Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 October 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 88-00904.
• Parties: William Jerome HOLLIDAY and Kay Roberta Holliday, husband and wife, Plaintiffs, v. BELL HELICOPTERS TEXTRON, INC., a Delaware corporation; Beloat's Aircraft Trim, Inc., a Texas corporation; Allison Gas Turbine Division, a division of General Motors Corp., a Delaware corporation; Standard Aero, Inc., a Delaware corporation; John Does 1-X; and Black Corporations 1-X, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

747 F. Supp. 1396

William Jerome HOLLIDAY and Kay Roberta Holliday, husband and wife, Plaintiffs, v. BELL HELICOPTERS TEXTRON, INC., a Delaware corporation; Beloat's Aircraft Trim, Inc., a Texas corporation; Allison Gas Turbine Division, a division of General Motors Corp., a Delaware corporation; Standard Aero, Inc., a Delaware corporation; John Does 1-X; and Black Corporations 1-X, Defendants.

Civ. No. 88-00904.

United States District Court, D. Hawaii.

October 12, 1990.

James F. Ventura, Libkuman Ventura Ayabe Chong & Nishimoto, Honolulu, Hawaii, Thomas L. Toone, Beer & Toone, P.C., Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiffs.

Burnham H. Greeley, James H. Hershey, Greeley Walker & Kowen, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Bell Helicopter.

Wesley W. Ichida, Lyle M. Ishida, Case & Lynch, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Beloat Aircraft.

John R. Lacy, Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Standard Aero.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT BELL HELICOPTER'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DAVID A. EZRA, District Judge.

Defendant Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc.'s motion for partial summary judgment as to Counts I (crashworthiness) and III (breach of warranty) of plaintiffs' complaint came on for hearing before this court on October 9, 1990. James H. Hershey, Esq. and Burnham H. Greeley, Esq. appeared for defendant Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc. ("Bell"). Bryan C. Yee, Esq. appeared for defendant Standard Aero, Inc. James F. Ventura, Esq. appeared for plaintiffs William J. and Kay R. Holliday ("plaintiffs"). Defendants Beloat's Aircraft Trim, Inc. and Allison Gas Turbine Division did not appear.

The court having reviewed the motion and the memoranda in support thereof and in opposition thereto, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and being fully advised as to the premises herein, GRANTS defendant Bell's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs' breach of warranty claims (Count III) and DENIES its motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs' crashworthiness claims (Count I). Bell has withdrawn its motion for partial summary judgment on the issue whether comparative fault principles apply.

BACKGROUND

This products liability action arises from the crash on June 7, 1986 of a helicopter piloted by plaintiff William Holliday and manufactured by defendant Bell. Plaintiffs sustained injuries when the helicopter lost power shortly after takeoff and plunged 50-100 feet to the ground.

Plaintiffs allege the helicopter, which was thirteen years old at the time of the crash and had been resold at least seven times, was defectively designed and manufactured. Specifically, plaintiffs claim the engine was manufactured improperly, causing a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. They also assert the pilot's seat and seatbelt were designed defectively, enhancing their injuries and giving rise to a crashworthiness claim.

DISCUSSION

1. Jurisdiction and Applicable Law

This is a diversity action over which this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In diversity actions, this court applies state substantive law. Stoddard v. Stoddard, 641 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.1981). However, whether a federal statute preempts state law is a question of federal law. Local Union 598, Plumbers & Pipefitters v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir.1988), aff'd, 488 U.S. 881, 109 S.Ct. 210, 102 L.Ed.2d 202 (1988).

2. Count III — Breach of Warranty

Warranty claims under state law are governed by a four year statute of limitations set out at Hawaii Rev.Stat. § 490:2-725(1), which covers breaches of contracts for sale. See Schulz v. Honsador, Inc., 67 Haw. 433, 436, 690 P.2d 279 (1984) (breach of warranty constitutes a breach of contract). The statute begins to run when a cause of action accrues:

(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

Hawaii Rev.Stat. § 490:2-725(2) (emphasis added). By its terms, the exception for future performance does not apply to implied warranty claims.

