Holguin v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo

• Citation: 954 S.W.2d 843
• Decision Date: 28 August 1997
• Docket Number: No. 08-96-00124-CV,08-96-00124-CV
• Parties: Linda HOLGUIN, as Next Friend of Jaji Rubio, a Minor,Individually and as Next of Kin to Rosa Sifuentes, Deceased, Appellant, v. YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

Page 843

954 S.W.2d 843

Linda HOLGUIN, as Next Friend of Jaji Rubio, a Minor,Individually and as Next of Kin to Rosa Sifuentes, Deceased, Appellant, v. YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO, Appellee.

No. 08-96-00124-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas El Paso.

Aug. 28, 1997.

Rehearings Overruled Nov. 19, 1997.

Woodrow W. Bean, II, El Paso, for appellant.

Kurt Paxson, Steven L. Hughes, Mounce, Green, Myers, Safi & Galatzan, El Paso, for appellee.

Before LARSEN, McCLURE and CHEW, JJ.

OPINION

McCLURE, Justice.

In this case, we address a question unaddressed by any Texas appellate court or, for that matter, by another court in the United States: whether the immunity enjoyed by federally recognized Indian tribes serves to bar a private suit brought pursuant to a state dram shop act by the survivors of a person who became intoxicated at a tribal casino and was subsequently killed in an off-reservation automobile accident. We answer in the affirmative, and conclude that:

the State of Texas created the Texas Dram Shop Act (the Act) pursuant to its police power to regulate the use of alcohol;

under 18 U.S.C. § 1161 and Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 103 S.Ct. 3291, 77 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983), the decision of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo to sell alcohol at a tribal casino subjects the Tribe to the Act;

tribal sovereign immunity cannot bar the State of Texas from enforcing the provisions of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code (the Code) against the Tribe, including the imposition of penalties for non-compliance with the Act; but

despite the public policy function served by private dram shop suits, tribal sovereign immunity protects the Tribe from private suits for personal injuries resulting from non-compliance with the Act.

SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

For purposes of evaluating the summary judgment granted by the trial court, we take as true all factual allegations contained in Appellant's complaint. On or about August 26, 1994, Rosa Sifuentes entered the casino of the Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, also known as the Tigua Indian Reservation. While in the casino, she drank alcoholic beverages served by employees who continued to serve her alcohol past the point at which she became obviously intoxicated. After Sifuentes left the casino, she lost control of her car and collided head-on with another vehicle on Alameda Avenue, which borders the reservation to the north. Sifuentes died of injuries resulting from the accident. Appellant brought suit, alleging wrongful death and survival, negligence, gross negligence, premises liability, and civil liability under the Texas Dram Shop Act.

The Tribe filed a motion for summary judgment, requesting that the court take judicial notice of its status as a federally recognized Indian tribe, as reflected in 25 U.S.C. § 1300g[the Ysleta Del Sur Restoration Act]. It argued that it was immune from Appellant's civil suit for personal injuries, and that only an explicit waiver of immunity by Congress would make it amenable to suit or liability.

Appellant responded by urging that federal law did not immunize Indian tribes from the exercise of police power by the states to regulate the traffic of liquor and to ensure public safety, especially in cases involving non-Indians. Appellant also requested a continuance of the summary judgment hearing in order to conduct further discovery. The trial court denied the continuance, granted summary judgment, and severed Appellant's claims against a co-defendant.

On appeal, Appellant raises seven points of error. In points one through six, she alleges that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on tribal immunity. In the seventh, she contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant the continuance. We affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On summary judgment, a movant/defendant must as a matter of law either (1) conclusively negate one or more of the elements of the plaintiff's cause of action; or (2) establish a complete affirmative defense as a matter of law. El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex.1987). Unlike other final judgments reviewed on appeal, we do not review the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment of the trial court. Continental Savings Association v. Collins, 814 S.W.2d 829, 831-32 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ). As explained in Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985), (1) the movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, all admissible evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true; (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and all doubts resolved in the non-movant's favor.

The Texas Supreme Court has determined that the Legislature intended to include the intoxicated person who causes the accident among those who may sue under the Act. Smith v. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.1993). Appellant's first points of error therefore require us to determine whether the tribal sovereign immunity enjoyed by the Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo as a federally recognized Indian tribe protects the Tribe from suit and liability under the Texas Dram Shop Act, TEX.ALCO.BEV.CODE ANN. §§ 2.01-2.03 (Vernon 1995).

TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Tribal Immunity in General

Indian tribes have long enjoyed the status of "domestic dependent nations." Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 8, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831). Absent clear congressional and/or tribal waiver, common law principles of sovereign immunity apply to Indian tribes. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 106, 113-14 (1978).

One specific attribute of tribal sovereignty consists of immunity from suit in state courts. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S.Ct. 905, 909, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112, 1120-21 (1991). In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959), the United States Supreme Court ruled that state laws were permitted to intrude only where essential tribal relations were not involved. In the absence of specific acts of Congress, states could not infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220, 79 S.Ct. at 270-71. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973), the Supreme Court specified that states could only pass or enforce laws applying to Indian tribes that did not interfere with tribal self-government and that involved non-Indians. McClanahan refocused the approach away from "inherent Indian sovereignty" and toward evaluating the "applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power" in order to determine if state regulation is preempted by federal law. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172, 93 S.Ct. at 1262.

As defined by McClanahan and its progeny, the basic assumptions with respect to tribal sovereignty are that (1) Indian tribes inherently possess the authority to govern their internal affairs; (2) states cannot interfere with tribal self-government; and (3) Congress possesses plenary power to limit the sovereignty of Indian tribes. After McClanahan, Indian tribes are presumed to have authority, but the scope of the tribes' inherent power to govern their internal affairs is defined by Congress. The states, in turn, have power over areas of regulation that Congress has taken away from the tribes but not placed under federal control. The power of a state to exercise control over an aspect of tribal affairs therefore ranks third behind the tribe itself and the federal government. The contrast between this general approach to tribal sovereign immunity and the approach adopted when alcohol regulation is at issue will become important to our analysis of the Texas Dram Shop Act.

The Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo

The Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo enjoys the status of a federally recognized tribe under 25 U.S.C. § 1300g-1-7, passed in 1987, and therefore enjoys tribal sovereign immunity. The Tribe consented in 25 U.S.C. § 1300g-4(f) to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the State of Texas according to the terms of Public Law 280, codified as 25 U.S.C. § 1321 and § 1322. The grant of civil jurisdiction found in Public Law 280 is found in 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a):

The consent of the United States is hereby given to any State not having jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country situated within such State to assume, with the consent of the tribe occupying the particular Indian country or part thereof which would be affected by such assumption, such measure of jurisdiction over any and all such civil causes of action arising within such Indian country or any part thereof as may be determined by such State that has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action; and those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country or part thereof as they have elsewhere within that State.

The United States Supreme Court has held that Public Law 280 and its amendments, entitled the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, do not constitute a waiver of tribal immunity. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877, 892, 106 S.Ct. 2305, 2314, 90 L.Ed.2d 881, 894-95 (1986). Public Law 280 was intended to create civil and criminal jurisdiction for the resolution of private disputes between individual Indians or between Indians and non-Indians, not to create jurisdiction over the tribes themselves. Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373, 383-384, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2108-09, 48 L.Ed.2d 710, 718 (1976). Suits brought against Indian...