Holland ex rel. Holland v. Marcy

• Decision Date: 04 December 2002
• Citation: 817 A.2d 1082
• Parties: Joel M. HOLLAND, Heather L. Holland, Minors, by Theresa L. HOLLAND, Parent and Natural Guardian, and Theresa L. Holland, in Her Own Right, Appellants, v. Edward E. MARCY, Appellee, v. Joel R. HOLLAND.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

817 A.2d 1082

Joel M. HOLLAND, Heather L. Holland, Minors, by Theresa L. HOLLAND, Parent and Natural Guardian, and Theresa L. Holland, in Her Own Right, Appellants, v. Edward E. MARCY, Appellee, v. Joel R. HOLLAND.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued February 19, 2002.

Filed December 4, 2002.

Anthony J. Sciarrino, Erie, for appellants.

Joanna K. Budde, Erie, for Marcy, appellee.

Before: DEL SOLE, P.J., JOHNSON, HUDOCK, FORD ELLIOTT, ORIE MELVIN, LALLY-GREEN, TODD, BENDER and BOWES, JJ.

OPINION BY ORIE MELVIN, J.:

¶ 1 Appellants, Joel Holland and Heather Holland, minors by and through their mother, Theresa Holland, appeal from the Order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Edward E. Marcy. The trial court determined that because mother neglected to acquire automobile insurance coverage for her registered vehicle and was therefore deemed to have selected the limited tort option pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(5), the minor Appellants stood in the same shoes as their mother and were likewise deemed subject to a limited tort recovery. In reaching this decision the trial court found persuasive the rationale expressed in the Commonwealth Court case of Hames v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 696 A.2d 880 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). Since Hames represents a conflicting viewpoint¹ from this Court's decision in Ickes v. Burkes, 713 A.2d 653 (Pa.Super.1998), we granted en banc certification to re-examine this Court's view on this issue. After review, we are not persuaded by the Hames Court's reasoning. Our anaylsis of the interplay between the relevant sections of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), and prior appellate precedent construing the term "owner" as used in the MVFRL, convinces us that the rationale expressed in Ickes, as more fully crystallized herein, is the better view. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings with respect to the minor Appellants.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Before turning to a discussion of the legal issues, we set forth the facts and procedural history of this matter. This negligence action arose from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in the early morning of August 3, 1997. Appellants were passengers in a 1985 Chevrolet Celebrity owned by Theresa Holland and being driven by her ex-husband, Joel R. Holland. The Holland vehicle was travelling in an easterly direction in the left lane of State Route 20 in Erie County, Pennsylvania. An accident occurred when Mr. Marcy, who was traveling easterly in the right lane, abruptly made a left turn by crossing the left (passing) lane and into the westbound lanes of State Route 20 bringing his vehicle into contact with the vehicle occupied by the Appellants. As a result of the impact, Joel Holland suffered a laceration to his forehead, leaving a scar, and further sustained a cervical strain and sprain. Heather Holland suffered a contusion of her right knee, cervical strain and sprain, contusions to her face, and recurrent nose bleeds. Appellants instituted suit against Mr. Marcy to recover economic and non-economic damages sustained as a result of his alleged negligence. ¶ 3 Thereafter, Mr. Marcy filed an Answer, New Matter and a Complaint to Join Additional Defendant Joel R. Holland². Following discovery, which revealed that insurance coverage on the Holland vehicle had lapsed, Mr. Marcy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the minor Appellants were bound by the deemed selection of the limited tort option resulting from Theresa Holland's failure to maintain appropriate insurance on her motor vehicle. He further asserted that all of the injuries claimed by the Appellants were not serious injuries as defined by the MVFRL, and thus, summary judgment was appropriate. Appellants filed responsive briefs, and on September 27, 2000, oral argument was heard before the Honorable Shad Connelly. On January 5, 2001, Judge Connelly granted summary judgment. This timely appeal followed.

ISSUES

¶ 4 Appellants frame two issues for our consideration. First, "[a]re minor [Appellants] bound by the vehicle owners' [sic] imputed selection of the limited tort option if the owner fails to have automobile insurance?" Appellants' brief, at 5. Alternatively, if the limited tort option was appropriately applied "[a]re the injuries of Joel Holland (facial scarring), of sufficient nature to require a jury to determine if said injuries constitute `permanent serious disfigurement' under Section 1702 of the [MVFRL]?" Id.

