Holland v. State
| Decision Date | 06 February 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2005-CA-01669-COA.,No. 2002-KA-01921-COA.,No. 2005-CA-01673-COA.,2005-CA-01669-COA.,2005-CA-01673-COA.,2002-KA-01921-COA. |
| Citation | 956 So.2d 322 |
| Parties | Jason HOLLAND a/k/a Jason Allan Holland, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee. Paul Sookraj, Appellant v. State of Mississippi, Appellee. Jason Holland a/k/a Jason Allan Holland and Paul Sookraj, Appellant v. State of Mississippi, Appellee. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
Jefferson D. Gilder, attorney for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, attorney for appellee.
Before MYERS, P.J., CHANDLER and ROBERTS, JJ.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
MYERS, P.J., for the Court.
¶ 1. On March 26, 2002 a woman was robbed at gun point in the Wal-Mart parking lot in Olive Branch, Mississippi. The victim's description of her assailants and the vehicle in which they fled led to the apprehension of Jason Holland and Paul Sookraj, the appellants herein. Sookraj and Holland both confessed to Olive Branch police that they conspired to commit the robbery and that Sookraj had been the gunman, while Holland had driven the getaway car. The two men then led police to a residential trash can in Memphis, Tennessee, where they had disposed of the victim's purse. On October 14, 2002, in the DeSoto County Circuit Court, Holland and Sookraj, each represented by separate counsel, pled guilty to the crime of armed robbery in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-1 (Rev.2000). Holland was sentenced to twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with eight years to serve and twelve years suspended; Sookraj was sentenced to twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with ten years to serve and ten years suspended.
¶ 2. Following their sentencing on November 8, 2002, Holland and Sookraj, through their new joint counsel, filed separate motions to withdraw their guilty pleas. The circuit court entered separate orders denying the motions to withdraw the pleas, finding that the court had no authority to reduce, suspend, or otherwise alter a lawfully imposed sentence. The circuit court order further stated that the proper procedure for the relief sought by Holland and Sookraj was to petition under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-1. Holland and Sookraj then appealed the circuit court's denial of their respective motions to withdraw their pleas of guilt to this Court. On motion of the State of Mississippi, Holland's and Sookraj's consolidated appeal was dismissed on November 4, 2003. See Sookraj v. State, No.2002-KA-01921-COA (Miss.Ct.App. Nov.4, 2003).
¶ 3. On March 2, 2005, Holland and Sookraj filed separate petitions for post-conviction collateral relief with the Circuit Court of DeSoto County. In their petitions, Holland and Sookraj each raised the issues of insufficient assistance of counsel and involuntariness of the pleas. Finding both Holland's and Sookraj's claims to be without merit, the circuit judge dismissed the petitions without holding an evidentiary hearing. From the circuit court's ruling, Holland and Sookraj now bring this consolidated appeal and raise the following issues, which we quote verbatim:
Issue 1: Did the Court err in finding that Mr. Sookraj and Mr. Holland had not made a prima facie case so that at least a hearing was required?
Sub-Issue A: Was the promise of the officers prior to getting the confession enforceable?
Sub-Issue B: Was the confession tainted by promises of leniency which were specific enough to warrant reliance?
Sub-Issue C: Was the identification of Mr. Sookraj in the photo lineup tainted due to one Indian and five black males?
Sub-Issue D: Was other evidence subject to suppression due to the fruit of the poisonous tree?
Sub-Issue E: Was counsel ineffective for Mr. Holland and/or Mr. Sookraj?
