Holland v. Anderson

• Citation: 38 Mo. 55
• Parties: LEONARD B. HOLLAND, Plaintiff in Error, v. DAVID ANDERSON et al., Defendants in Error.
• Decision Date: 31 March 1866
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

38 Mo. 55

LEONARD B. HOLLAND, Plaintiff in Error,

v.DAVID ANDERSON et al., Defendants in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1866.

Error to St. Louis Land Court.

Glover & Shepley, and Peacock & Cornwell, for plaintiff in error.

I. The action was one for cancellation, rescission, and for general relief; and prior to the late code was purely an equity suit. Such a case was only triable by the court, and no instructions could be asked, or any legal propositions announced, on the trial by the court. It was the duty of the court to make a decree on the petition, answers, and evidence; and the whole case will be reviewed in this court on its merits, as shown by the pleadings and evidence--21 Mo. 93; 28 Mo. 129, 322; 20 Mo. 431.

II. The fraud by misrepresentation and by concealment was clearly established. It appears to have been deliberately planned and prosecuted. It was an imposition on one who trusted implicitly to Anderson's representations.

The plaintiff, on well established principles of equity, was entitled to the relief he sought; that is, in a proper case for rescission, rescission will be decreed if the court can put the parties in statu quo. The plaintiff insists that the case made was one authorizing rescission, for the fraud--1 Sto. Eq. §§ 202-3; 1 Dev. Eq. 411; 11 Mo. 655; 34 Mo. 195; 1 Rand. 403; 1 Freem. Ch. 241, 249; 3 Littell, 375; 7 J. Ch. 200; 7 Cranch, 69; 3 Sme. & M. 386; 25 Mo. 72.

Inadequacy of consideration, though not of itself sufficient cause to set aside an instrument, will have great weight when fraudulent representations or concealments accompany it--2 J. Ch. 24; 9 Mo. 201; 4 Dessaus. 651; 10 Yerg. 202; 2 Greene Ch. 489; 2 Yerg. 294.

If it is contended that if the court below could not rescind the contract because Anderson had put the notes and property he got from Holland out of his hands (1 Dana, 424; 3 Dana, 201-2; 4 Dana, 196; 6 B. Mon. 41, 127), which may be conceded for the present, still Holland was entitled to compensation for the gross fraud which had been practiced on him. Anderson had no title to some of the Rosehill property, and by his fraud the leasehold was less valuable than he represented it. For this, plaintiff had a right to compensation--11 Paige, 277; 5 J. J. Marsh, 8. The petition was filed for rescission, and that should have been granted, and would have been but for the conduct of Anderson. In such case compensation was proper--5 J. J. Marsh, 18, 28; 2 Bibb, 410; 1 A. K. Marsh, t. p. 317, s. 426; 2 Id. t. p. 828, s. 489; 1 Dana, 590. Where there is title to part, and no title to another part, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation--1 A. K. Marsh, 257.

But one who has been guilty of fraud, and has not procured a perfect title at the trial of the cause, has no claim to any delay to procure the title--3 Dana, 201; 3 J. J. Mar. 337; Reese v. Smith, 12 Mo. 348-9.

A bill for compensation alone will not lie in equity; but where the bill is filed for specific performance or concealment, or to set up a resulting trust, and fails by act of defendant putting the property beyond the reach of the court, compensation will be granted rather than turn the party over to another suit--1 Cow. 711; 2 Barbour, S. C. 270-1, 281; 3 Swanst. 109; 1 Cox, 258; 9 Cranch, 492; 5 J. J. Marsh, 18; 2 A. K. Marsh, t. p. 659. The last two cases were bills for rescission--2 Sto. Eq. § 799, p. 141.Sharp & Broadhead, for defendants in error.

I. Fraud is never to be presumed; it must be proven by him who asserts it, in equity as well as at law--1 Sto. Eq. 221-2, § 190.

II. As to representations as to value, title of record, or any other facts open to the inspection of both parties, the facts being within the means of knowledge of the party, it is his own laches and neglect if he does not know them, and it is to a great extent a matter of judgment; equity will not relieve--1 Sto. §§ 197, 200-1.

III. The aid of a court of equity can only be invoked by him who ha been vigilant in asserting his claims. “ Vigilantibus, non dormienlibus, æquitas subvenit.” The defendant may have made transactions, or so conducted his affairs, as that it would be inequitable to disturb them. Third persons may have acquired rights during the delay, equity will not interfere after such delay--Smith Eq. 19 & 20.

IV. If Holland, who claims now to have been defrauded, after he knew the facts acquiesced in the transaction, and claimed and asserted rights under it, or dealt with Anderson about it, he cannot afterwards ask relief of a court of equity--1 Sto. § 203. And Holland, after knowing all the facts, claimed, held, rented, and dealt with all the property under the contract as his own, and still does; he is therefore barred from any right to rescind, and has waived it, if any he ever had--1 Adol. & Ell. 40; Campb. v. Fleming, 7 Greenl. 70; Brinley v. Tibbetts, 4 Mass. 502.

V. In an exchange of property, Holland now claims that he was defrauded, and asks to rescind. No matter what facts are shown, he was bound first to restore all he had received under the contract (it is not enough, if he had notified Anderson of his readiness to do so), and he was bound to do this without delay--Norton v. Young, 3 Greenl. 30; 4 Mass. 502; Blanchard v. Stone, 15 Vt. 271; 3 Wend. 236; Thomas v. Todd, 6 Hill. 340; Lawrence v. Dale, 3 Johns. Ch. 23.WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a suit in the nature of a bill in equity, for rescission and cancellation of a contract in respect of an exchange of lands. The petition asked for rescinding the contract, and also prayed for general relief; but it was admitted on argument that the prayer for rescission could not be granted, because the property had been changed in such a manner that it was impossible to have it restored. But it is contended that, although that part of the bill failed, the court should still have awarded the plaintiff compensation, under the prayer for general relief.

Judge Story says, “the usual course is for the plaintiff, in this part of the bill, to make a special prayer for the particular relief to which he thinks himself entitled, and then to conclude with a prayer for general relief, at the discretion of the court. The latter can never be properly and safely omitted; because, if the plaintiff should mistake the relief to which he is entitled, in his special...