Hollifield v. Hilton, 17542
| Decision Date | 25 October 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 17542,17542 |
| Citation | 515 S.W.2d 717 |
| Parties | Calvin W. HOLLIFIELD et ux., Appellants, v. Frank HILTON et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Burkett & Bodoin and Michael R. Burkett, Fort Worth, for appellants.
Callaway & Marshall and Clyde M. Marshall, Jr., Fort Worth, for appellees, Frank Hilton and L. Wayne Williams.
Law, Snakard, Brown & Gambill and Walter S. Fortney, Fort Worth, for appellee, Mansfield State Bank.
Day & Day, Fort Worth, for appellees, Mansfield State Bank and John A. George, Trustee.
This is an action brought by appellants to set aside a foreclosure sale which was regularly held under a deed of trust covering 18 acres of their land. Trial before the court without a jury resulted in judgment for appellees sustaining the foreclosure sale. The appellees (defendants below) are the foreclosing bank-lienholder, the Trustee (Substitute) and purchasers at the sale.
The appellees, Frank Hilton and L. Wayne Williams, are the purchasers at foreclosure, and they seek affirmance of the judgment below quieting their title to the 18 acres of land in litigation.
There is no dispute that the indebtedness was owed and that the appellants were in default. The appellants have not offered to pay or tendered the amount of the indebtedness and they refused to accept the sum of $17,001.05 tendered to them by the trustee, said sum representing the excess bid at the trustee's sale. The trial court rendered judgment that the appellants take nothing except the $17,001.05 tendered into the registry of the court.
This appeal is predicated upon seven points asserting the trial court erred in rendering judgment for appellees because (1) the evidence conclusively established and (2) showed, as a matter of law, that appellants had abandoned that portion of their homestead upon which a mobile home park was located; (3) the finding to the contrary was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence; (4) in finding that appellants did not offer evidence sufficient to enable it to accurately describe the mobile home park because such finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence; (5) the evidence conclusively established and (6) conclusively showed, as a matter of law, that appellants were not estopped to urge their rights of homestead; and (7) the finding to the contrary was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
We affirm.
This Court has carefully reviewed the entire record in this cause. The following statement is in our opinion a fair summary of the evidence presented to the trial court.
Appellees Hilton and Williams purchased the 18 acre tract which is the subject of this suit at a substitute Trustee's foreclosure sale on March 6, 1973, and claim title under a Trustee's deed. The sale was conducted by appellee John A. George, acting as substitute Trustee under a deed of trust given by appellants Mr. and Mrs. Hollifield to appellee Mansfield State Bank. The deed of trust secured a deed of trust note dated June 6, 1968, by the Hollifields to said Bank. The note and deed of trust were given in renewal and extension of the Hollifields' prior mechanic's lien note and securing mechanic's lien contract dated March 6, 1968, to one George W. Tucker, a contractor, and by him assigned to the Bank. The parties will hereafter be referred to by last names only, and the lienholder simply as the Bank.
The contract was for construction of improvements on the property, consisting of a roadway, utility lines, small concrete patios and a septic tank and underground sewage system, in order for the Hollifields to see if they could rent parking spaces for mobile homes thereon. It was undisputed that both Mr. and Mrs. Hollifield executed and ackowledged the mechanic's lien contract prior to commencement of the work, that the money evidenced by the notes and liens was actually advanced and used for such improvements, that the note was in fact in default, and that the foreclosure sale was in all respects regularly held after prior notice to the Hollifields.
The Hollifields, through their counsel, stipulated in the trial that the Bank's lien was valid as to that portion of the 18 acre tract where the mobile home parking area was actually situated. They, the Hollifields, submit, however, that the lien is not enforceable as to the entire 18 acres because the improvements financed by the loan were not made on their residence or to the whole parcel of land. The improvements were made only upon that portion of the land where the mobile home park is situated and this portion had been abandoned by the Hollifields as their homestead. The lien can thus be valid only as to the abandoned portion; it cannot extend to the remaining homestead of the Hollifields so say the latter.
The sole question before the trial court was therefore to determine whether the Bank's lien extended to and was valid as to the entire 18 acres or only to that portion of the 18 acres covered by the mobile home park.
Appellants rested their case solely on the testimony of Mr. Hollifield. Mrs. Hollifield was present throughout the trial but never took the witness stand. Mr. Hollifield's testimony is summarized in the paragraph next following.
The 18 acres in issue was part of a 100-acre farm purchased in 1952. He built his home thereon in about 1956. His family had occupied the property ever since as their farm homestead. He used the property for grazing cattle and some crop farming in earlier years. Due to his disability, the use was limited primarily to pasturage in recent years. He had repeatedly sold small tracts off the farm for family income so that its size had been reduced to approximately 60 acres in 1968, when the mechanic's lien contract originated. His decision to try renting spaces in one corner of the farm for temporary parking of mobile homes was also brought about by his inability to perform agricultural labor and a desire to supplement family income. The mechanic's lien contract was made for only 12 mobile home parking spaces with the idea of going into it on a trial basis, not knowing whether it would prove profitable. He saw no inconsistency with his homestead claim for such temporary rental use of that portion of the farm. He always...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Perry
...as his residence22 and (d) is used for non-agricultural business purposes, as part of his homestead. But see, Hollifield v. Hilton, 515 S.W.2d 717, 717-721 (Tex.Civ.App.1974), writ ref'd, n.r.e. (holding that where appellants owned and resided upon contiguous 60-acre rural farm and used 18 ......
-
In re Moody
...or alienation. Long Bell Lumber Co. v. Miller, 240 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1951, no writ); Hollifield v. Hilton, 515 S.W.2d 717 (Tex.Civ.App.—Ft. Worth 1974, writ ref'd. n.r.e.). 12. The burden of proving abandonment is on the party asserting that the homestead rights have been ab......
-
In re Liao
...Property. Abandonment of homestead is a question of fact on which both use and intent are relevant. Hollifield v. Hilton, 515 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (internal citation omitted); see In re Perry, 345 F.3d 303, 319 (5th Cir.2003) (internal citation omitt......
-
Drake Interiors, L.L.C. v. Thomas
...does temporary renting of the homestead constitute an abandonment. SeeTex. Const. art. XVI, § 51; Hollifield v. Hilton, 515 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Homestead rights have historically enjoyed great protection in our jurisprudence, and once a homeste......