Holden v. Merritt

• Decision Date: 15 December 1894
• Parties: HOLDEN v. MERRITT.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

92 Iowa 707

61 N.W. 390

HOLDEN

v.MERRITT.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 15, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Linn county; J. H. Preston, Judge.

Action at law to recover damages for malicious prosecution. Trial to a jury, verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.H. M. Remley and Thompson & Stewart, for appellant.

Smith & Clemens and J. W. Jamison, for appellee.

DEEMER, J.

It is claimed in the petition that the defendant maliciously, and without probable cause, induced one Eaton, a postoffice inspector of the United States for the state of Iowa, to file an information before a United States commissioner accusing plaintiff of having taken from the post office in Central City, Iowa, about the 2d of July, 1891, a letter or package addressed to the defendant, and of opening the same, without defendant's consent, with the design of obstructing the correspondence and prying into the business and secrets of the defendant, and with endeavoring to conceal and secrete the correspondence of the defendant. It is averred that the charge was wholly false, and without probable cause, and that, when presented to the grand jury, it wholly ignored it, and plaintiff was discharged. The defendant denies making any charge against the plaintiff to the post-office authorities, and says that all he did was to answer inquiries propounded to him by the government inspector who was investigating the matter, in which he stated that plaintiff had, without his knowledge and consent, opened a private letter addressed to him, at Central City, Iowa; that the statement so made was true, was made in good faith, and was privileged.

In order to recover, it was necessary for plaintiff to establish each of the following matters: (1) That he was prosecuted in a criminal action, substantially as alleged. (2) that the prosecution was instigated or procured by the defendant; (3) that the prosecution has terminated in the acquittal or discharge of the plaintiff; (4) that it was without probable cause; and (5) that it was malicious.

It is insisted on the part of the defendant that there is no evidence that he instigated or procured the prosecution. The evidence shows that from April 1 to July 4, 1891, the plaintiff and defendant were engaged in the general merchandising business, at the town of Central City, under the firm name of Merritt & Holden. They did not get along pleasantly, and on the 3d or 4th of July dissolved partnership. There is testimony tending to show that, about the time of the dissolution, Merritt remarked to witnesses in the case “that Holden had been opening his mail, and he could prove it, and that he would put him where the dogs wouldn't bite him.” Merritt says himself that shortly thereafter he consulted with the Honorable William G. Thompson in regard to accusing plaintiff of the crime charged against him; that Thompson told him to see Francis, the deputy United States marshal; that he concluded to lay the matter before the United States officers, and went to see Mr. Francis, and to him stated the case; that thereafter Eaton, the inspector, came to see him; and that he related the facts, as he claims them to be, to Eaton. There is testimony tending to show that Francis communicated the fact that complaint had been made to him to Eaton, and that Eaton went to see defendant by reason of this complaint, and that Eaton, after hearing the statements of the defendant, and of his son, filed the information upon which plaintiff was arrested. There is also testimony tending to show that, after the examination of plaintiff before the commissioner, defendant said to the plaintiff, “If you had behaved yourself, and made no disturbance, I wouldn't have done anything with you.” If the jury believed this testimony, as they had a right to do,--although much of it was denied by the defendant,--then it is apparent that the defendant set the machinery of the law in motion; at least, the jury was authorized to so find. It need not be shown that the defendant ordered or directed the warrant or process to issue, or that he participated in its execution. If he, on his own motion, gave information or made complaint to the officers of the law in such a manner as that, in the regular and ordinary course of events, an arrest must be made, or will probably follow, this is sufficient to warrant the jury in finding him the real prosecutor. Grant v. Deuel, 3 Rob. (La.) 17; Dennis v. Ryan, 65 N. Y. 385;Walser v. Thies, 56 Mo. 89.

Again, it is insisted that defendant simply gave to Eaton, the inspector, a true statement of the facts in the case, and left it with him to determine whether an offense had been committed, and the propriety of the proceeding with the charge, and that the rule announced in Newman v. Davis, 58 Iowa, 449, 10 N. W. 852, wherein it is said: “If a justice of the peace, by mistake of judgment, conceives an act to be a felony which is not a felony, and in consequence of that mistake causes an innocent person to be arrested and imprisoned, the law will not hold the person who made the complaint responsible, in this form of action, for the consequences thereof,”--should apply. It will be noticed in that case that no information was filed against the defendant in the criminal action. The prosecuting witness simply stated the facts to the justice, who wrote them in his docket, and thereupon issued a warrant for the arrest of the party charged. The informationin that case did not charge upon the person complained against any specific offense, nor did the facts stated impute any crime. No information was at any time filed. The language above set forth from...