Holden v. Lynn
Decision Date | 12 December 1911 |
Docket Number | Case Number: 1332 |
Citation | 30 Okla. 663,1911 OK 503,120 P. 246 |
Parties | HOLDEN v. LYNN. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE--Appeal--Immaterial Errors. Very liberal rules of construction should be applied to pleadings in a justice of the peace court, and technical objections will not be allowed to reverse a judgment, where it is apparent from an examination of the entire record that no substantial right of the party raising the objection could have been affected by the ruling, and where a reversal on that ground would tend to defeat the ends of justice.
2. ANIMALS -- Trespassing Animals -- Destruction of Crops -- Evidence. When an action of trespass is brought against the owner of cattle, which have broken through the fences and destroyed the plaintiff's corn, evidence is properly excluded which tends to show that the corn was grown and remained in the shocks on Indian land, cultivated by a lessee whose lease was not approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Williams v. Steinmetz, 16 Okla. 104, 82 P. 986, overruled.
3. PARTNERSHIP--Action of Tort--Parties. An action of tort may be brought against one member of a partnership without joining the others.
Error from Osage County Court; C. T. Bennett, Judge.
Action by John P. Lynn against J. S. Holden, to recover the value of certain corn and fodder belonging to the plaintiff and destroyed by the cattle of the defendant. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
Grinstead, Mason & Scott, for plaintiff in error
Boone, Leahy & MacDonald, for defendant in error
¶1 The plaintiff sued the defendant in a justice court of Osage county for $ 100, the alleged value of certain corn and fodder destroyed by defendant's cattle. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and an appeal was taken to the county court, where, on a retrial, judgment was again rendered for the plaintiff, in the sum of $ 65, and the defendant brings error.
¶2 Three questions are involved: (1) Did the bill of particulars state a cause of action? (2) Did the court err in excluding evidence tending to show that the land on which the corn was grown belonged to an Osage Indian, and was not under lease approved by the Secretary of the Interior? (3) Can the suit be maintained against the defendant alone, when the cattle belonged to a partnership?
¶3 The objection urged against the bill of particulars is that the plaintiff does not allege therein that he was the owner of the crops destroyed; and it does require the application of exceedingly liberal rules of construction to ascertain from the bill of particulars who owned the cattle, but, in view of the fact that this is a justice of the peace case, that a justice court is not a court of record, that the evidence did establish that the defendant owned the cattle, and that no substantial right of the defendant can be affected, we are not disposed to reverse the case.
¶4 In Lobenstein v. McGraw, 11 Kan. 645, 648, Justice Brewer, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:
¶5 On the trial it appeared that the corn involved was grown on the "Old Lady Corndropper place"; that it had been cut and shocked; that the plaintiff bought it from the man who raised it; that it was surrounded by a wire fence; and that the defendant's cattle broke down this fence and ate the corn. The defendant offered to prove that this was Osage Indian land, that the man who raised the corn did not have a lease approved by the Secretary of the Interior, and the court refused to permit this evidence. This ruling is assigned as error. The defendant's contention is that under the Act of June 28, 1906, c. 3572, sec. 7, 34 Stat. 539, providing "that all leases given on said lands [Osage] for the benefit of the individual members of the tribe entitled thereto, or for their heirs, shall be subject only to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior," this lease was void; and that therefore the plaintiff could not recover for trespass to his corn bought from the lessee. In support of this contention, he cites Light v. Conover, 10 Okla. 732, 63 P. 966; Megreedy v. Macklin, 12 Okla. 666, 73 P. 293; and Williams v. Steinmetz, 16 Okla. 104, 89 P. 986. Light v. Conover and Megreedy v. Macklin hold that, when an Indian lease does not carry the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, it is absolutely void, and that no rent can be recovered under the lease.
¶6 These cases rest upon the well-established rule that the courts will not enforce an invalid contract, whether malum in se or malum prohibitum; and that therefore the plaintiff cannot recover in any action where it is necessary for him to prove the illegal contract, in order to make out his case. In the case at bar, as it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove title to the land, or to prove the existence of any lease at all, the principle on which these cases were decided does not apply.
¶7 Williams v. Steinmetz, supra, however, presents a different question. In that case certain land in Caddo county had been allotted to Robert L. Williams, a son of W. G. Williams (a white man, who had been adopted into the Caddo tribe) and of a Caddo Indian woman. Steinmetz and Painter leased this land from Robert L. Williams, took possession of it, and planted it to corn and cotton. The lease was not approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The cultivated land was inclosed by a good fence. The cattle of W. G. Williams and Robert L. Williams broke down the fence and destroyed the corn. Suit was brought by the lessees against the owners of the cattle, and judgment was rendered in their favor by the trial court. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the territory, in an opinion delivered by Justice Burwell, after holding that the lease was void, held that by reason of that fact the plaintiffs could not recover damages for the trespass. The principal discussion in the opinion is as to the validity of the lease, and it seems to have been taken for granted by the court that if the lease was invalid the plaintiffs could not recover. At page 109 of 16 Okla., at page 988 of 82 P., the court said:
¶8 It will be noted from the quotation that the two cases cited by the court in support of the conclusion reached are Light v. Conover and Mayes v. Cherokee Strip Live Stock Ass'n. We have called attention to the fact that Light v. Conover was an action to recover rent; and this is likewise true of Mayes v. Cherokee Strip Live Stock Ass'n. In both of these cases, recovery was denied, on the ground that the plaintiff would have to prove an illegal contract, and that, as the law will not aid the parties in enforcing an illegal contract, recovery could not be had. That principle, however, did not apply in Williams v. Steinmetz, nor does it apply in the case at bar.
¶9 It will be noticed that the exact question involved here is whether the defendant could offer evidence concerning this leasehold interest. If it devolved upon the defendant to prove this state of facts, then it is clear that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to do so, and if the plaintiff did not have to prove the illegal contract, he, of course, did not rely upon it, and the court, by giving the relief sought would not be enforcing or lending its aid to the enforcement of an illegal agreement. If a man who raises a crop of corn on Indian land, without a lease executed in the manner required by law, acquires no rights whatever to the corn after it is grown and harvested, even as against a wilful trespasser, and if a man who purchases this corn from such a lessee acquires no rights whatever, even as against a wilful trespasser, then the plaintiff in this case should not have recovered. But if such an owner has a property interest, good against a bare trespasser, the ruling of the trial court was...
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