Holladay v. Langford

• Decision Date: 31 October 1885
• Citation: 87 Mo. 577
• Parties: HOLLADAY, Appellant, v. LANGFORD.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

87 Mo. 577

HOLLADAY, Appellant,

v.LANGFORD.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1885.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Appeals.

AFFIRMED.

George A. Castleman for appellant.

(1) The deed of Castello, sheriff, to James M. Hughes and others, parties to this cause, prior to suit in partition, could not establish an “outstanding title,” and furnished no defence in the cause; besides that deed was subsequent to deed of trust made by Sigerson. (2) If there was any duty to set up, in the partition cause, the title acquired by Holladay, subsequent to the decree in that cause, then it was more the duty of Tracy, as he was plaintiff in the cause, and he cannot invoke his own mission as an estoppel against other parties. (3) While it may be admitted that all parties to the record in the partition cause are concluded by the adjudication of the title upon that date, they are not concluded upon a title subsequently acquired and in no way in conflict with it. (4) As a party in interest and to the cause, Tracy must have known the state of this title; and, even if he were not a party to the suit, Holladay had, by recording the deed to himself, notified Tracy of his exclusive title to lot number forty. The statutes make the filing and recording notice to the world, and Tracy will not be heard to say that he was ignorant of the title. R. S., sec. 679. For “to enable a man to set up title by estoppel, the party must have been ignorant of the true state of the title at the time he took it, or been without means of ascertaining it by reference to records.” Herman's Law of Estoppel, sec. 422; Wood v. Griffin, 46 N. H. 237; Gore v. White, 20 Wis. 430; Hill v. Epley, 31 Pa. 334. “When a title has been once duly recorded no responsibility will arise from a failure to take further steps to warn subsequent purchasers who may fairly be presumed to have taken the means pointed out by law and acquired all the knowledge which it is important for them to have.” Herman's Law of Estoppel, sec. 427; Fisher v. Waserman, 11 Ohio, 542; Knauff v. Thompson, 16 Pa. 357; Hill v. Epley, 31 Pa. 331. (5) The sheriff conveyed in his deed “all the right, title and interest” of the parties to Tracy; but the sheriff was acting under the judgment of partition, and was executing it. This decree was his power and indicated what he was to sell, i. e., the estate held in trust by William M. Hughes for himself and other parties. He could not sell more than he was empowered to sell. (6) At the date of the decree, the original deed of trust made by Sigerson was only a lien upon the property. The parties to it need not have been and were not parties to the cause, Hull v. Lyon, 27 Mo. 570. (7) Title acquired under the deed of trust subsequent to the decree in partition is good even in favor of a party to that cause. Watson v. Priest, 9 Mo. App. 264.

E. T. Farish for respondent.

(1) There is no error in the record. (2) The motion for a new trial raises no objections which can be considered by this court. The only ground specified in the motion is that the court erred in construing the law; by it the error complained of is not indicated; the objection is too vague and indefinite. It would seem that the appellant objected to some ruling of the court in regard to the sufficiency of the advertisement of notice of foreclosure of deed of trust, but the record shows that the objection of the defendant was overruled and the deed admitted in evidence. So that this court is left at last to conjecture as to what was the ground of the decision of the court below. (3) But if the proceedings of the court below were subject to attack, and this court will look into the record to find support for the judgment, it is ag easy matter to sustain the action of the court in givinn judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff was a party to the partition proceeding, in which there was a final decree and order of distribution in April, 1873. The plaintiff took his portion of the proceeds of said sale, including a portion of the money paid for this very property by his co-tenant, John H. Tracy, the lessor of the defendant in this case, and by such act is estopped to assert outstanding or adverse title. W. S., sec. 39, p. 971; Herman on Estoppel, 419; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 304; Sanderson v. Balance, 2 Jones Eq. 323; Ryder v. Rubber Co., 4 Bosw. 169; McCormick v. McMurtrie, 4 Wall. 192; Carr v. Wallace, 7 Wall. 394; Garner v. Bird, 57 Barb. 277; 14 Serg't & R. 27; Moody v. Van Dyke, 4 Bum. 31; Bell v. Haines, 10 Serg't & R. 43. (4) The partition suit was pending in court some four years after Holladay's claim of title accrued under the foreclosure of the Sigerson deed of trust. The judgment in partition settled and established the title to the land and excluded the assertion by any party to the record of any title acquired prior to the final judgment in partition. Jones v. Shanton, 11 Mo. 433; Forder v. Davis, 38 Mo. 107; Pentz v. Kuester, 41 Mo. 447; Parkinson v. Caplinger, 65 Mo. 292; Durham v. Durham, 34 Mo. 447; McMurtry v. Glasscock, 20 Mo. 432.

NORTON, J.

This is a suit in ejectment, begun in the circuit court of St. Louis county in 1877 to recover a parcel of land in the subdivision of the common of Carrondelet, south of the river Des Peres, of 39-98 arpens, known as lot forty of said subdivision. On the trial defendant had judgment which, on plaintiff's appeal, was affirmed by the St. Louis court of appeals, and from which plaintiff appeals to this court. On the trial it was agreed that defendant was in the possession of the land sued for as the lessee of John H. Tracy; that on the twenty-eighth of March, 1857, John Sigerson was seized in fee-simple of the land in controversy.

The plaintiff put in evidence a deed of trust executed by Sigerson the twenty-eighth of March, 1857, conveying among other property, the lot in controversy to secure the payment of a note for five thousand dollars. Default having been made in the payment of said note, the trustee, Williams. on the thirtieth of November, 1869, sold the said lot to the plaintiff, Jesse Holladay, and executed and delivered to him a deed for the same which was duly recorded on the sixth of December, 1869.

The defendant, in support of her title, put in evidence the record...