Holcomb v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 8017SC878
Citation | 52 N.C.App. 474,279 S.E.2d 50 |
Decision Date | 16 June 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 8017SC878,8017SC878 |
Parties | Sigmond W. HOLCOMB and wife, Laura C. Holcomb v. UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Finger, Park & Parker by Daniel J. Park and Raymond A. Parker, II, Elkin, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge and Rice by Daniel W. Donahue and Keith A. Clinard, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellee.
Summary judgment is a drastic measure, and it should be used with caution. Williams v. Power & Light Co., 296 N.C. 400, 250 S.E.2d 255 (1979). On such motion the court is required to view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Hinson v. Jefferson, 20 N.C.App 204, 200 S.E.2d 812 (1973); Brice v. Moore, 30 N.C.App. 365, 226 S.E.2d 882 (1976). We must accept, therefore, as the trial court was required to do for purposes of this motion, plaintiffs' forecast of evidence that the collapse of the east basement wall was caused by the failure of the downspout which dumped approximately three tons of water on a small area of already saturated soil and that it was the weight of this water that caused the east basement wall to collapse and not the shifting of clay or any earth movement.
Based on these facts, which plaintiffs' affidavits forecast, and which a jury could believe if presented as evidence at trial, we see two issues of law which if either were resolved against plaintiffs, would warrant entry of summary judgment in defendant's favor. The first is whether as a matter of law, a gutter downspout is part of the plumbing system of a home so as to bring damage resulting from "discharge, leakage or overflow" therefrom within Peril 15 of the insurance policy. The second is whether the damage to plaintiffs' home is expressly and unambiguously excluded from coverage under the policy by language of Additional Exclusions 1 or 2.
With regard to the first issue, we must construe the word plumbing in light of the generally accepted rule in this jurisdiction that where the meaning of a word is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, doubts will be resolved against the insurance company and in favor of the insured. Woods v. Insurance Co., 295 N.C. 500, 246 S.E.2d 773 (1978). "If such a word has more than one meaning in its ordinary usage and if the context does not indicate clearly the one intended, it is to be given the meaning most favorable to the policyholder, ... since the insurance company selected the word for use." Trust Co. v. Insurance Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970). Construction of the term "plumbing system" to include gutter downspouts would clearly favor the insured in this case. The surrounding language does not establish whether the parties intended the term to include downspouts and the record does not indicate that the term was defined in the policy. We must turn, therefore, to the ordinary meaning of the term to determine whether any usage of the term "plumbing system" could encompass the gutters and downspouts on the outside of a building.
We believe there can be no doubt that the ordinary meaning of the term "plumbing system" includes the gutters and downspouts designed for the disposal of rainwater. Accord Schumacher v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 154 So.2d 637 (La.App.1963). We note that the Schumacher court found evidence of the ordinary meaning of the term "plumbing" in the articles of two well-known encyclopedias in general use today. From the Encyclopedia Britannica, the Schumacher court quotes:
"Scope of plumbing plumbing systems include roof drains, area drains, swimming pools, sprinkling systems, standpipes and hose connections for fire protection, sprinkling systems and hose connections for watering gardens and lawns ...."
Id. at 640. The court also quotes the Collier's Encyclopedia's similar definition of the scope of plumbing:
Id. While we believe this alone establishes plaintiffs' construction of the term as one reasonable reading of the policy language, we find even more persuasive authority upon which to base our holding.
The North Carolina Building Code Council and the North Carolina Department of Insurance, who jointly publish the State Building Code, define plumbing as follows
North Carolina State Building Code, Vol. II, Plumbing § 301 at 3-6 (1980) (emphasis added). We note, too, that the Code contains an entire chapter (Ch. XV) devoted to the regulation of storm drains. Chapter XV prescribes the conductors and connections that a plumber may use (§ 1504), specifies the manner of constructing roof drains (§ 1505), and includes tables specifying the size of vertical leaders (defined in § 301, at 3-5 of the Code as downspouts) and gutters for various roof sizes up to 29,000 square feet (§§ 1506.1, 1506.3). We believe such extensive treatment of storm drainage systems, in the major source of regulation of buildings in this State, (see G.S. 143-135.1 to -143), and in a separate volume of that regulatory Code devoted exclusively to plumbing, renders defendant's contention "that 'plumbing system' should not be construed to include gutters or roof drains" without merit. We hold that, as a matter of law, Peril 15 of the insurance policy covered any loss to plaintiff attributable to water discharged from his gutters and downspouts.
We turn then to the second issue: whether plaintiff's loss is expressly and unambiguously excluded from coverage. The insuring provisions of the policy extend coverage only, "except as otherwise excluded or limited." Appellee contends that, even if the gutters and downspouts are a part of the plumbing system of plaintiffs' house, coverage under the policy for plaintiffs' loss is expressly excluded by the language of the policy. The applicable exclusions provide:
"This policy does not insure against loss:
....
a. flood, surface water, waves, tidal water or tidal waves, overflow of streams or other bodies of water, or spray from any of the foregoing, all whether driven by wind or not;
b. water which backs up through sewers or drains; or
c. water below the surface of the ground including that which exerts pressure on or flows, seeps or leaks through sidewalks, driveways, foundations, walls, basement or other floors or through doors, windows or any other openings in such sidewalks, driveways, foundations, walls or floors.
....
Exclusion 2 can be dismissed out of hand. It is not a legitimate ground for summary judgment. The affidavit of Larry R. Absher, Sr., a licensed professional engineer, was to the effect that he "inspected the soil around the manholes, fence post, and fire hydrants in the general area of Mr. Holcomb's home and found absolutely no evidence of any earth movement around these objects." Absher further stated that in his professional opinion "the failure of the east basement wall was not a result of a gradual shift of clay or earth movement." These statements were sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether any earth movement caused or contributed to the collapse of the east basement wall. Summary Judgment is not to be entered...
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