Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hosp. Inc., I-

• Decision Date: 18 February 1983
• Docket Number: No. 7237,J,I-,D,7237
• Parties: , 35 UCC Rep.Serv. 1154 Francis ONTAI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STRAUB CLINIC AND HOSPITAL INC., Defendant-Appellant, and General Electric Company, Defendant-Appellee, and John Doesohn Doe Partnershipsohn Doe Corporationsohn Doe Governmental Entitiesefendants.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 734

659 P.2d 734

66 Haw. 237, 35 UCC Rep.Serv. 1154

Francis ONTAI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STRAUB CLINIC AND HOSPITAL INC., Defendant-Appellant, and General Electric Company, Defendant-Appellee, and John Does I-X, John Doe Partnerships I-X, John Doe Corporations I-X John Doe Governmental Entities I-X, Defendants.

No. 7237.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Feb. 18, 1983.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where a seller or lessor, who is engaged in a business of selling or leasing a product, sells or leases a defective product which is dangerous to the user or consumer, and injury results from its use or consumption, the seller or lessor will be held strictly liable in tort for the injury.

2. Under the rule of strict products liability, the plaintiff need not show that the article was dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases or uses it.

3. It is enough, under the theory of strict products liability, that the plaintiff demonstrates that because of its manufacture or design, the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer or user as to its safety.

4. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff under the theory of strict products liability to show that the offending product was dangerously defective and that the defect was the proximate cause of his injuries.

5. The failure of the manufacturer to equip the product with a safety device may constitute a design defect.

6. It is the legal duty of manufacturers to exercise reasonable care in the design and incorporation of safety features to protect against foreseeable dangers.

7. Plaintiffs in design defect cases may proceed both on a theory of negligence for negligent design and a theory of strict liability in tort for defective design.

8. A manufacturer must give an appropriate warning of any known dangers which the user of its product would not ordinarily discover.

9. The likelihood of an accident taking place and the seriousness of the consequences are always pertinent matters to be considered with respect to the duty to provide a sufficient label.

10. A duty to warn actually consists of two duties: One is to give adequate instructions for safe use, and the other is to give a warning as to dangers inherent in improper use.

11. A third party's negligence is not a defense unless such negligence is the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

12. The test to determine whether an intervening negligent act is a superseding cause is one of foreseeability of the third person's conduct.

13. A seller's warranty, whether express or implied, extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty. It is not necessary that plaintiff be in privity with the seller in order to recover for personal injuries sustained as a result of breach of implied warranty. HRS § 490:2-318.

14. The warranty of merchantability is implied by operation of law into every sale of goods by a merchant seller. HRS § 490:2-314.

15. Merchantability means, inter alia, that the goods are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used.

16. The essential components of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose are that the seller has reason to know of the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and that the buyer relies on the seller's expertise in supplying a suitable product.

17. Whether or not the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises in any individual case is basically a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances of the transaction.

18. Where a product is defective, an action for breach of implied warranty of merchantability and implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose lies against the seller even when the defect is not detectable by the seller.

19. What the Code requires is not evidence that the defects should or could have been uncovered by the seller but only that the goods upon delivery were not of a merchantable quality or fit for their particular purpose.

20. Lack of skill or foresight on the part of the seller in discovering the product's flaw was never meant to bar liability for breach of implied warranty of merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose.

21. A motion for a directed verdict in a nonjury case will be treated as if it were a motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b).

22. A motion to dismiss in a jury case will be treated as if it were a motion for directed verdict under Rule 50(a).

23. The granting of a motion by the defendant for directed verdict after a plaintiff's opening statement is not to be lightly undertaken.

24. The opening statement is an opportunity for counsel to acquaint the jury with the issues in the case, his theory of the case as reflected in his pleadings, and to prepare the trial judge and the jurors for their reception and consideration of the evidence he intends to offer. He is not required to detail or to exhibit his evidence as part of such a statement. He must be given the benefit of every inference in determining the sufficiency of his opening statement.

David L. Turk and Sharon Leng, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant.

Dennis W.E. O'Connor and H. William Goebert, Jr., Honolulu (Hoddick, Reinwald, O'Connor & Marrack, Honolulu, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Richard E. Stifel and Lani L. Ewart, Honolulu (Goodsill, Anderson & Quinn, Honolulu, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.

Before LUM, Acting C.J., NAKAMURA, J., and OGATA and MENOR, Retired Justices, Assigned Temporarily. ^*

MENOR, Retired Justice.

This is a consolidated appeal by plaintiff Francis Ontai ("Ontai") from the directed verdict entered against him by the lower court in favor of defendant-appellee General Electric Company ("G.E."), and by defendant Straub Clinic and Hospital, Inc. ("Straub") from the dismissal of its cross-claim against G.E.

On March 1, 1976, plaintiff Ontai went to Straub for an air contrast barium enema examination of the colon. The examination took place in Room 62, also referred to as Room 2, of Straub. This examination involved taking X-rays of Ontai in various positions, some of which required that the X-ray table be tilted to a near vertical position. Ontai remained on the X-ray table during this procedure. While the table was in this near vertical position, the footrest at the bottom end of the table gave way, and Ontai fell to the floor of the examination room. As a result, he was injured. Ontai subsequently filed suit against Straub and G.E., and Straub in turn cross-claimed against G.E. Ontai's claim against G.E. is based on strict liability in tort, negligence, and implied warranty. So, essentially, is Straub's cross-claim against G.E.

On September 11, 1978, the lower court, in a jury trial, granted G.E.'s motion for a directed verdict against Ontai following the presentation of his case in chief. Later that same day, at the close of Straub's opening statement, the lower court granted G.E.'s motion to dismiss Straub's cross-claim.

I

Plaintiff Ontai claims that the footrest was defective, and that G.E. was therefore answerable for Ontai's injuries on the theory of strict tort liability.

The rule of strict tort liability formulated in the Second Restatement of Torts, § 402A, provides that "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property...." (Emphasis added) Such a condition may be the result of the manufacturing or production process, or it may arise from the design of the product itself.

This court in Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970), approved of the Restatement rule but eliminated the requirement that the defective product must have been "unreasonably" dangerous to the consumer or user. The rule, as thus adopted for this jurisdiction, provides that where a seller or lessor, who is engaged in the business of selling or leasing a product, sells or leases a defective product which is dangerous to the user or consumer, and injury results from its use or consumption, the seller or lessor will be held strictly liable in tort for the injury. Id.; see Brown v. Clark Equipment Co., 62 Haw. 530, 618 P.2d 267 (1980); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Haw. 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982).

Under our formulation of the rule of strict products liability, the plaintiff need not show that the article was dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases or uses it. ¹ Id.; Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969). It is enough that the plaintiff demonstrates that because of its manufacture or design, the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer or user as to its safety. Id.; Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978).

In Stewart, this court for the first time addressed the question of strict products liability, and in finding the rule of strict liability in tort to be a sound legal basis for recovery in products liability cases, cited with apparent approval the California case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962). In that case the plaintiff had been injured when a piece of wood on which he was working flew out of his Shopsmith, which was a combination power tool usable as a saw, drill, and wood lathe. In affirming the judgment against the manufacturer, the California supreme court held:

To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design...