Holden v. State

• Decision Date: 20 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 345,2010.,345
• Citation: 23 A.3d 843
• Parties: Michael HOLDEN, Defendant Below, Appellant,v.STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

23 A.3d 843

Michael HOLDEN, Defendant Below, Appellant,

v.STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

No. 345

2010.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: March 23, 2011.Decided: June 20, 2011.

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, Cr. ID. No. 1001017724.Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED.Eugene J. Maurer, Jr., Wilmington, Delaware for appellant.Maria T. Knoll and Timothy J. Donovan, Jr. (argued), Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for appellee.Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices.STEELE, Chief Justice:

On June 30, 2010 after a stipulated bench trial, the trial judge found Michael Holden guilty of Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon. The trial focused on the propriety of the police seizure of the weapon before Holden “carried.” Because the objective evidence failed to establish a reasonable belief that Holden was armed and dangerous before the police searched him and seized the weapon, the trial judge erroneously denied Holden's motion to suppress the illegally obtained evidence. We therefore reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 24, 2010, Officer Fleming and Officer Ham of the Wilmington Police Department were patrolling their district in Wilmington near 4th Street and Rodney Street. The officers observed a Ford Bronco with three black males inside make a left hand turn onto 5th Street without using a turn signal. Officer Fleming ran a registration check on the Bronco, which had a Pennsylvania license plate, and learned that the license plate was registered to a female Pennsylvania resident, Haile Vicks. Fleming and Ham immediately suspected that the Bronco was stolen. After reconfirming, the license plate information with the data center, the officers activated their emergency equipment and put their car in reverse to follow the Bronco.

When the officers reached the Bronco, it had already stopped and pulled off the road, and the front passenger, Michael Holden, was outside the vehicle and walking away from the area. The back seat passenger, Jeremie Campbell, was getting out of the vehicle to follow Holden. Fleming and Ham got out of the police car and ordered Holden and Campbell back to the Bronco. Both men continued walking and the officers ordered them back a second time. After returning to the Bronco, the officers ordered Holden and Campbell back inside the Bronco “to control the scene.”

After all three passengers were “secure” in the Bronco, Ham approached the driver side of the Bronco and Fleming approached the passenger side. The officers obtained proper identification from all 3 occupants and verified that none of them had any outstanding warrants or capiases.¹ Upon returning to the Bronco, Ham questioned David Johnson about the ownership of the vehicle, because Johnson was unable to provide the vehicle's registration. Simultaneously, Fleming went to the passenger side of the vehicle, followed by an Officer Tynes, who had just arrived at the scene.² Fleming then asked Holden if he had any weapons or contraband on his person. Holden answered no. Fleming then ordered Holden out of the vehicle and told him to put his hands on the back of the vehicle, where Officer Tynes was waiting. ³ Tynes then patted Holden down. During that pat down, Tynes found a gun tucked in Holden's front waistband.

The officers arrested Holden and the State indicted him for carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Holden moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the pat down search. The Court held a suppression hearing on May 20, 2010. On June 1, 2010, a judge denied Holden's motion to suppress without explanation.⁴ After a bench trial, the trial judge found Holden guilty of CCDW and sentenced him immediately. Holden appeals.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Judge Erroneously Denied Holden's Motion to Suppress Because The Police Officers Had No Reasonable Articulable Suspicion That Holden Was Armed and Presently Dangerous When the Police Patted Him Down and Discovered the Weapon.

