Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc.
Decision Date | 10 January 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 05-6301.,05-6301. |
Citation | 474 F.3d 223 |
Parties | Millicent P. HOLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METHODIST HEALTHCARE, INC., doing business as Methodist University Hospital, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
David P. Jaqua, Jessica A. Neal, BUTLER, SNOW, O'MARA, STEVENS & CANNADA, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee. Millicent P. Hollins, Atlanta, Georgia, pro se.
Before DAUGHTREY and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; REEVES, District Judge.*
McKEAGUE, J. (p. 227), delivered a separate concurring opinion.
The plaintiff, Millicent Hollins, filed this action against her former employer, Methodist Healthcare, Inc., claiming that her termination from employment as a resident in the hospital's Clinical Pastoral Education program violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101. On appeal, Hollins challenges the order of the district court dismissing her claim based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the constitutional "ministerial exception" to the enforcement of employment discrimination laws that is derived from the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom. See Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 379 F.Supp.2d 907 (W.D.Tenn.2005). We find no basis upon which to disturb the district court's decision and, therefore, we affirm.
The facts of this case are fully set out in the district court's opinion. In summary, the record establishes that the defendant operates Methodist Hospital in Memphis "in accordance with the Social Principles of The United Methodist Church" and is associated with the Conferences of the United Methodist Church, a clearly religious organization. The plaintiff was a resident in the hospital's clinical pastoral education program, which required her to initiate pastoral visits with patients and family members and to be on call during her non-working hours as a chaplain for all the Methodist health facilities in the Memphis area. Because the program was accredited by the Association of Clinical Pastoral Education, the hospital was required to sign a form agreeing, in essence, to adhere to the association's policy of non-discrimination on the basis of "race, gender, age, faith group, national origin, sexual orientation, or disability."
As the result of a psychiatric evaluation, Hollins was dismissed from the residency program because, according to her, she was "perceived as being a threat of harm to Defendant's workplace." After she filed suit under the ADA, the hospital responded with a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), invoking the "ministerial exception" and contending that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Hollins argued in response that the defendant was not entitled to claim exemption from the ADA under the ministerial exception. In addition, she asserted that even if it were so entitled the hospital had waived the right to rely on the ministerial exception as a defense to her ADA claim by seeking and obtaining accreditation from the Association of Clinical Pastoral Education, including the defendant's agreement to abide by the association's non-discrimination policy. The district court held that the defendant was entitled to rely on the exception and that it had not waived its right to invoke the exception. As a result, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the claim and dismissed the complaint. Hollins now appeals that ruling.
We review de novo a district court's order of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir.1990). In response to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction. See id. In addition, unlike Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, under which the existence of genuine issues of material fact warrants denial of the motion to dismiss, "the court is empowered to resolve factual disputes when subject matter jurisdiction is challenged." Id.
The ministerial exception, a doctrine rooted in the First Amendment's guarantees of religious freedom, precludes subject matter jurisdiction over claims involving the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministerial employees, based on the institution's constitutional right to be free from judicial interference in the selection of those employees. See generally Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference, 978 F.2d 940 (6th Cir.1992). Although the ministerial exception is often raised in response to employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (2006), which specifically bars discrimination on the basis of religion, it has also been applied to claims under the ADA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006), as well as common law claims brought against a religious employer. See, e.g., Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.2006) ( ); Ogle v. Church of God, 153 Fed.Appx. 371 (6th Cir.2005) (common law claims); Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir.2004) (ADA claim); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir.1999) (ADA claim); Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C.Cir.1990) (ADEA claim); Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.1986) (common law claims).
In order for the ministerial exception to bar an employment discrimination claim, the employer must be a religious institution and the employee must have been a ministerial employee. But, in order to invoke the exception, an employer need not be a traditional religious organization such as a church, diocese, or synagogue, or an entity operated by a traditional religious organization. Examining cases decided in all of the circuit courts, the Fourth Circuit found that the exception has been applied to claims against religiously affiliated schools, corporations, and hospitals by courts ruling that they come within the meaning of a "religious institution." See Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 309-310 (4th Cir.2004) Its investigation led the Fourth Circuit to conclude that a religiously affiliated entity is considered "a `religious institution' for purposes of the ministerial exception whenever that entity's mission is marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics." Id. at 310 ( ).
In this circuit, we have thus far applied the ministerial exception only to ordained ministers. However, other circuits have extended the doctrine to bar employment discrimination claims brought by other employees of a religious institution. These courts have considered a particular employee to be a "minister" for purposes of the ministerial exception based on the function of the plaintiff's employment position rather than the fact of ordination. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir.1985). As a general rule, the ministerial exception will be invoked if "the employee's primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship." Id. at 1169 ). See, e.g., id. at 1168 ( ); E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir.2000) ( ); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir.2003) ( ). We agree with this extension of the rule beyond its application to ordained ministers and hold that it applies to the plaintiff in this case, given the pastoral role she filled at the hospital.
On appeal, Hollins argues that the ministerial exception should not have barred her claim, because Methodist Healthcare was not a "religious institution" and because she was not a "ministerial employee." In addition, she asserts that even if the exception applied to this employment relationship, the defendant...
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