Hollingshead v. Watkins
| Decision Date | 01 July 1919 |
| Docket Number | 31538 |
| Citation | 173 N.W. 4,186 Iowa 582 |
| Parties | B. F. HOLLINGSHEAD, Appellee, v. WALTER WATKINS, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Wright District Court.--H. E. FRY, Judge.
ACTION for damages. The petition was in three counts. Two of the counts claimed damages for assault and battery, and the third claimed damages for the conversion of straw. There was a verdict for the plaintiff upon all the counts. A motion for new trial was sustained as to the second count and overruled as to the others. Judgment was entered on the verdict as to the first and third counts. The defendant appeals. Later, the plaintiff also appealed from the order granting new trial as to the second count. The defendant is designated as the appellant.
Affirmed.
McGrath & Archerd, for appellant.
Sylvester Flynn and Eugene Schaffter, for appellee.
I.
On the first count of his petition, the plaintiff recovered verdict for $ 500 damages for assault and battery. Upon the second count, he recovered verdict for $ 1,800 for damages for assault and battery upon his wife, the cause of action having been assigned by her to the plaintiff. Upon the third count the plaintiff recovered verdict for $ 35. The general ground of reversal urged by the appellant as to the first count is that the verdict for $ 500 was excessive, and was the result of passion and prejudice. The general line of argument is that the injury inflicted upon the plaintiff was comparatively slight, and that the actual damages sustained could not exceed the sum of $ 100, and that it was excessive to allow $ 400 as exemplary damages.
The salient facts in the case are that, at the time of the altercation between the parties, and for some years prior thereto, the plaintiff was and had been a tenant upon the farm of the defendant. His lease was about to expire, and he was about to remove from the premises. To that end, he held a public sale upon the premises, and in his sale notices, he listed for sale a stack of straw. The defendant appeared at the sale and notified those in attendance that the plaintiff had no right to sell such straw, the defendant then believing that his lease forbade the removal of the straw. This action of the defendant's was effective in stopping the sale of the straw. A few days later, the plaintiff sold to a neighbor a small load of the straw, at a price of $ 1.50. Learning of this fact, the defendant appeared at the plaintiff's home upon the premises, and opened the altercation with a protest against the conduct of the plaintiff in selling the load of straw, the plaintiff contending for his right so to do. According to the story of the plaintiff, the defendant knocked him down and held him upon the ground, while he beat him with his fist upon the face. The particular target of the defendant's blows was the plaintiff's eye. The plaintiff's face was bruised, and his eye was bloodshot and black for many weeks. The contention of the defendant in evidence was that he acted only in self-defense; that the plaintiff assaulted him by striking him upon the breast; that the defendant acted only in reasonable self-defense; and that the punishment inflicted by him upon the plaintiff while upon the ground was intended only to disable him from renewing his assault upon the defendant. We need not dwell upon the differing versions of the two parties to the fight. That question was for the jury. When it is considered that the defendant was the younger man, and that he was 6 feet tall, and weighed 217 pounds, whereas the plaintiff was a small man, weighing 145 pounds, the finding of the jury that the defendant was himself the aggressor may well be tolerated by the court, as not lacking support in the evidence. The defendant's claim that the plaintiff struck him on the breast is suggestive of the traditional "slap upon the wrist," and is not indicative of great menace to the defendant.
We must, therefore, consider the case upon the theory that the jury properly found the defendant as the aggressor. The aggression had no mitigation in the circumstances. If the defendant had been right in his contention concerning the straw, his grievance would have been exceedingly petty. But he was in the wrong in his contention. The lease did not forbid the plaintiff from removing straw. The defendant could have ascertained that fact by reference to the lease more easily than he could pursue the course which he did.
Whether the exemplary damages allowed, if any, were out of proportion to the amount of the actual damages, the record does not enable us to speak. The amount of actual damages, as distinguished from exemplary damages, is not disclosed by the verdict. We cannot say, upon this record, that the actual damages could not have exceeded $ 100, as contended by appellant. Plaintiff was entitled to actual damages for both physical and mental suffering. The plaintiff carried the marks of the combat upon his countenance for many weeks. This fact contributed to his humiliation and mental suffering. It cannot be said, we think, that the jury might not have allowed as actual damages a very substantial proportion of the amount of the verdict rendered. While it is urged that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice, yet the record discloses no evidence of such passion and prejudice, except the size of the verdict. While the verdict is, perhaps, fully as large as it ought to be, we see no ground, upon the record, for saying, as a matter of law, that it is larger than it ought to be. The defendant availed himself of the privilege of combat, regardless of cost. It has proven to be more expensive than he supposed. Peace...
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