Holcombe v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc.

• Citation: 976 F.Supp.2d 326
• Decision Date: 30 September 2013
• Docket Number: Nos. 03–cv–4785 (SLT)(JMA), 08–cv–1593 (SLT)(JMA).,s. 03–cv–4785 (SLT)(JMA), 08–cv–1593 (SLT)(JMA).
• Parties: Fougere Q. HOLCOMBE, Plaintiff, v. US AIRWAYS GROUP, INC. et. al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

976 F.Supp.2d 326

Fougere Q. HOLCOMBE, Plaintiff,

v.US AIRWAYS GROUP, INC. et. al., Defendants.

Nos. 03–cv–4785 (SLT)(JMA), 08–cv–1593 (SLT)(JMA).

United States District Court,

E.D. New York.

Sept. 30, 2013.

Limited on Preemption Grounds

N.Y.McKinney's Executive Law § 290 et seq.

Vladimir Matsiborchuk, Attorney at Law, Bronx, NY, William J. Sipser, Tuckner, Sipser, Weinstock & Sipser, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey I. Kohn, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Philip A. Goldstein, Shawn R. Fox, McGuireWoods LLP, New York, NY, Ira L. Gottlieb, Bush, Gottlieb, Singer, Lopez, Kohanski, Adelstein, Dickinson, Glendale, CA, Daniel E. Farrington, The Farrington Law Firm, LLC, Bethesda, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TOWNES, District Judge.

Fougere Q. Holcombe (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against U.S. Airways Group, Inc. and U.S. Airways, Inc., (together, “US Airways”), Loretta Bove and Beth Holdren, and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (the “Union”) (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting breach of contract claims and alleging that Defendants discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). US Airways, Bove and Holdren, and the Union have all filed separate motions to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint. For the reasons that follow, the court grants the Union's motion in part and denies it in part, grants U.S. Airways' motion in part and denies it in part, and grants Bove and Holdren's motion in its entirety.

I. Standards of Review

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569, 127 S.Ct. 1955. If a party does not “nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed.” Id.

Because “a Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the facts alleged on the face of the complaint ... or, more accurately, the sufficiency of the statements in the complaint,” Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P, 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir.1991) (internal citations omitted), materials outside the four corners of the complaint are “generally not considered on a motion to dismiss unless the court treats it as one for summary judgment, giving all the parties a reasonable opportunity to present relevant evidence under Rule 56.” Nicholls v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2004 WL 1533831, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2004). However, a court can consider “documents attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in it by reference, ... matters of which judicial notice may be taken, or ... documents either in plaintiff's possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.” Brass v. Am. Film Technologies, Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir.1993) (citing Cortec Indus., Inc., 949 F.2d at 47–48). The Second Circuit has clarified, however, that mere notice or possession of a document is not enough, and a plaintiff must have reliedon the document in drafting the complaint. See U.S. v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 518 F.Supp.2d 422, 451 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (citing Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002)).

II. Background

Except where indicated, the following facts come directly from the first amended complaint (“Amended Complaint”) and are construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the party opposing dismissal.

In September of 1986, Plaintiff began working for U.S. Airways as a part-time passenger service agent at LaGuardia airport (“LGA”). (Amended Complaint ¶ 43.) In 1987, she was awarded a full-time passenger service position. ( Id. ¶ 45.) Beginning in 1992, Plaintiff functioned as a fleet service agent where she performed tower/operations work, which includes work associated with the communication required to coordinate station operations. ( Id. ¶ 46.) Although it is not clear from the amended complaint precisely when, at some point Plaintiff was diagnosed with Crohn's disease, an inflammatory bowel condition, and she suffers from multiple complications associated with her disease. ( Id. ¶ 9; Union Ex. G, U.S. Airways Ex. 12 (“Arbitration Decision”) at 2.) Plaintiff's symptoms are particularly strong at night. (Amended Complaint ¶ 9.) In 1995, Plaintiff requested an accommodation and submitted medical information to U.S. Airways indicating that, as a result of her worsening medical condition, she was unable to work at night, stand for long periods of time, or perform strenuous lifting. ( Id. ¶¶ 49–50.)

