Holden v. Knight

Decision Date02 August 2016
Docket NumberCase No. 3:15-CV-432 JD
PartiesTHOMAS HOLDEN, Plaintiff, v. WENDY KNIGHT, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
OPINION AND ORDER

Thomas Holden, a pro se prisoner, began this case by filing a complaint in LaPorte Circuit Court in LaPorte County, Indiana, on July 20, 2015, which was removed here by the defendants. Holden complained that all the money deposited in his prison trust fund account was being garnished to pay off a $1,500 debt he owed to another correctional facility. Because of the deficiencies in the complaint, the court found that he did not state a claim for which relief could be granted, but Holden was given leave to file an amended complaint in the spirit of Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013).

In that amended complaint (DE 23) he repeated many of the same arguments surrounding the prison garnishing money from his prison trust fund account. The court informed him that those claims were either time-barred or without merit. Holden also alleged that he was suffering from an undisclosed skin condition and was being treated by Dr. Thompson. Holden complained that Dr. Thompson discontinued his prescribed Claritin because that medication was available in the commissary, even though Dr. Thompson knew that Holden did not have money to purchase that medication. However, Dr. Thompson was not named as a defendant in the amended complaint. Moreover, it was unclear whether Holden's medical condition was objectively serious to trigger the Eighth Amendment. For both of these reasons, it appeared that Holden might be able to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Thompson. Accordingly, he was invited to file a second amended complaint pursuant to Luevano. (DE 27.) Holden has now filed his second amended complaint, along with a supporting memorandum. (DE 30, 31.) Holden has again brought suit against various prison officials at both CIF and ISP. Holden renews his request to dismiss the imposed sanctions and restitution order in CIC-12-07-0211, have his prison trust account reimbursed for the funds that have been garnished to pay the restitution order, and prohibit the prison from garnishing 100% of his prisoner trust account. Holden has included a new Eighth Amendment claim, alleging Dr. Thompson was deliberately indifferent to his skin rash when the doctor discontinued the prescription of Claritin, knowing that Holden could not purchase that medication from the commissary.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b). Courts apply the same standard under Section 1915A as when deciding a motion under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 603. In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court must bear in mind that "[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, mustbe held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). To state claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: "(1) that defendants deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law." Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).

According to the allegations of the second amended complaint and documents submitted, Holden was charged with assaulting an officer while he was housed at the Correctional Industry Facility ("CIF"). On July 24, 2012, in CIC-12-07-0211, hearing officer Connie Williams found Holden guilty of that charge and imposed 120 day loss of good time credits and ordered Holden to pay restitution in the amount of $1500 plus the cost of the staff member's pending medical bills. On August 10, 2012, Holden was transferred to the Indiana State Prison ("ISP"), where he is currently incarcerated. On December 31, 2013, Donald Parks, the Business Office Administrator at ISP, began garnishing restitution from Holden's prison trust account at 100% of his available funds to pay the ordered restitution.

It ISP, Dr. Thompson had been treating Holden for Urticaria, a skin rash. (DE 31 at 17.) Among other things, Dr. Thompson had prescribed Claritin to treat Holden's skin rash. However, when Claritin became available at the commissary, Dr. Thompson discontinued Holden's prescription. Dr. Thompson was aware that Holden would be unable to purchase Claritin from the commissary because the money in his prison trust fund account was all being garnished to pay off the $1,500 restitution.

To start, Holden again brings suit against Wendy Knight, Superintendent of CIF, for her alleged failure to follow the prison policies in connection with his 2012 disciplinary hearing; Connie Williams, the hearing officer that was involved in his 2012 disciplinary case and ordered restitution;and Andrew Pritchard, the Chief Financial Officer at CIF, who began withdrawing 100% of his prisoner account in 2012 pursuant to the restitution order. In the court's prior order, it was explained that these claims were untimely. "Indiana's two-year statute of limitations . . . is applicable to all causes of action brought in Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2001). In his memorandum, Holden argues that because inmates are required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit, the two-year limitation period should not start to run until he exhausted his administrative remedies on June 17, 2014. (DE 31 at 8.) However, that is not the case. The two-year period began to run in 2012, when the disciplinary hearing took place and the restitution was ordered. See Sellars v. Perry, 80 F.3d 243, 245 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action."). Holden had two years from that date to file suit. Because Holden filed his complaint against these defendants far more than two years after the claims arose, they are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Despite the statute of limitations problem, these allegations also fail to state a plausible claim under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement that deny inmates "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008). However, "the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons," and conditions that may seem "restrictive" or "even harsh" are "part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-49 (1981). To start, the mere fact that the prison policies were not followed does not demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation. See Estate of Davis v. Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994) (violation of jail regulation could support a negligence claim, but not a claim of indifference undersection 1983 where defendant had no knowledge that violation of policy would result in strong likelihood of violence to inmate); See also State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Even if defendants disregarded one or more of their established procedures . . . [their actions] do not constitute deliberate disregard for the possibility that [an inmate] would take his own life" where defendants lacked actual knowledge). Thus, Holden's claim that Wendy Knight failed to follow prison policy in connection with his disciplinary hearing does not plausibly allege an Eighth Amendment claim. In addition, having his prison trust account frozen until a debt is paid does not rise to the level of the types of harsh conditions that can be considered denying Holden the "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." See Meineke v. Finnan, 2014 WL 3586546, *3 (S.D. Ind. July 21, 2014) (noting that freezing a prisoner trust account is not considered atypical or significant); Parker v. Correction Corp. of America, 2014 WL 2481874, *5 (W.D. Tenn. June 3, 2014); Cotton v. Kingston, 2003 WL 23221147 (W.D. Wisc. Oct. 20, 2003). Consequently, Holden's complaint that Pritchard and Williams garnished 100% of his trust account does not plausibly state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

Next, Holden renews his claim against Donald Parks, ISP's Business Office Administrator, for garnishing 100% of his prisoner trust account. Holden complains that taking 100% of his money constitutes an unlawful taking of his money. However, as he was previously told, such a claim is more appropriately addressed through a tort claims action. Though the Fourteenth Amendment provides that state officials shall not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law", a state tort claims act that provides a method by which a person can seek reimbursement for the negligent loss or...

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