Holder v. Cannon Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 11 May 1904 |
| Parties | HOLDER v. CANNON MFG. CO. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Cabarrus County; McNeill, Judge.
Action by D. M. Holder against the Cannon Manufacturing Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
W. G Means, for appellant.
Montgomery & Crowell and M. B. Stickley, for appellee.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover of the defendant damages for causing him to be discharged from the service and employment of the Gibson Manufacturing Company. There was evidence to the effect that in June, 1903, the plaintiff was employed and at that time in the service of the Gibson Manufacturing Company, and that his work was satisfactory to the company, according to the testimony of W. E. Stafford the boss of the weaving room in which the plaintiff worked. The plaintiff testified that when Stafford discharged him he asked Stafford the cause of the discharge, and Stafford replied that he had had a letter from the Cannon Manufacturing Company, and that that company wanted him discharged, but that he hated to do it. He also testified that B. A. Price, the superintendent of the Gibson Mill, told him that he had a letter from the Cannon Company, and had to follow it. He said further that he asked Roberts, the boss weaver at the Cannon Mill, whether he or Barnhardt, assistant manager of the defendant, wrote the letter, and that Roberts made no answer Price and Stafford both testified for the defendant that they had never received any letter from any person connected with the Cannon Mill in reference to the discharge of the plaintiff, and that they never said one word to the plaintiff about having received such a letter. That evidence of the plaintiff was nothing but hearsay, and would not have been received if it had been objected to by the defendant. But, not having been objected to, it went to the jury as evidence, and there is no exception to it to be heard by us.
E. C Barnhardt testified for the defendant that he was assistant manager of both the defendant company and the Gibson Company, and that he had the authority to discharge or have hands discharged; that he, as assistant manager of the Gibson Mill, had the plaintiff discharged of his own motion, without conference or suggestion from any officer or agent of the defendant company, and that there was no letter about discharging him. On cross-examination that witness said that he discharged the plaintiff because he refused to make up some lost time at the Cannon Mill, and he did not want that kind of a man at the Gibson Mill; that the plaintiff had gone out on a strike at the Cannon Mill; and that, upon seeing his looms standing still, he asked the plaintiff if he was sick, and he answered that he was not. The witness further testified that the defendant company is a different company from the Gibson Company, but that the general officers, managers, and assistant managers are the same in both companies, and attend to the business of each and both. In the fourth allegation of the complaint it was alleged that the defendant company, through its officers or agents, while the plaintiff was in the employment of the Gibson Company, unlawfully, willfully, and maliciously, for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff in his occupation and reputation, and of humiliating him, and depriving him of the right to earn a living, conspired to have discharged, and procured the discharge of, the plaintiff from the employment of the Gibson Company by certain false and fraudulent representations. In the answer there was a general denial of that allegation. On the trial the defendant undertook to show by evidence that it had no communication with or suggestion from the defendant company on the subject of the plaintiff's discharge from the employment of the Gibson Company, but that the Gibson Company acted in the matter solely and entirely upon information which came to Barnhardt, the assistant manager of the Gibson Company, by reason of his connection with the defendant company. Upon Barnhardt's testimony the defendant could have asked the court to instruct the jury that, as the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant was indefinite as to time, the defendant company would not be responsible for the discharge of the plaintiff because of knowledge of the character of the plaintiff and of his conduct at the defendant's mill, acquired by Barnhardt as assistant manager of both mills. But no such request for instructions was made by the defendant. The jury took the view, notwithstanding the testimony of Price, of Stafford, and of Barnhardt, that no letter or communication had been received by the Gibson Company from the defendant on the subject of the plaintiff's discharge; that the plaintiff's testimony to that effect was true; and their verdict was rendered on that theory of the case.
The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that he was discharged without cause by the defendant company, and that he was discharged from the employment of the Gibson Company, while giving satisfaction in his work to that company, by a letter from the defendant demanding his discharge from the service of the Gibson Company, and upon that evidence, believed by the jury, the law applicable to the case seems to be clear. In order to constitute malice in a case like the present, it is not necessary that the defendant should show actual ill will or hatred to the plaintiff, but it is sufficient if the act done, to the apparent damage of the plaintiff, is without legal excuse. Any person who by any act causes the discharge of another from the service of a third party maliciously and willfully--that is, without lawful justification-- is liable to the injured party for damages. Haskins v. Royster, 70 N.C. 601, 16 Am. Rep. 780; Morgan v. Smith, 77 N.C. 37.
There was no exception to the charge of his honor. The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury to answer the first issue: "Did the defendant wrongfully and unlawfully cause the discharge of the plaintiff by the Gibson Manufacturing Company as alleged in the complaint?" "No." And the instruction was properly refused. Again, the...
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