Hollingsworth v. Arcadia Citrus Growers Ass'n
| Decision Date | 07 June 1934 |
| Parties | HOLLINGSWORTH v. ARCADIA CITRUS GROWERS ASS'N et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
On Rehearing September 2, 1935.
On Further Rehearing December 19, 1935.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1936.
Creditors' bill by the Arcadia Citrus Growers Association against Juanita T. Hollingsworth, individually and as administratrix of the estate of J. N. Hollingsworth, deceased, and others in which the Florida Trust & Banking Company intervened. From a decree for complainant, defendants appeal.
Reversed and remanded. Appeal from Circuit Court, De Soto County; W. J. Barker, judge.
W. D Bell, of Arcadia, and John B. Singeltary, of Bradenton, for appellant.
Leitner & Leitner and Treadwell & Treadwell, all of Arcadia, for appellees.
J. N Hollingsworth died in February, 1926, indebted to Arcadia Citrus Growers Association in the sum of $4,549.17. Juanita T. Hollingsworth was duly appointed administratrix of the estate of J. N. Hollingsworth, and in March, 1928, Arcadia Citrus Growers Association reduced its claim to judgment against her as such. Florida Trust & Banking Company also held a claim against J. N. Hollingsworth at the time of his death and subsequently reduced its claim to judgment against the administratrix.
In April, 1927, Arcadia Citrus Growers Association filed its creditors' bill against Juanita T. Hollingsworth individually and as administratrix of the estate of J. N. Hollingsworth and B. F. Welles, R. O. Turner and Elmer Garner as trustees, seeking to subject the proceeds of certain promissory notes held by said trustees for the estate of J. N. Hollingsworth to the payment of its judgment. Florida Trust & Banking Company was permitted to intervene and become a party complainant to the creditors' bill. A demurrer to the creditors bill was overruled, answer was filed, and on final hearing the chancellor found the equities to be with complainants. A final judgment was entered in which the trustees were directed to pay the costs of this litigation and to appropriate the balance of the proceeds of the promissory notes held by them to the payment of complainants and interveners judgments. The instant appeal is from that final decree.
Appellant has raised and argued many questions, but the real issue presented is whether the proceeds of the promissory notes in controversy were a part of the estate of J. N. Hollingsworth, or did they belong to his wife Mrs. Juanita T. Hollingsworth at the time of his death? This was a question of equitable cognizance, notwithstanding section 3774 et seq., Rev.Gen.St.1920, section 5647 et seq., Comp.Gen.Laws 1927. Benedict v. Wilmarth, 46 Fla. 535, 35 So. 84, 4 Ann.Cas. 1033.
Mrs. Hollingsworth contends that the notes were given to her by her husband, J. N. Hollingsworth, in October, 1923, and she is supported in this by the testimony of other witnesses. There is substantial testimony to the contrary, and the record shows beyond question that in 1923 when the notes were alleged to have been given to her, J. N. Hollingsworth was hopelessly involved and was indebted far beyond his ability to pay. In the face of hopeless conflicts in the testimony, the chancellor held that the notes were never given to Mrs. Hollingsworth.
In some jurisdictions voluntary conveyances against attacking creditors are considered as fraudulent per se, but the weight of authority is that such conveyances only afford a prima facie or presumptive evidence of fraud which may be rebutted or explained. The latter rule has been approved in this state. Claflin v. Ambrose, 37 Fla. 78, 19 So. 628; Russ v. Blackshear, 88 Fla. 573, 102 So. 749. In either event the burden is on the one claiming the advantage of the voluntary conveyance to prove that the grantor had other property sufficient to discharge his obligations. 12 R.C.L. § 108, p. 593, § 174, p. 668.
There is ample support in the record for the finding and judgment of the chancellor. He was familiar with the properties involved and the witnesses, including the parties to the litigation. It is conclusively shown that for long prior to and subsequent to 1923 J. N. Hollingsworth was in no position to make a donation of any of his properties.
The judgment below is consequently affirmed.
Affirmed.
On Rehearing.
