Holley v. Young

Decision Date05 October 1876
Citation66 Me. 520
PartiesLYDIA M. HOLLEY et al. v. JOTHAM D. B. YOUNG, appellant. 1876.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

ON EXCEPTIONS.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.

Writ dated May 7, 1875. It was admitted that the plaintiff, whose name before marriage was Lydia P. Mace, had a deed of the premises and gave the defendant thirty days notice to quit before commencing the suit.

The defendant introduced his lease under seal, signed by the plaintiff, Lydia P. Mace, and by her sister Sarah F. Mace dated December 10, 1873, and stating as follows: " For and in consideration of seventy-five dollars, to be paid by Jotham D. B. Young in quarterly payments of every three months during the year, which we do hereby acknowledge, and we do hereby lease and let to said Young, the east half of our house and shed and the whole of the stable during the year 1874, and to give possession on the 1st day of January next. We further agree to lease to said Young said premises situated in Farmington village at the price and conditions named as long as he wishes to occupy the same. The said Young agreeing to take good care of the premises and not to suffer them to go to waste more than the natural use of the same."

It was admitted that the defendant paid his rent as it became due and that both parties recognized and acted under the provisions of the lease and that there was no breach of its conditions.

The plaintiff offered to prove by parol evidence, the circumstances under which the lease was obtained, for the purpose of attempting to show that there was fraud practiced upon her; but the court ruled that the lease must speak for itself, and that the evidence offered was not admissible.

The plaintiff obtained possession of the premises, the defendant vacating the same after the officer holding the writ of possession had notified him, that he, the officer, had such a writ for his removal and the plaintiff thereafterwards held the same.

The case was submitted to the presiding justice with right of exceptions. He ruled that the action could not be maintained; and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.

H. L. Whitcomb, for the plaintiff, contended that after the expiration of a year, the plaintiff had the right to terminate the lease by the thirty days notice; that by the terms of the lease, it expired with the year 1874; that while true it was there was an agreement to lease further, that was an agreement to be performed in futuro; that the remedy of the defendant, if any, was by an action for breach of contract or a suit in equity to compel a performance; and that fraud rendering every contract void whether verbal or in writing, the parol evidence showing fraud was erroneously excluded.

S. C. Belcher, for the defendant, claimed that the clause " we further agree to lease to said Young said premises, at the price and conditions named, as long as he wishes to occupy the same," was a lease, and that the defendant indicated his election to hold over after the expiration of the first year by remaining in possession and paying rent according to the conditions of the lease, and that the plaintiff, by accepting the rent, showed that she so understood, and waived any right to notice, if she was entitled to any; and cited to various propositions subordinate to this, the following cases: Hallett v. Wylie, 3 Johns. 44, 47; Thornton v. Payne, 5 Johns. 74; Jackson v. Kisselbrack, 10 Johns. 336; Kramer v. Cook, 7 Gray 550; Delashman v. Berry, 20 Mich. 292.

APPLETON C. J.

This is an action of forcible entry and detainer. The tenants claim possession by virtue of a lease from the complainants under seal. The rights of the parties depend upon the construction to be given to its terms.

The lease is dated Dec. 10, 1873: It leases and lets to the tenant certain premises therein described at a specified rent for one year. Then follow these words: " We further agree to lease to said Young said...

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17 cases
  • Starr v. Holck
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • June 27, 1947
    ...to enjoy the privilege of extension provided for. Kramer v. Cook, 7 Gray 550;Stone v. Stamping Co., 155 Mass. 267, 29 N.E. 623;Holley v. Young, 66 Me. 520.’ The extension of the lease operated to extend the option to purchase. Under paragraph 4 of the instrument, hereinbefore quoted, all co......
  • Andrews v. Marshall Creamery Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 20, 1902
    ... ... to enjoy the privilege of extension provided for. Kramer ... v. Cook, 7 Gray 550; Stone v. Stamping Co., 155 ... Mass. 267 (29 N.E. 623); Holley v. Young, 66 Me ... 520. In well-reasoned cases in Massachusetts the view is ... expressed that holding over is merely evidence of an ... ...
  • Miller v. Albany Lodge No. 206, F. & A.M.
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • March 1, 1916
    ... ... Montgomery v. Hamilton County, 76 Ind. 362, 40 ... Am.Rep. 250; Terstegge v. First German Mut. Ben ... Soc., 92 Ind. 82, 47 Am.Rep. 135; Holley v ... Young, 66 Me. 520; Kramer v. Cook, 7 Gray ... (Mass.) 550; Kimball v. Cross, 136 Mass. 300; ... Cooper v. Joy, 105 Mich. 374, 63 N.W. 414; ... ...
  • Medomak Canning Co. v. York.
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • March 17, 1948
    ...be effective without the necessity of any further act or instrument’. This provision was an option for an extension of the lease. Holley v. Young, 66 Me. 520; Perry v. Rockland & R. Lime Co., 94 Me. 325, 47 A. 534; Carrano v. Shoor et al., 118 Conn. 86, 171 A. 17. The plaintiff claims that ......
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