Holland v. State
| Decision Date | 16 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | CR-20-642 |
| Parties | Robert HOLLAND, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Short Law Firm, by: Lee D. Short, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Jacob H. Jones, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
Robert Holland was sentenced to death for capital murder. He now appeals the circuit court's denial of his Rule 37 petition for ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
Holland was convicted of, and sentenced to death for, the capital murder of his cellmate at the Cummins Unit of the Division of Correction. While incarcerated for the murder of his parents, Holland strangled his cellmate. We affirmed Holland's conviction and death-penalty sentence on direct appeal. Holland v. State , 2015 Ark. 318, 468 S.W.3d 782.
Holland then filed a petition for postconviction relief with the circuit court under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.5. He argued that his counsel, John Cone and Rebekah Kennedy, were constitutionally ineffective for multiple reasons. The circuit court held a Rule 37.5 hearing during which his trial counsel testified. The circuit court denied Holland's Rule 37.5 petition. Holland now appeals that denial.
Our standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is a two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prevail under Strickland , the petitioner must show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Coakley v. State , 2021 Ark. 207, at 2, 633 S.W.3d 328, 330.
In evaluating the first prong, deficient performance, we presume counsel was effective, and allegations without factual substantiation cannot overcome that presumption. Id. The petitioner has the burden of identifying specific acts and omissions that, when viewed from counsel's perspective at the time of trial, could not have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id.
As for the second prong, ineffectiveness claims alleging deficiency in attorney performance must affirmatively prove prejudice. Smith v. State , 2016 Ark. 417, at 3, 504 S.W.3d 595, 597. The petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the fact-finder's decision would have been different absent counsel's errors. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id.
We will not reverse a circuit court's denial of a Rule 37.5 petition unless the circuit court's findings are clearly erroneous. Coakley , 2021 Ark. 207, at 3, 633 S.W.3d at 330. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, has a firm conviction there has been a mistake. Id.
First, Holland argued his trial counsel failed to object to the use of handcuff restraints at the beginning of the first day of his jury trial and that this was ineffective assistance of counsel. But this isolates one segment of the case regarding his attorney's protection of Holland's due process interest.
Holland's counsel filed a pretrial motion for Holland to appear in civilian clothes and without restraints. At the hearing on the motion, Judge Jodi Dennis agreed and ruled Holland would appear in the courtroom without handcuffs or arm restraints and in civilian clothes. But on the first morning of trial an issue arose concerning the availability of restraints. As Holland's attorney explained to the new trial court judge, in chambers, before voir dire began:
One more thing on the record. [Judge] Jodi Dennis did make a ruling that he was to be – appear in the courtroom without handcuffs. The ADC people say that today, for reasons – various reasons, they are going to have to have him walk into the courtroom with the handcuffs, sit him down, take the handcuffs off once he is sitted down – seated. They're in charge of security. We don't have a problem with that ... tomorrow and the next day, they have a device that they can put on him where he won't have to go in the courtroom with the handcuffs. All we're asking today is that he, as unobtrusively as possible, go in and the handcuffs be removed, taken out of the way.
The trial court agreed and ruled that the handcuffs be removed unobtrusively on that first day once Holland was seated.
Due process does not permit the routine use of visible restraints if the circuit court has not considered the circumstances of the particular case. Williams v. State , 369 Ark. 104, 251 S.W.3d 290 (2007) (citing Deck v. Missouri , 544 U.S. 622, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005) ). Holland's contention that any use of handcuffs is prohibited is inaccurate. In Deck , the Supreme Court held "that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during the penalty phase, as it forbids their use during the guilt phase, unless that use is ‘justified by an essential state interest’—such as the interest in courtroom security—specific to the defendant on trial."
544 U.S. at 624, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn , 475 U.S. 560, 568–69, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986) ). Deck also held that an essential state interest may be courtroom decorum, which was the concern Holland's attorney testified to at the Rule 37 hearing. Id. at 628, 125 S.Ct. 2007. When determining whether a particular physical restraint is justified, a circuit court may take such steps as are reasonably necessary to maintain order in the courtroom, though restraints are not per se prejudicial. Williams v. State , 347 Ark. 728, 747–48, 67 S.W.3d 548, 559–60 (2002).
We do not agree that Holland's counsel was deficient in failing to object to the use of restraints and preventing Holland from being seated in handcuffs the first day of his jury trial. Handcuffs were used only after the circuit court considered the circumstances of this case, which comports with Deck . Trial counsel properly moved for Holland not to have restraints on him at trial and was successful on that motion. Only after discovering that the Division of Correction had no other safe means to bring Holland into the courtroom and seat him the first day, did Holland's counsel stipulate to Holland entering in handcuffs and being restrained for that short period of time.1 And counsel knew that in addition to the current capital-murder charge, Holland was already serving a sentence for the murder of his parents. Holland's trial counsel stipulating to this was not deficient such that it denied Holland of his right to counsel.
Under Deck , a constitutional violation occurs only if the shackles are visible to the jury without the court weighing their use and necessity. The record here demonstrates the court weighed their use on two occasions. This comports with Deck ; thus, we cannot say counsel was ineffective for failing to object.2
Holland's next ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument arose from conduct during jury selection. He asserted that his attorneys failed to life qualify the jurors, failed to test for mitigation-impaired jurors, and should have moved to exclude one specific juror, Betty Davis.
To prevail on an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel over jury selection, Holland first must overcome the "heavy burden" and presumption that jurors are unbiased. Howard v. State , 367 Ark. 18, 36–37, 238 S.W.3d 24, 39–40 (2006). To accomplish this, he must show actual bias, and the actual bias must have been sufficient to prejudice him to the degree that he was denied a fair trial. Id. Bare allegations of prejudice by counsel's conduct during voir dire that are unsupported by any showing of actual prejudice do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
Holland first asserted that his counsel failed to life qualify and explore mitigation impairment with several jurors: Danny Chambliss, Lauren Light, Billy Holmes, Betty Davis, Jerry Courson, and Jeremy Blevins. We agree with the circuit court that Holland has failed to show that his defense was constitutionally ineffective on this point.
As to Juror Chambliss, Holland asserted he was an "automatic death penalty juror," meaning that Chambliss would automatically sentence Holland to death if he was found guilty of capital murder. This record shows otherwise. During voir dire, Holland's attorney asked Chambliss his feeling about the death penalty, and Chambliss responded: Cone also asked Chambliss if he understood that the default punishment for capital murder is life and that "it takes more than just finding someone guilty of capital murder ... to give them the death penalty." Chambliss replied, Cone further instructed him that there is no automatic death penalty in Arkansas, and Chambliss explained that he understood that. The record does not show Chambliss was inclined toward a death sentence.
Similarly, the State instructed Jurors Light and Holmes that if they felt that the death penalty was not appropriate, "life without parole would be the only option." Both agreed. And in response to Holland's counsel's questions, Holmes stated that he could consider life under the right circumstances. Both also affirmed that they understood that the death penalty is not automatic for capital murder and that they could "follow [their] conscience" and vote for a life sentence even if they found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators.
Betty Davis likewise stated she understood that, as a juror, she could only consider death if she...
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