Hollingsworth v. Brown
Decision Date | 05 June 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 1D00-3126.,1D00-3126. |
Citation | 788 So.2d 1078 |
Parties | Leo C. HOLLINGSWORTH, Appellant, v. C. BROWN, J. Brown, Schwartz, J. Arnett and C.W. Kirkland, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Leo C. Hollingsworth, pro se.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Sean F. Callaghan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellees.
Leo Hollingsworth appeals the dismissal of his amended complaint, claiming that the trial court erred in holding that he was required to exhaust administrative remedies. We have jurisdiction,1 and affirm.
On January 29, 1999, inmate Hollingsworth filed a complaint against various correctional officers, charging that, under color of state law, they engaged in retaliatory conduct against him for filing a grievance, and that their actions violated his First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances. He sought compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice, because Hollingsworth had not exhausted available administrative remedies.
Hollingsworth contends on appeal that he brought this action pursuant to section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), and nothing in that statute required him to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. On the contrary, section 768.28(9)(a) does not provide a cause of action in tort, but simply states the requirements for governmental waiver of sovereign immunity. Nevertheless, Hollingsworth's substantive allegations stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Huffman v. Davis, 571 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
(. ) In 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, prisoners are required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking § 1983 relief:
(a) Applicability of administrative remedies. No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
The issue raised by this case is whether § 1997e required Hollingsworth to file a grievance with regard to his claims for damages, when the available administrative remedies do not provide monetary relief.2
In Adlington v. Mosley, 757 So.2d 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), the circuit court held that an inmate who had filed a civil complaint for damages against a private company that operated a correctional facility was required to exhaust administrative remedies, and the appellant did not challenge this ruling. Although the Fourth District agreed, it reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine whether there was a procedure available for inmates to file grievances against private facilities. The court in Adlington acknowledged in dicta that the federal courts are in disagreement about whether the exhaustion doctrine should apply to suits involving damages, and stated that it found the decisions requiring exhaustion more persuasive. Id. at 574. We agree with this reasoning.
The three federal circuit courts that initially addressed the exhaustion issue have concluded that because inmate grievance procedures cannot result in money damages, an inmate seeking monetary relief from prison officials is not required to exhaust administrative remedies.3 See Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 1998)
; Lunsford v. Jumao As, 155 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.1998); Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir.1997).4
The Eleventh Circuit issued a contrary decision in Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir.1998). The previous version of § 1997e necessitated exhaustion only of "such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available," which led courts to conclude that it would be futile to require an inmate seeking damages to employ state prison grievance procedures. Id. at 1326. The 1995 Prison Litigation Reform Act, however, removed the above-quoted language and now simply requires the inmate to exhaust "such administrative remedies as are available." Courts are thus no longer permitted to examine available grievance procedures to determine whether they would serve the inmate's intended purpose. Otherwise, there would be an "enormous loophole" in the Act that Congress "clearly did not intend." Id. The court pointed out that requiring the inmate to go through the grievance procedure may cause prison officials to halt the practice being complained of, "which at least freezes the time frame for the prisoner's damages." Id. at 1327. Accord Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65 (3d Cir.2000)
; Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876 (6th Cir.1999); Perez v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532 (7th Cir.1999).5
1. The order was final and appealable, because the dismissal was without prejudice "to Plaintiff refiling his action after he has exhausted all available administrative remedies." When the trial court dismisses an action without prejudice to amend the complaint, the order is nonfinal and nonappealable. See, e.g., Benton v. Department of Corrections, 782 So.2d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
. When, however, it appears that the trial court intended the plaintiff to pursue his or her claim in a different proceeding, the order is final. See, e.g., Eagle v. Eagle, 632 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Carlton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
2. Cf. Husman v. Colchiski, 689 So.2d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
(. ) The opinion does not state whether the inmate sought monetary relief, thus it does not address the issue in the case at bar.
3. Some of the cases involve § 1983 suits...
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