Holder v. Ill. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 02 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–1456.,12–1456. |
| Citation | 751 F.3d 486 |
| Parties | Zane HOLDER, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and Illinois Department Of Central Management Services, Defendants–Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John A. Baker, Baker, Baker & Krajewski, Springfield, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Mary Ellen Welsh, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendants–Appellants.
Before POSNER, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
Zane Holder began working for the Illinois Department of Corrections (Department) in 2006 as a correctional officer at the Shawnee Correctional Center in Illinois. Unfortunately, a few years later, Holder's wife, Sarah, began to suffer from mental health problems relating to opiate dependency. Holder found it necessary to take leave from work to care for and provide emotional support for his wife.
In order to assess his options, Holder spoke with the facility's Family and MedicalLeave Act (FMLA) coordinator. Holder, like all new employees, had received information about FMLA leave when he was hired. Nevertheless, at the time Holder asked about his options to care for his wife, the human resources representative gave him another informational packet which explained FMLA leave. FMLA entitles eligible employees to twelve work weeks of leave during a twelve month period to care for a spouse with a serious medical condition (the definition of which we will discuss more below). 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
Soon after, Holder informed the warden about his need for a leave of absence under the FMLA. On October 3, 2007, Holder submitted an FMLA medical certification form indicating that his wife suffered from a serious health condition as defined under the Act and that she was currently incapacitated with a chronic mood disorder and substance abuse disorder. Sarah Holder's psychiatrist checked the box indicating that it would “be necessary for the employee to take off work only intermittently or to work less than a full schedule as a result of the condition,” and that the need for leave would continue for an “unknown” duration. Holder received written notification from the Department of Corrections that his FMLA request had been approved. The Department never asked him to submit any additional medical documentation supporting his claim for FMLA benefits, and it continued to pay its share of his health insurance premium until April 18, 2008.
The FMLA medical certification form that Holder submitted attributed to FMLA leave seven absences that Holder had already taken in August and September, 2007. The rest of the absences were recorded when Holder called into work on a day-by-day basis to advise the Department that he would need to be home to care for his wife. The officer receiving the phone call would fill out the first part of the Notification of Absence form and then, upon returning to work, Holder would complete the form indicating which type of leave he had taken, as required by the procedures. The Department approved each and every one of his requests. All in all, Holder requested and received FMLA leave for approximately 130 days as listed below:
September 30–October 2, 2007 (the Department initially reported 11)
9 days
October 2007 (the Department initially reported 11)
7 days
November 2007
9 days
December 2007
13 days
January 2008
17 days
February 2008
13 days
March 2008
19 days
April (through the 17th) 2008
11 days
April 18–30 2008
7 days
On April 18, 2008, the FMLA coordinator advised Holder that his FMLA leave had expired and that if he needed additional leave, he would have to take it under a comparable state program—the Illinois Family Responsibility Leave program (FRL). The State's leave program allows up to a year of unpaid leave “under circumstances temporarily inconsistent with uninterrupted employment of State service” 80 Ill. Admin. Code § 303.148(d), such as “provid[ing] regular care to a disabled, incapacitated or bedridden” family member 20 ILCS § 415/8c(5). Under the FRL program, the State only covers an employee's insurance premiums for up to six months. 80 Ill. Admin. Code § 303.148(n).
Between April 20 and June 9, 2008, Holder took twenty-nine absences, listing the State leave program on the “Notification of Absence” forms. The Warden disapproved his requests for June 8–9 and on the denied form, Holder wrote “last one!!!”