On appeal, Holden claims the trial judge erroneously denied his motion to suppress the firearm because the police lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous when they conducted the pat down search. We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion.⁵ To the extent the claim of error implicates questions of law; however, the standard of review is de novo.⁶ We review a trial judge's factual findings to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the findings and whether those findings were clearly erroneous.⁷ Here, the trial judge denied the suppression motion after an evidentiary hearing without making any factual findings and without supplying a written or transcribed oral decision for review. Our case law mandates that a judge make factual determinations and supply a legal rationale for a judicial decision as a matter of law.⁸ Failure to do so may be an abuse of discretion.⁹ As we have acknowledged before, “[w]e are mindful of the tremendous time burdens on our trial courts. But it is part of a trial judge's adjudicative responsibilities ‘to state the reasons for his action, no matter how briefly.’ ” ¹⁰

Generally, police officers can stop an individual for investigatory purposes if they have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. ¹¹ Reasonable suspicion is defined as the officer's ability “to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants the intrusion.” ¹² In determining whether reasonable articulable suspicion exists, we “must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the situation as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in the same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts with such an officer's subjective interpretation of those facts.” ¹³ That said, such an officer is justified in “frisking” an individual only if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is armed and presently dangerous. ¹⁴

A police officer who observes a traffic violation has probable cause to stop the vehicle and its driver.¹⁵ During a lawful traffic stop, a police officer may order both the driver and passengers out of the vehicle pending completion of the traffic stop.¹⁶ The scope and duration of the detention must be reasonably related to the initial justification for the traffic stop.¹⁷ A police officer may not conduct a pat down search of a person during a traffic stop unless the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person subject to the frisk is armed and dangerous.¹⁸ This reasonable suspicion standard is the same standard that is applied to a pedestrian reasonably suspected of criminal activity under Terry v. Ohio.¹⁹ With these principles in mind, we examine whether, under the totality of the circumstances here, the police possessed a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop and frisk Holden.

Holden concedes that the initial vehicle stop was valid.²⁰ We agree. The record shows that the officers pulled over the Bronco after observing the driver make a turn without signaling and that a license plate check revealed a fictitious tag. After running the license plate, the officers were suspicious that the vehicle may be stolen.²¹ Based on these observations, the officers had probable cause to stop the Bronco for the traffic violations and inquire into the vehicle's ownership.

Holden was already outside the vehicle when the officers arrived. ²² With tasers drawn, Fleming and Ham ordered Holden back to the vehicle, and after the second order, Holden complied.²³ Even though Holden was detained before the police ordered him back inside the vehicle, ²⁴ neither officer asked Holden any questions about his identity, his address, or his purpose for being there.²⁵ Fleming did not notice any bulge on Holden's clothing; and in fact, did not even believe Holden was armed and dangerous before ordering him to get back in the vehicle.²⁶ Fleming testified that had he thought Holden armed and dangerous, he would have frisked him before putting him back in the vehicle.²⁷

This Court cannot, however, conclude from the above facts that the police had the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk Holden when he was ordered out of the vehicle. There are insufficient articulable facts that when viewed objectively, suggest Holden was armed. After identifying the vehicle's occupants, the police determined that none of them had any outstanding warrants. When the officers returned to the vehicle, there were three police officers and three vehicle occupants. After Johnson, the driver, was unable to answer questions regarding the vehicle's ownership, Ham asked him to step out of the vehicle.²⁸ Simultaneously, the police ordered Holden out of the vehicle and Tynes frisked him.²⁹ The record reflects that the police never questioned Holden about being out that night or about the vehicle's ownership.³⁰ The objective facts at this point were: (1) Holden was a passenger in a vehicle with a fictitious tag; (2) Holden walked away from the vehicle when the police arrived; (3) Holden returned to the vehicle; (4) the police ordered Holden inside the vehicle without frisking him for weapons; (5) the police saw no weapons in the vehicle or any bulge on Holden's body indicating a weapon; (6) the police frisked Holden immediately after ordering him from the vehicle before they gathered any additional facts.

The State suggests that because the driver could not answer questions about the car it became more likely that the car was stolen, and that therefore, the passengers were likely armed. We disagree. Based on the objective facts, we cannot extrapolate from the fact of a fictitious tag alone that (i) a car theft occurred ³¹ and that (ii) the occupants must be armed and dangerous. Even...