By an opinion filed herein on June 7, 1934, the final decree of the circuit court was affirmed. Thereafter a petition for rehearing was allowed and a rehearing and reargument had before the Supreme Court en banc on October 10, 1934. The case is now before the court for decision on rehearing.
Upon rehearing, the Supreme Court finds itself equally divided in opinion as to whether the decree of the circuit court should be affirmed or reversed. Mr. Chief Justice WHITFIELD, Mr. Justice TERRELL, and Mr. Justice DAVIS are of the opinion that the judgment of affirmance of this court previously entered, should be adhered to on rehearing; that the decree appealed from should accordingly stand affirmed as the judgment of this court. The views of these justices are stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice DAVIS filed herewith. Mr. Presiding Justice ELLIS and Mr. Justice BUFORD, in whose conclusion Mr. Justice BROWN concurs, are of the opinion that the previous judgment of affirmance by this court should not be adhered to, but that the decree should be reversed for further proceedings to be had in accordance with the opinion prepared on rehearing by Mr. Justice ELLIS and filed herewith.
The Supreme Court being equally divided in its opinion as to the proper judgment to be rendered in this cause on rehearing, as appears by the opinions and expressions of view herewith filed, the decree of the circuit court will be affirmed on rehearing on the authority of the rule enunciated in State ex rel. Hampton v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224, 37 So. 51, and cases following same.
Affirmed on rehearing by equally divided court.
I see no reason for now recanting from what we deliberately decided on the first appeal.
The bill below was filed by Arcadia Citrus Growers Association, a judgment creditor of the estate of James N. Hollingsworth; the defendant being the administratrix of said estate, and it being alleged in the bill as the basis for the equity of it that because the defendant was the administratrix of the estate and was claiming adversely certain assets which complainant was entitled to reach as the assets of the estate of James N. Hollingsworth, that the controversy over the ownership of the disputed assets should be decided in equity. The disputed assets were moneys about to be paid in upon a note and mortgage and therefore capable of dissipation unless the defendant administratrix were immediately enjoined from such unlawful act.
Assets of a deceased debtor remain bound to unpaid creditors who pursue them, wherever found, even into the hands of a legatee after distribution. This rule is not affected by the fact that without such pursuit the effects of the deceased debtor would have been sufficient to pay both debts and legacies, or, in other words, by the fact that the estate was or was not insolvent. Davis v. Newman, 41 Va. (2 Rob.) 664, 40 Am.Dec. 764; note, 112 Am.St.Rep. 1022.
The complainant below was a judgment creditor and as such was entitled to have its judgment satisfied out of any assets that were the assets of the judgment debtor estate at the time its judgment was obtained. The purpose of the suit was to have it ascertained and established that the assets here in controversy were not at any time the private assets of Mrs. Hollingsworth, the administratrix, as claimed by her. The case was presented and tried in the court below as a case of that description and nothing else. The chancellor so characterized it in his final decree, and we affirmed his decision on the original hearing because the resultant decree was simply a decree on the facts as to which we could not say that the chancellor was clearly wrong.
The solvency or insolvency of the estate was not material on the question of complainant's right to a decree in favor of complainant when complainant succeeded in establishing that the administratrix was about to receive, and convert to her own use, funds that belonged in fact to her deceased husband's estate, and which were therefore subject to an equitable garnishment in her hands after third parties had paid said funds over to her upon demand pursuant to her claim and pretense that she personally, and not in her capacity as administratrix, was entitled to have, receive, and enjoy the same.
It seems to me that as a judgment creditor of the estate J. N. Hollingsworth, deceased, as complainant, had the equitable right to file a bill to implead as defendant Mrs. Hollingsworth, individually and as administratrix, for the purpose of having adjudicated whether or not the funds she claimed as her own, and which were about to be paid her, were or were not her own individual funds, and not funds of her husband's estate, and if found to be the latter, to have entered against Mrs. Hollingsworth, individually, a decree in the nature of an equitable garnishment of such funds as assets of the J. N. Hollingsworth estate in order that same might be applied for the purpose of satisfying the judgment of complainant against such estate. I therefore dissent from the holding that the bill of complaint was not sufficient to sustain the decree rendered in this case.
J. N Hollingsworth and Juanita T. Hollingsworth were married in July,...
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