US Airways' company procedure instructs employees with disabilities to direct requests for reasonable accommodations to the U.S. Airways Human Resources Department (“HR”). After review of an employee request for accommodation, HR renders a decision and notifies the station manager and employee of its decision. ( Id. ¶ 55.) Although it is unclear if this procedure was followed, in 1996, U.S. Airways offered to accommodate Plaintiff by allowing her to occupy an open-time position in the tower. ( Id. ¶ 51.) At this point in time, U.S. Airways offered employees two types of duty assignment: tower positions and open-time tower positions. There were essentially no differences in job responsibilities for these positions; the difference lay in how the shifts were assigned. Tower agents bid for fixed time shifts, whereas open-time agents, who did not have a set work schedule, bid for open time shifts. (Arbitration Decision at 3.) Plaintiff accepted U.S. Airways' proposed accommodation and, for the next several years, due to her seniority, was able to obtain day shifts through the bidding process. (Amended Complaint ¶ 53.)

In 2001, Loretta Bove became station director/manager at LGA. ( Id. ¶ 54.) In that capacity, Bove was responsible for direct and overall station operation as well as implementation of HR's decisions regarding employee requests for accommodations. ( Id. ¶¶ 54, 56.) That same year, the tower agent positions were merged with the open-time tower agent positions, creating a single tower agent position. ( Id. ¶ 57; Arbitration Decision at 3–4.) Due to the merger of the positions, the bidding process at LGA changed. The open-time positions were made available for open bid to all tower agents and Plaintiff no longer had the seniority to obtain day-time shifts, although she alleges that U.S. Airways concealed its seniority lists from her. (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 57, 63.)

In 2000 and 2001, Plaintiff underwent several surgeries and took two extended medical leaves due to her condition. ( Id. ¶ 64.) Upon returning to work following Plaintiff's second medical leave, she worked day-time shifts for two weeks and then, from January to November of 2002, was forced to work night shifts. ( Id. ¶ 66.) In January of 2002, Plaintiff met with Bove to discuss an accommodation for her medical restrictions. ( Id. ¶ 67.) At the meeting, Plaintiff allegedly proposed several possible accommodations that she would accept if a day-time shift was not available to her at LGA, including temporary assignments, combination of job duties, assignment to another position, or assignment to other fleet service positions within the company outside of the craft and class covered by the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).¹ ( Id. ¶ 69.) Bove indicated that it was impossible for U.S. Airways to provide Plaintiff with day-time shifts without violating seniority provisions in her CBA and that she would wait for HR's response to Plaintiff's accommodation requests before commenting on them. ( Id. ¶ 73.)

In its letter dated January 25, 2002, HR indicated that day-time shifts might not be available to Plaintiff but offered several possible solutions as to how U.S. Airways might accommodate Plaintiff without violating the seniority requirements in the CBA. ( Id. ¶ 74.) According to Plaintiff, Bove refused to adequately accommodate her. Bove declined Plaintiff's requests to transfer her to another location or position, refused to engage in the interactive process with Plaintiff, and refused to comply with HR's directions. ( Id. ¶¶ 75, 82.) Instead, Bove advised Plaintiff that she could either return to work on the evening shift, which her seniority would allow, or she could take a leave of absence if she could not return to work. ( Id. ¶ 77.) Notwithstanding Bove's alleged stance on Plaintiff's requests for accommodation, Plaintiff does acknowledge that in early 2002, Bove offered her an available ramp position. ( Id. ¶ 92.) However, because this position required an individual to load and unload cargo on and off airplanes, which Plaintiff says she could not physically do given her medical condition, Plaintiff contends that this offer did not constitute an accommodation at all. ( Id. ¶ 93.) Plaintiff alleges that Bove, with the Union's acquiescence, “purposefully precluded [her] ... from being transferred to another position or location in accordance with the relevant provisions of the CBA and [US Airways'] policy.” ( Id. ¶¶ 87–88.) Plaintiff also alleges that, for its part, HR failed to make any further inquiries, exercise control, or otherwise investigate Bove's conduct. ( Id. ¶ 76.)

On October 7, 2002, Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge alleging discrimination...