Plaintiffs agree they have no express warranty claim. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition at 2, 6. Their only response to the request for summary judgment on the implied warranty claim is to argue that H.R.S. § 490:2-725(2) is "clearly not the law with regard to an implied warranty of merchantability sic." Plaintiffs cite only one case, Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hospital, Inc., 66 Haw. 237, 659 P.2d 734 (1983), which is not on point. Ontai discusses generally breaches of implied warranty in design defect cases, but does not address the applicable statute of limitations or even mention H.R.S. § 490:2-725(2).

This court has found no authority for the proposition that H.R.S. § 490:2-725(2) does not apply to breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. The parties do not dispute that Bell tendered delivery of the helicopter in April 1973. Therefore, the statute of limitations expired in April 1977. Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until 1988. Any claims for breach of warranty, express or implied, are therefore barred by the statute of limitations.

3. Count I — Crashworthiness

Bell argues plaintiffs' crashworthiness claim is impliedly preempted by the Federal Aviation Act ("FAA"), 49 U.S.C.App. § 1301 et seq., and the pervasive regulatory scheme promulgated under it. Alternatively, Bell asserts the claim is preempted because it is based on state law that conflicts with federal regulations. Bell does not argue express preemption.

A. Implied Preemption

Where Congress has not enacted an explicit preemption clause, state law may still be displaced if an intent to preempt is "`implicitly contained in the federal statute's structure and purpose.'" San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir.1981) (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977)), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000, 102 S.Ct. 1631, 71 L.Ed.2d 866 (1982). In order to show the FAA impliedly preempts plaintiffs' state law design defect claims, Bell must show that Congress intended the FAA to occupy the specific field of products liability. See West v. Northwest Airlines, No. 89-35820, slip op. 10989, 10996 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 1990). Section 1506 of the FAA is a savings clause, which specifically precludes a finding of such Congressional intent. See id.; 49 U.S.C.App. § 1506 (App.1982). Section 1506 provides:

Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.

There is no general, implied private right of action for injuries arising out of violation of the FAA's safety provisions. In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 408 (9th Cir.1983). Accordingly, section 1506 preserves those state common law and statutory causes of action without which many injured plaintiffs would receive no redress at all. Section 1506 "recognizes that the statutory scheme established by the Federal Aviation Act is designed merely to complement existing statutory and common law remedies, not to supplant them." Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 541 F.Supp. 1338, 1345 (W.D.Pa.1982).

For example, the FAA does not preempt a common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408, 1416 (9th Cir.1984). Nor does it preempt a state statutory claim for unfair trade practices and consumer protection violations. Brunwasser, 541 F.Supp. at 1346. Moreover, several courts have allowed crashworthiness claims against an aircraft manufacturer where the plaintiff alleged that a defective seatbelt enhanced his injuries, although these courts did not address FAA preemption specifically. See, e.g., Meil v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 787 (10th Cir.1981); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F.Supp. 1093 (D.Mont.1981).

Bell contends the federal regulation of aircraft design, maintenance, and operation is so comprehensive and the federal interest so dominant as to impliedly preempt plaintiffs' design defect claim. In support of its position, Bell refers the court to regulations addressing specifically the design of aircraft seats and safety belts. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 27.1413, 27.785, 27.1307, 27.1301, and 27.561 (1973).¹ It claims these regulations provide the exclusive standard for measuring design defects and that plaintiffs' crashworthiness claim is an improper attempt to encroach upon that standard. Bell makes the slippery slope argument that if this court allows plaintiffs' claim to proceed, it will render federal regulations meaningless and invite "partisan experts retained for litigation" to dictate aviation standards. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support at 13.

The parties have not cited, nor has this court discovered, any case directly deciding whether the FAA preempts a state tort claim based on a products liability theory against an aircraft manufacturer that has met minimum FAA safety standards. However, the Ninth Circuit and several other courts have found the FAA does not preempt state tort claims based on other theories. This court finds those cases instructive.

The Ninth Circuit found the FAA did not preempt a state law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Hingson, 743 F.2d at 1416. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit concluded the FAA did not preempt state bailment law as it relates to the liability of an airplane owner for the negligent acts of a pilot, and it allowed a wrongful death action to proceed. Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1394 (...