor device, and that the result "read positive" for the presence of alcohol. Over defendant's objection to "any interpretation ... about what [that positive result] may have indicated," Officer Greer was permitted to testify as follows: "From my dealings in the past ... it would lead me to believe that he was a less safe driver, but I'm not going to base my opinions on that one machine." Officer Greer explained that any opinion he formed about defendant's capabilities was made in conjunction with defendant's observed inability to perform the field sobriety finger dexterity test and balance test.
Lewis v. State, 214 Ga.App. 830, 831(1), 832, 449 S.E.2d 535. In the case sub judice, Clapsaddle v. State, 208 Ga.App. 840, 842(2), 432 S.E.2d 262.
3. The trial court erroneously charged the substance of OCGA § 40-6-392(b) on the conclusions that may be drawn according to various blood alcohol levels by using the prohibited term "presumption." See Lattarulo v. State, 261 Ga. 124(1), 401 S.E.2d 516; Ellerbee v. State, 215 Ga.App. 102, 104(5), 449 S.E.2d 874. When this error was brought to the attention of the court, the jury was brought back and informed by the court that the court The trial court amended its charge by substituting the term inference for presumption, i.e., if defendant had an (Emphasis supplied.) Defendant renewed his motion for mistrial, arguing "the damage cannot be undone...." In his eleventh enumeration, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motions for mistrial and new trial, arguing the initial error in the charge "must have left the jury in a confused condition of mind...." We agree that a new trial must be held on Count I of the accusation.
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