Holder v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Ark. 10/9/2003)

• Decision Date: 09 October 2003
• Docket Number: CR 03-3
• Citation: ___ S.W.3d ___
• Parties: Elbert HOLDER v. STATE of Arkansas.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 1

___ S.W.3d ___

Elbert HOLDER v. STATE of Arkansas.

CR 03-3

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered October 9, 2003

1. EVIDENCE — CHALLENGE TO SUFFICIENCY OF — EVIDENCE VIEWED IN LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO STATE. — In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the supreme court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and considers only the evidence that supports the verdict.

2. EVIDENCE — SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE — DEFINED. — The supreme court will affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it; substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture.

3. EVIDENCE — CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE — MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH DEFENDANT'S GUILT & INCONSISTENT WITH ANY OTHER REASONABLE CONCLUSION. — Circumstantial evidence may provide the basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion; in other words, if there are two equally reasonable conclusions as to what occurred, this merely gives rise to a suspicion of guilt, which is not enough to support a conviction.

4. CRIMINAL LAW — ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY — CORROBORATION REQUIRED. — The testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated before a defendant may be convicted of a felony.

5. CRIMINAL LAW — CAPITAL MURDER — SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED JURY VERDICT. — Where, among other things, much of the testimony against appellant was provided by an accomplice who helped appellant plan and carry out the murder, the evidence constituted substantial evidence in support of the jury verdict; further, although the accomplice was a key witness, her testimony was corroborated by other evidence connecting appellant with the murder; there was no merit to appellant's claim that the trial court denied his directed-verdict motion in error.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — COMPULSORY PROCESS — CRIMINAL DEFENDANT MUST SHOW TESTIMONY WOULD BE MATERIAL & FAVORABLE. — Before a criminal defendant can show that he or she was deprived of the right to compulsory process, he or she must show that the testimony would be both material and favorable to his or her case.

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — COMPULSORY PROCESS — APPELLANT SHOWED NO PREJUDICE FROM TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOT TO ORDER WITNESSES' APPEARANCE & TESTIMONY. — Where it was clear that appellant was simply hoping that the subpoenaed witnesses would provide helpful testimony, this fell short of the required showing that the testimony would have been both material and favorable to his case; therefore, appellant showed no prejudice from the trial court's decision not to order the witnesses' appearance and testimony; additionally, the testimony that was offered at the hearing did not show bias by the trial judge.

8. JUDGES — AVOIDANCE OF ALL APPEARANCES OF BIAS — PRESUMPTION OF IMPARTIALITY. — Both the Arkansas Constitution, article 7, section 20, and the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C (2003), provide that a judge shall not preside over cases in which a judge might be interested and that a judge must avoid all appearances of bias; a trial court enjoys a presumption of impartiality.

9. JUDGES — BIAS — QUESTION CONFINED TO CONSCIENCE OF JUDGE. — The question of bias is usually confined to the conscience of the judge; even where a judge knows someone connected with another criminal case involving the defendant, that mere fact standing alone is not cause for recusal.

10. JUDGES — RECUSAL — DISCRETIONARY DECISION. — The decision of whether to recuse is within the trial court's discretion; abuse of that discretion must be proven by showing bias or prejudice.

11. JUDGES — RECUSAL — REVIEW FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — To decide whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the supreme court reviews the record to see if prejudice or bias was exhibited; the party seeking recusal must demonstrate bias; unless there is an objective showing of bias, there must be a communication of bias in order to require recusal for implied bias; absent some objective demonstration by the appellant of the trial judge's prejudice, it is the communication of bias by the judge that will cause the supreme court to reverse his or her refusal to recuse.

12. JUDGES — RECUSAL — NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE OF JUDGE'S LIFE EXPERIENCES. — A judge is not required to recuse because of his or her life experiences.

13. JUDGES — RECUSAL — NO OBJECTIVE SHOWING OF PREJUDICE OR COMMUNICATION OF BIAS. — In the present case, there was no objective showing of prejudice or communication of bias.