DISCUSSION

¶ 5 Initially, we note that when considering whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, our review is plenary. Kleban v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 771 A.2d 39, 42 (Pa.Super.2001). Moreover, this Court is not bound by the conclusions of law of the trial court, as we may reach our own conclusions and draw our own inferences. Adamski v. Allstate Ins., 738 A.2d 1033 (Pa.Super.1999),appeal denied, 563 Pa. 655, 759 A.2d 381 (2000) (citation omitted). We may disturb the trial court's order only upon a finding of an error of law or abuse of discretion. Bostick v. Schall's Brakes and Repairs, Inc., 725 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Pa.Super.1999),appeal denied, 560 Pa. 694, 743 A.2d 912 (1999). In determining whether summary judgment was properly granted, this Court applies the same standard as the trial court. Harber Philadelphia Center City Office Limited v. LPCI Ltd. Partnership, 764 A.2d 1100, 1103 (Pa.Super.2000),appeal denied, 566 Pa. 664, 782 A.2d 546 (2001) (citation omitted).

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits demonstrate that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... In determining whether to grant summary judgment a trial court must resolve all doubts against the moving party and examine the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment may only be granted in cases where it is clear and free from doubt the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Schwartzberg v. Greco, 793 A.2d 945, 947 (Pa.Super.2002) (quoting Piluso v. Cohen, 764 A.2d 549, 550 (Pa.Super.2000), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 633, 793 A.2d 909 (2002) (citations omitted)).

¶ 6 Moreover, statutory interpretation involves issues of law that are subject to plenary review by this Court. Commonwealth v. Packer, 568 Pa. 481, 798 A.2d 192 (2002). The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa.Super.2002). The Legislature's intent "can only be derived by reading all sections of the statute together and in conjunction with each other and construed with reference to the entire statute." Storms ex rel. Storms v. O'Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 559 (Pa.Super.2001) (quoting Panea v. Isdaner, 773 A.2d 782, (Pa.Super.2001)). If the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute is clear, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Price v. Pennsylvania Property, 795 A.2d 407 (Pa.Super.2002). "When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, a court cannot disregard them under the pretext of pursuing the spirit of the statute." Grom v. Burgoon, 448 Pa.Super. 616, 672 A.2d 823, 825 (1996); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a).

¶ 7 Since this matter involves the interpretation of various sections of the MVFRL, we must begin by analyzing the express words of the statute. Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 567 Pa. 514, 521, 788 A.2d 955, 959 (2001). Our examination, therefore, begins with § 1705(a)(5), which provides: "[a]n owner of a currently registered private passenger motor vehicle who does not have financial responsibility shall be deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative." (emphasis added). In relevant part § 1705(b)(2) states: "[t]he tort option elected by a named insured shall apply to all insureds under the private passenger motor vehicle policy who are not named insureds under another private passenger motor vehicle policy." (emphasis added). Section 1705(b)(3) provides that "an individual who is not an owner of a currently registered private passenger motor vehicle and who is not a named insured or insured under any private passenger motor vehicle policy shall not be precluded from maintaining an action for noneconomic loss or economic loss sustained in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person pursuant to applicable tort law." (emphasis added). Additionally, we note that under both § 1702(2) and § 1705(f), an "Insured" is defined as any individual residing in the household of the named insured who is a spouse or other relative of the named insured; or a minor in the custody of either the named insured or relative of the named insured. 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1702(2), 1705(f) (emphasis added). A "named insured" is defined as "[a]ny individual identified by name as an insured in a policy of private passenger motor vehicle insurance." 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(f).

¶ 8 Appellants advocate for application of our holding in Ickes to the facts of this case. Conversely, Mr. Marcy argues Hames is more applicable because its facts are virtually identical. Initially, we note the fact that Ickes involved an injured adult passenger whereas Hames, as in the instance case, involved injured passengers who were minors is a distinction without a difference in determining the proper interpretation of the applicable provisions of the MVFRL.

¶ 9 In Hames, appellants, Venice Hames, Venicia Hames, a minor, and Kiara Hames, a minor, were involved in an accident in which their vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by an employee of appellee, the Philadelphia Housing Authority. Venice Hames was driving an uninsured Plymouth Voyager minivan registered to his wife, Angela Hames. Venicia and Kiara, age six and three respectively at the time of...