Holden v. Mcgillicuddy

• Citation: 215 Mass. 563,102 N.E. 923
• Parties: HOLDEN v. McGILLICUDDY.
• Decision Date: 22 October 1913
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

215 Mass. 563

102 N.E. 923

HOLDEN v. McGILLICUDDY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Franklin.

October 22, 1913

COUNSEL

Wm. A. Davenport and Harry A. Weymoth, both of Greenfield, for plaintiff.

Frank J. Lawler, of Greenfield, for defendant.

OPINION

SHELDON J.

This accident occurred in Vermont, and the rights of the parties are governed by the law of that state.

Under our decisions the illegal conduct of the plaintiff in operating his machine without a license to do so was merely evidence of negligence on his part. But on the whole evidence the jury have found, not only that he was in the exercise of due care, but also that this illegal conduct did not contribute to the injury sued for. Under our common law therefore, it was not a bar to his recovery. Holland v Boston, 213 Mass. 560, 100 N.E. 1009; Bourne v Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, 95 N.E. 404, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 701; Moran v. Dickinson, 204 Mass. 559, 90 N.E. 1150. There was no evidence as to the law of Vermont upon this question, and its common law is presumed to be the same as ours. Hazen v. Mathews, 184 Mass. 388, 68 N.E. 838; Gordon v. Knott, 199 Mass. 173, 179, 85 N.E. 184, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 762. The plaintiff's recovery cannot be defeated upon this ground.

But it was undisputed that by the statute law of Vermont the owner of an automobile or motor vehicle must annually, by application to the Secretary of State upon a specified blank, cause it to be registered, and that a further statute provided that 'no automobile or motor vehicle shall be operated upon a public highway' unless so registered. Did the plaintiff's failure to have his automobile so registered, and the fact that without such registration he was operating it upon a public highway in Vermont, prevent him from maintaining this action?

We held in Dudley v. Northampton Street Railway, 202 Mass 443, 89 N.E. 25, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561, that under our statutes one who was operating an automobile upon our public ways without its being registered as required by those statutes was a mere trespasser upon the way, and had no greater rights against persons who were lawfully using the way than that they should not recklessly or wantonly injure him or his property. That rule has been followed in our later cases. Feeley v. Melrose, 205 Mass. 329, 91 N.E. 306, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1156, 137 Am. St. Rep. 445; Trombley v. Stevens-Duryea Co., 206 Mass. 516, 518, 92 N.E. 764; Chase v. New York Central & Hudson River R. R., 208 Mass. 137, 156 et seq., 94 N.E. 377; Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, 172, 95 N.E. 404, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 701; Love v. Worcester Cons. St. Ry. Co., 213 Mass. 137, 99 N.E. 960; Holland v. Boston, 213 Mass. 560, 562, 100 N.E. 1009. The Dudley Case, ubi supra, turned partly upon the language of some of the provisions of the statute, which, so far as the evidence at the trial showed (and we cannot go beyond that evidence), are not found in the statutes of Vermont. But the decisive feature of our decisions has been that the prohibition of the use of unregistered automobiles upon the public ways was intended, not merely to create a public duty to be enforced in the ordinary administration of the criminal law, but to provide for the protection of travelers upon the highways, to regulate the rights of such travelers among themselves. So it was said in the Dudley Case, 202 Mass. 443, 448, 89 N.E. 25, 28, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561: 'It is a reasonable assumption that the Legislature intended to put these forbidden and dangerous machines outside the pale of travelers.' So again in Chase v. New York Central & Hudson River R. R., 208 Mass. 137, 158, 94 N.E. 377, 385, the court said: 'Under the decisions, the operation of the unregistered automobile is deemed to be unlawful in every feature and aspect...