¶ 4. In their reply brief, Holland and Sookraj attempt to define sub-issues A-D as issues that deal only with the prejudice to a defense under the second prong of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) test for ineffective assistance of counsel, rather than non-jurisdictional defects or rights incident to a jury trial that would be deemed waived by the entry of their guilty pleas. However, what is clearly under attack in the appellant's brief is the voluntariness of the confessions, and therefore, the voluntariness of the guilty pleas, as well as the ineffectiveness of Holland's and Sookraj's separate counsel in advising them that the police officers' promises of leniency in sentencing were not enforceable, and the cumulative effect of those three issues on the necessity of an evidentiary hearing before the trial court. Thus, we must address the following three issues:
I. WHETHER THE CONFESSIONS WERE VOLUNTARY?
II. WHETHER THE GUILTY PLEAS WERE KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY MADE?
III. WHETHER COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE?
¶ 5. Finding no error, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 6. This Court employs the "clearly erroneous" standard when reviewing a trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595, 598(¶ 6) (Miss.1999). The trial court's denial of post-conviction relief will not be addressed absent a finding that the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. Andrews v. State, 932 So.2d 61, 62(¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App. 2006). However, we review questions of law de novo. Brown, 731 So.2d at 598(¶ 6).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
¶ 7. Holland and Sookraj first assert that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether their guilty pleas were involuntary, and second that they received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel when entering their separate guilty pleas. In order to have obtained the right to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of their ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Holland and Sookraj were required to establish a prima facie case in their petitions to the lower court. Robertson v. State, 669 So.2d 11, 13 (Miss.1996). When a motion for post-conviction relief is filed, the trial judge is obligated to review the motion, all files, records, transcripts, and correspondence relating to the judgment. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-11(1) (Rev.2000); Cole v. State, 608 So.2d 1313, 1325 (Miss.1992). If upon such review it is clear that there is no entitlement to relief, the judge may enter an order dismissing the action. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (Rev.2000); Cole, 608 So.2d at 1324. "We adhere to the principle that a post-conviction relief petition which meets basic pleading requirements is sufficient to mandate an evidentiary hearing unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Robertson, 669 So.2d at 13 (citing Harveston v. State, 597 So.2d 641, 643 (Miss. 1992)). A post-conviction claim for relief is properly dismissed without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing where it is manifestly without merit. Id. (citing Sanders v. State, 440 So.2d 278, 284 (Miss.1983)).
¶ 8. Holland and Sookraj argue that their confessions were not voluntary because they relied on alleged promises made by Olive Branch police officers that they would receive lighter sentences, such as boot-camp or probation, if they confessed to the armed robbery. The State argues that Holland and Sookraj waived any right to exclude the allegedly coerced confessions when they voluntarily pled guilty to the charge of armed robbery.
¶ 9. We have consistently "recognized that a valid guilty plea operates as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional rights or defects which are incident to trial." Swindoll v. State 859 So.2d 1063, 1065(¶ 9) (Miss.Ct. App.2003) (quoting Anderson v. State, 577 So.2d 390, 391 (Miss.1991)). Included in these rights are "those secured by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as well as those comparable rights secured by Section[s] 14 and 26, Article 3, of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890." Id. (quoting Sanders v. State, 440 So.2d 278, 283 (Miss. 1983)). Accordingly, if Holland and Sookraj entered valid guilty pleas, then they explicitly waived any right to suppress the alleged coerced confessions. Since Holland and Sookraj have also raised the issue as to whether their pleas were indeed valid, we find that any ruling as to the voluntariness of the confession, or waiver thereof, necessarily depends on our holding as to the validity of the guilty plea.
¶ 10. Holland and Sookraj argue that their separate pleas were not entered knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily. They claim that their separate former counsel incorrectly advised them that the alleged promises of leniency in sentencing, made by the Olive Branch police to elicit their confessions, could not be enforced. Holland and Sookraj claim to have relied on this advice when entering their separate guilty pleas. On appeal, Holland and Sookraj claim that they would not have pled guilty if they had known that the court could have been bound by their reliance on the officers' promises or that their confessions could have been excluded.
¶ 11. Our standard of review for considering the voluntariness of a guilty plea is well-settled. "This court will not set aside findings of a trial court unless such findings are clearly erroneous." Swindoll, 859 So.2d at 1065(¶ 9) (quoting Weatherspoon v. State, 736 So.2d 419, 421(¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.1999)). A guilty plea is not binding upon a criminal defendant unless it is entered voluntarily and intelligently. Myers v. State, 583 So.2d 174, 177 (Miss.1991). A plea is deemed "voluntary and...
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