Hollingsworth v. State, 2000-CA-02095-COA.
| Decision Date | 28 January 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2000-CA-02095-COA.,2000-CA-02095-COA. |
| Parties | Brian HOLLINGSWORTH, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
Kimberly G. Starks-Dudenbostel, Pascagoula, attorney for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by: Scott Stuart, attorney for appellee.
EN BANC.
IRVING, J., for the Court.
¶ 1. Brian Hollingsworth appeals from the denial of his motion seeking post-conviction collateral relief in the Circuit Court of Washington County, Mississippi. In this appeal, Hollingsworth contends (1) that the trial court erred in failing to rule on his motion for leave to amend his original post-conviction relief motion and his motion for discovery, (2) that the trial court erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing, (3) that the trial court erred in not finding that the appointment of Martin Kilpatrick as special prosecutor prejudiced Hollingsworth, (4) that the trial court erred in not addressing and subsequently granting him relief under his claim of violation of his due process rights, (5) that the prosecution breached the plea bargain agreement with him, (6) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and (7) that he entered into an involuntary and unintelligent plea agreement.
FACTS
¶ 2. In May of 1996, Hollingsworth beat and/or strangled Charles M. Page, Jr. A friend of Hollingsworth, Brian Prestridge, joined Hollingsworth in beating Page. Later, Page's body was found in the Mississippi River, decomposed with multiple rib fractures. Hollingsworth was indicted for Page's murder. Prestridge and Hollingsworth retained Gaines Dyer to represent them. Thereafter, Dyer terminated his representation of Hollingsworth as a client due to a conflict of interest. Prestridge entered a plea agreement and revealed that Hollingsworth strangled Page to death and that Prestridge helped Hollingsworth dump Page's body in the Mississippi River. Later, Hollingsworth entered a plea of guilty to manslaughter. On June 6, 1997, he was sentenced to twenty years with three years suspended.
¶ 3. On or about May 25, 2000, Hollingsworth filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) motion seeking to vacate his judgment of conviction and sentence. At that time, Hollingsworth also filed a motion for production of documents, including a transcript of the plea hearing. On May 31, 2000, Hollingsworth filed a motion for leave to amend his PCR motion. Attached to this motion were two affidavits which Hollingsworth asked that the court consider.
¶ 4. On June 22, 2000, Judge Gray Evans ordered the Washington County District Attorney and George Kelly, Hollingsworth's attorney, to answer by affidavit. On June 29, 2000, Hollingsworth filed a second motion for leave to amend his PCR motion, asserting newly discovered evidence. In this amended motion, Hollingsworth alleged that the prosecution deliberately failed to produce the recently acquired autopsy reports and that missing from the evidence was the liver tissue removed during the first autopsy. Thereafter, Dyer, Kelly, and Prestridge responded by affidavit to Hollingsworth's PCR motion.
¶ 5. In July of 2000, Hollingsworth filed his request for leave to invoke the process of discovery. In September of 2000, Hollingsworth again sought leave to amend his PCR motion. Also, in October of the same year, he filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the State had failed to respond, leaving no genuine issue of material fact. As a result of this motion, Cheryl Sullivan responded on behalf of the Washington County District Attorney's Office.
¶ 6. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge entered an order on December 7, 2000, dismissing with prejudice Hollingsworth's PCR motion.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
¶ 7. Hollingsworth's issue concerning the trial court's failure to rule on his subsequent motions is twofold. One part of the issue applies to the three motions for leave to amend his PCR motion. The other applies to his request to invoke the process of discovery.
¶ 8. Hollingsworth avers that he filed two requests for amendments to his PCR motion prior to any responsive pleadings being filed and one request for amendment after defense attorneys filed their responsive affidavits but before a response was filed by the State. Hollingsworth avers that his amendments outlined specific constitutional issues of ineffective assistance of counsel, violation of due process rights and prosecutorial misconduct. Hollingsworth asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to rule on his motions to amend his PCR motion.
¶ 9. When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for post-conviction relief, we will reverse only where the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. Kirksey v. State, 728 So.2d 565, 567(¶ 8) (Miss.1999). We find that the trial court's denial was not clearly erroneous because the trial judge addressed Hollingsworth's issues and gave legal support for his reasoning.
¶ 10. Hollingsworth filed a motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence. Four issues were asserted therein: (1) that the grand jury's determination of probable cause was tainted, (2) that Circuit Judge Shirley Byers exhibited judicial misconduct thereby compromising Hollingsworth's constitutional right to due process, equal protection and an impartial judge, (3) that Hollingsworth was denied effective assistance of counsel, and (4) that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily given. Subsequently, Hollingsworth filed three motions for leave to amend with affidavits which essentially provided support for the issues raised in his initial PCR motion.
¶ 11. In his final order, the judge addressed each issue raised in Hollingsworth's PCR motion. Therefore, we disagree with Hollingsworth's assertions that the judge failed to rule on his subsequent motions for leave to amend as they were merely supplements to the initial issues raised. The trial judge addressed the issue regarding the grand jury by explaining that Hollingsworth failed to present evidence of the State's misconduct and that Hollingsworth had waived his right to attack this issue when he pleaded guilty. The judge addressed Hollingsworth's allegations of judicial misconduct by explaining that the appointment of the special prosecutor was granted by the judge as per a motion made by the assistant district attorney.
¶ 12. As to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel by Dyer, the trial judge pointed out that Hollingsworth's mother filed a "Petition for Arbitration before the Fee Dispute Committee of the Mississippi Bar" and that the ruling of the arbitrator clearly stated that "`there was no evidence to indicate that Brian Hollingsworth's defense and representation was [sic] prejudiced by Mr. Dyer's actions.'" The trial judge concluded that the ruling of the arbitrator decided the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to Dyer and that "without some showing of prejudice, [Hollingsworth] cannot proceed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." While we do not agree that the ruling of the fee dispute arbitrator was res judicata as to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim respecting Dyer, our review of the record does not convince us that the trial judge's acceptance of the arbitrator's findings, as opposed to conducting an independent analysis, constitutes reversible error.
¶ 13. With respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel charge leveled against George T. Kelly, the judge analyzed the allegations via the test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and concluded that there was "no evidence that Mr. Kelly was deficient in his representation of [Hollingsworth]." Lastly, as to Hollingsworth's claim that his plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently given, the trial judge noted that Hollingsworth signed a plea petition which outlined the rights he was waiving. The trial judge also noted that, during the plea hearing, Hollingsworth was asked questions specifically about the rights he was waiving.
¶ 14. Hollingsworth also contends that he filed a request for leave to invoke the process of discovery which outlined substantial good cause with specificity for the discovery requested. Hollingsworth avers that the trial court's failure to rule on his motion to invoke discovery robbed this Court of the necessary guidelines to determine whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion.
¶ 15. The Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Acts allows a party to invoke the process of discovery but only if "the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise." Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-15 (Rev.2001).
¶ 16. Hollingsworth signed a sworn petition to enter a guilty plea. This petition enumerated the rights Hollingsworth was waiving by pleading guilty. Among the enumerated rights were the right to subpoena documents and witnesses and the right to confront witnesses against him. Moreover, Hollingsworth appeared before the judge at his plea hearing and stated under oath that he was waiving his right for the State to prove its case against him as shown by the following exchange:
This issue lacks merit.
¶ 17. Hollingsworth avers that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding the sentence given to him by the judge. This contention is wholly without merit. Before accepting Hollingsworth's plea, the trial judge asked Hollingsworth:
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