14. JUDGES — RECUSAL — REVIEW OF RECORD FAILED TO REVEAL PREJUDICE OR BIAS IN TRIAL COURT'S HANDLING OF CASE. — The supreme court's review of the record failed to reveal prejudice or bias in the trial court's handling of the case.

15. JURY — BATSON RULE — PEREMPTORY STRIKES MAY NOT BE USED TO EXCLUDE JURORS SOLELY ON BASIS OF RACE. — Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), a prosecutor in a criminal case may not use his peremptory strikes to exclude jurors solely on the basis of race; similarly, a criminal defendant may not exercise peremptory challenges based on race of the juror or racial stereotypes.

16. JURY — BATSON CHALLENGE — THREE STEPS FOR TRIAL COURT TO FOLLOW. — The following three steps are to be followed by a trial court when a Batson challenge is made:(1) the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie case of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must come forward with a race-neutral explanation; and (3) the trial court must decide whether the opponent has proven purposeful racial discrimination.

17. JURY — BATSON CHALLENGE — THREE-STEP PROCESS. — The supreme court has delineated a three-step process to be used in the case of Batson challenges: first, the strike's opponent must present facts to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination; that is, the opponent must present a prima facie case of racial discrimination; second, once the strike's opponent has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to present a race-neutral explanation for the strike; if a race-neutral explanation is given, the inquiry proceeds to the third step, in which the trial court must decide whether the strike's opponent has proven purposeful discrimination; here, the strike's opponent must persuade the trial court that the expressed motive of the striking party is not genuine but, rather, is the product of discriminatory intent.

18. JURY — BATSON CHALLENGE — ESTABLISHING PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT. — With respect to proving a Batson violation, the first step of making a prima facie case of purposeful discriminatory intent in the use of peremptory strikes is accomplished by showing: (1) that the strike's opponent is a member of an identifiable racial group; (2) that the strike is part of a jury-selection process or pattern designed to discriminate; and (3) that the strike was used to exclude jurors because of their race.

19. JURY — BATSON CHALLENGE — ISSUE OF PRIMA FACIE CASE BECOMES MOOT WHERE PARTY STRIKING JURORS OFFERS RACE-NEUTRAL EXPLANATION & TRIAL COURT RULES ON ULTIMATE ISSUE OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION. — Once the party striking jurors offers a race-neutral explanation, and the trial court rules on the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether a prima facie case was shown becomes moot.

20. JURY — BATSON CHALLENGE — REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT'S RULING. — The supreme court will reverse a trial court's ruling on a Batson challenge only when its findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence; in making Batson rulings, the supreme court accords some measure of deference to the trial court as it is in a superior position to make these determinations because it has the opportunity to observe the parties and determine their credibility; moreover, unless discriminatory intent appears in the prosecution's explanation, the reason given will be considered race-neutral.

21. JURY — BATSON CHALLENGE — REQUIREMENTS FOR FINDING ON PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION. — In step three under Batson, the trial court must make a finding of fact whether purposeful discrimination has been shown; this requires the trial court to determine whether the party opposing the strikes has carried the burden of proving purposeful discrimination; proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause; the ultimate burden of persuasion that there is purposeful discriminatory intent rests with and never shifts from the party opposing the strikes.

22. JURY — BATSON CHALLENGE — DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE. — Discriminatory purpose implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of the consequences; it implies that the decision maker selected a particular course of action at least in part "because of" not merely "in spite of" its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.

23. JURY — BATSON CHALLENGE — PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATORY INTENT MUST BE PROVEN. — Intent to discriminate based on race must be shown; thus, disparate impact alone is not enough to prove purposeful discriminatory intent under step three of the Batson analysis; striking even one juror for racial reasons violates the Equal Protection Clause; however, purposeful discriminatory intent must be proven.

24. JURY — BATSON CHALLENGE — PATTERN OF STRIKES. — Under step one in a Batson challenge, a pattern of strikes may provide sufficient proof to state a prima facie case; however, even under step one, a party who requests a prima facie finding of purposeful discrimination is obligated to develop a record beyond numbers.

25. JURY — BATSON CHALLENGE — FINDINGS CLEARLY AGAINST PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. — Because the trial court proceeded to step three under Batson, it was apparent that the trial...