Holler v. Holler
| Decision Date | 22 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 3979.,3979. |
| Citation | 612 S.E.2d 469,364 S.C. 256 |
| Parties | Nataliya HOLLER, Respondent, v. William HOLLER, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Family Court, York County, Robert E. Guess, J.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
William Holler, of Rock Hill, Pro Se, for Appellant.
David Bradley Jordan, of Rock Hill and Harold A. Oberman, of Charleston, for Respondent.
William Holler (Husband) appeals from the family court's determination that a premarital agreement signed by Nataliya1 Holler (Wife) is not enforceable. We affirm.
Wife is originally from Ukraine. She was educated in Ukraine and taught college students in that country. English is not Wife's first language. After seeing Husband's picture in "a feminine magazine," Wife wrote a letter to him in English and included her phone number. Thereafter, Husband and Wife talked on the phone for "[a]bout a year." Their conversations were in English. During this time, Husband visited Wife in Ukraine.
On September 5, 1997, Wife traveled to the United States to marry Husband. At the time of her arrival, Wife's English was "really poor." Husband disputed Wife's inability to speak English, claiming she spoke "[v]ery well." Upon completing an English course, Wife received a certificate from Central Piedmont College in May of 1998.
In October or early November 1997, Wife became pregnant with Husband's child. Wife's visa was scheduled to expire on December 4, 1997, and she would have to return to Ukraine unless she married Husband. Wife came to the United States without money and relied upon Husband to provide support.
Wife admitted that, while she was still in Ukraine, Husband told her about the premarital agreement. However, Wife believed she "needed to sign some papers under the law of South Carolina before we g[o]t married." Wife claimed: "[Husband] faxed me some documents for American Embassy, and one page was he told me that we need — when you get to United States we have to sign that agreement before we get married because this is under [the] law of South Carolina." Husband delivered the premarital agreement to Wife sometime before the marriage. Husband first stated he faxed it to her five or six months before she arrived in the United States. Husband maintained he handed her a copy to sign within a week after she arrived. Yet, Wife declared Husband gave her a copy of the premarital agreement only two weeks before she signed it.
Prior to signing the premarital agreement, Wife attempted to translate a portion of the agreement from English into Russian, but was unable to complete the translation. "Because it was too hard," Wife became frustrated with the translation and quit. Wife had eleven pages of translation before she determined the effort was futile. Wife professed the agreement "had specific language which [she did not] understand even in Russian." Wife never retained counsel because she had no money to pay someone to review the agreement.
Wife signed the agreement on November 25, 1997. The parties were married on December 1, 1997, merely three days before Wife's visa was set to expire.
Husband and Wife separated on February 13, 2000. Wife brought this action seeking a divorce, custody of the parties' child, child support, equitable distribution of marital property, and alimony. Husband answered and counterclaimed. Subsequently, he filed a motion to dismiss the claims for alimony and equitable distribution asserting the premarital agreement controlled. After a hearing, the family court denied the motion to dismiss. The court ruled the premarital agreement was invalid and unenforceable because it was signed under duress and was unconscionable.
In appeals from the family court, this court may find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Dearybury v. Dearybury, 351 S.C. 278, 569 S.E.2d 367 (2002); Lanier v. Lanier, 364 S.C.App. 211, 612 S.E.2d 456, 2005 WL 645880 (2005); Moghaddassi v. Moghaddassi, 364 S.C.App. 182, 612 S.E.2d 707, 2005 WL 196558 (2005). However, this broad scope of review does not require us to disregard the family court's findings. Bowers v. Bowers, 349 S.C. 85, 561 S.E.2d 610 (Ct.App. 2002); Badeaux v. Davis, 337 S.C. 195, 522 S.E.2d 835 (Ct.App.1999). Nor must we ignore the fact that the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony. Lacke v. Lacke, 362 S.C. 302, 608 S.E.2d 147 (Ct.App.2005); Murdock v. Murdock, 338 S.C. 322, 526 S.E.2d 241 (Ct.App.1999); see also Dorchester County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Miller, 324 S.C. 445, 477 S.E.2d 476 (Ct. App.1996) ().