More than eight months later, in February 2009, the Illinois Department of Central Management Services informed Holder that the State had mistakenly paid for his health insurance premiums past the sixtieth day to which he was entitled leave, including from January 1, 2008, through June 30, 2008, and that Holder was responsible for repaying those health premiums. Beginning May 31, 2009, the State began garnishing Holder's wages, deducting 25% of his earnings each month until he had refunded $8,291.83. Holder filed suit claiming that the State defendants (the Departments of Corrections and the Department of Central Management Services) interfered with his rights under the FMLA by denying him intermittent leave beginning on or about January 1, 2008, by failing to provide notice that Holder's FMLA leave was exhausted, and by requiring him to repay the premiums beginning in January 2008. The State argued that Holder was not entitled to FMLA leave, that he never returned from that leave, and that the Department was not required to pay his health insurance premiums. Holder countered that he was entitled to continue his leave after the sixtieth day because the Department approved those additional days of FMLA leave and now was equitably estopped from denying it. The parties disputed when Holder had reached the sixtieth day of leave. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.
In its summary judgment ruling, the court held that the State was equitably estopped from asserting that Holder was not entitled to FMLA leave. After reviewing the elements of equitable estoppel, the court stated:
[T]he Department represented to Holder that it had approved his FMLA leave based on the medical certification form. The Department's approval of Holder's request for FMLA leave is essentially an assertion by the Department that it was satisfied Sarah suffered from a serious health condition. Holder detrimentally relied on that representation by taking absences, believing the Department would cover his insurance premiums, and not pursuing FRL. Further, the Department could have requested more information concerning Sarah's condition if it did not believe the doctor's certification was sufficient; the department, however, failed to do so. Thus it was reasonable for Holder to rely on the Department's representation that it was satisfied Sarah suffered from a serious health condition. Accordingly, the Department is now estopped from asserting Holder was not entitled to FMLA leave.
(R. 48, p.6) (emphasis ours).
The court concluded that a jury would have to resolve the following factual issues that still remained: (1) When Holder's leave expired—that is, when he took his sixtieth day of leave; (2) Whether it was reasonable for Holder to rely on the Department's representations that he was entitled to FMLA leave after his sixtieth absence; (3) If it was reasonable for Holder to rely on the Department's misrepresentations, how many days after the sixtieth day was Holder's reliance reasonable. ( Id. p.11). Ultimately the parties stipulated before trial that the sixtieth day of Holder's leave occurred on January 31, 2008. The parties also stipulated that the State's portion of Holder's insurance premium that the defendants withheld from Holder's paycheck was $611.05 per pay period and that there were two pay periods each month.
Before trial, Holder filed a motion in limine seeking to bar “the Defendants from offering any evidence or from arguing that Holder was not entitled or eligible for FMLA leave.” (R. 50, p.2). The State responded that it did not object based on the ruling of the court but wished to preserve the issue for appeal. (R. 51, pp.1–2).
Three days before jury selection, the defendants moved to amend the pre-trial order to remove Holder's claim as to January 2008, stating that the action was moot as the defendants had asked the Illinois Comptroller to cut a check for Holder for the disputed amount. The court stated that “January [2008] will not be an issue before the jury [but] may very well be an issue for the Court.” (R. 86, Tr. 10/26/11, p.21).
At the close of the evidence Holder moved for partial judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, for the premiums withheld in January 2008, arguing that by stipulation, the sixtieth day of FMLA leave did not occur until January 31, 2008, and thus the State was unquestionably required to pay for the premiums for that month. Rather than ruling on the motion immediately, the judge took it under advisement. The State then moved for judgment as a matter of law under the same rule arguing (1) that they had already sent a request to the comptroller to cut a check for January 1, 2008 through January 30, 2008, and that the FMLA limits employees to sixty days of leave and that any days that Holder took after that were not covered by the FMLA regardless of any facts of the case. The court denied the State's motion.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the State, and after dismissing and then speaking with the jurors, the judge returned to the bench to address the pending Rule 50 motion, granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the month of January and awarding the plaintiff $1,222.10 for January 2008. The court entered a judgment for the defendants for the rest of the months. After some post-trial motions which we will address in the course of the decision, this appeal followed.
We begin by addressing the State's argument regarding the propriety of the Rule 50 motion, a legal decision which we review de novo. Rapold...
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