Husband raises numerous issues regarding the findings of fact made by the family court. In essence, the attack by Husband on the order of the family court involves two issues: (1) whether the court erred in finding the premarital agreement invalid and unenforceable; and (2) whether the family court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the premarital agreement.
Husband argues the family court was without jurisdiction to determine the validity of the premarital agreement. He maintains Wife should have brought her action in the circuit court because the premarital agreement barred Wife from receiving alimony and designated the parties' respective property as nonmarital. We disagree.
The jurisdiction of the family court is determined by section 20-7-420 of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2004). Section 20-7-420(2) provides:
The family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction:
. . . .
(2) To hear and determine actions:
For divorce a vinculo matrimonii, separate support and maintenance, legal separation, and in other marital litigation between the parties, and for settlement of all legal and equitable rights of the parties in the actions in and to the real and personal property of the marriage and attorney's fees, if requested by either party in the pleadings.
S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-420(2) (Supp.2004) (emphasis added). South Carolina Code section 20-3-130(G) states:
(G) The Family Court may review and approve all agreements which bear on the issue of alimony or separate maintenance and support, whether brought before the court in actions for divorce from the bonds of matrimony, separate maintenance and support actions, or in actions to approve agreement where the parties are living separate and apart. The failure to seek a divorce, separate maintenance, or a legal separation does not deprive the court of its authority and jurisdiction to approve and enforce the agreements.
S.C.Code Ann. § 20-3-130(G) (Supp.2004).
This court and the South Carolina Supreme Court have allowed appeals from the family court involving a premarital agreement without raising an issue of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hardee v. Hardee, 355 S.C. 382, 585 S.E.2d 501 (2003); Bowen v. Bowen, 352 S.C. 494, 575 S.E.2d 553 (2003); Heins v. Heins, 344 S.C. 146, 543 S.E.2d 224 (Ct.App.2001). In Gilley v. Gilley, 327 S.C. 8, 488 S.E.2d 310 (1997), the validity of the prenuptial agreement of the parties was not challenged. The Gilley court analyzed the status of the property, i.e., marital or nonmarital in the context of the prenuptial agreement. The court expounded:
[H]usband asked the family court for an order of separate maintenance requiring the parties to live separate and apart, equitable distribution of the marital home and other personal property, and attorney's fees. The family court dismissed husband's action finding it did not belong in family court since the prenuptial agreement provides that neither party can claim alimony or separate maintenance. Further, the family court dismissed the action because the prenuptial agreement provided that property acquired by the parties during the marriage or owned at the time of the marriage would not be the subject of any claims for equitable apportionment. The family court ruled that any claims arising from property or investments must be asserted in circuit court. We agree.
The family court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine actions for separate support and maintenance, legal separation, other marital litigation between the parties, and for settlement of all legal and equitable rights of the parties in the actions related to the real and personal property of the marriage. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-420(2) (Supp.1995). Property excluded by written contract or antenuptial agreement of the parties is excluded from marital property and is considered nonmarital property. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-473 (Supp.1995). The family court does not have authority to apportion nonmarital property. Id.
Gilley, 327 S.C. at 11, 488 S.E.2d at 312. Property excluded from the marital estate by written contract or premarital agreement of the parties is considered nonmarital property over which the family court has no jurisdiction. See S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-473 (Supp. 2004) (); S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-473(4) (Supp.2004) ().
In the instant case, the litigation between the parties was clearly marital in nature as the Wife sought a divorce, custody of the child, child support, alimony, and equitable distribution of the marital property. Husband asserted the premarital agreement as a defense to the causes of action for alimony and equitable distribution. The family court was then required to determine, pursuant to Hardee v. Hardee, 355...
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