Hollins v. Wilkie
| Decision Date | 12 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-cv-2201 DMS (JLB) |
| Parties | BRIAN HOLLINS, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT WILKIE, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Pending before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Brian Hollins filed a response in opposition to the motion, and Defendant filed a reply. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted.
On January 8, 2018, the San Diego Veterans Affairs ("VA") Healthcare System hired Plaintiff as the Bar Code Medication Administration Coordinator and Clinical Nurse Informatics, Registered Nurse III Grade. (
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/ / / On July 31, 2018, Plaintiff initiated contact with an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") counselor at the VA. (Pl. Depo. 127: 20-25; 143:24-144:2; Complaint of Employment Discrimination ["EEO Complaint"], Ex. 20 to Def. NOL.) On September 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed a formal EEO complaint alleging harassment, retaliation, and the creation of a hostile work environment based on race, sex, and disability. (Pl. Depo. 144:3-6; EEO Complaint.) He amended the complaint on November 1, 2018 and December 11, 2018. (Notice of Partial Acceptance and Amendment of the EEO Complaint for Brian Hollins ["Notice of Partial Acceptance"], Ex. 21 to Def. NOL.) On December 28, 2018, the VA's Office of Resolution Management accepted some of Plaintiff's claims for investigation but dismissed others. (Notice of Partial Acceptance.) Plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of those claims. On August 19, 2019, the VA's Office of Employment Discrimination Complaint Adjudication issued a final agency decision determining that Plaintiff failed to prove any of his claims against the VA. (Final Agency Decision, Ex. 23 to Def. NOL.)
Plaintiff resigned his employment with the San Diego VA Healthcare System effective November 24, 2018. (Notification of Personnel Action, Ex. 19 to Def. NOL.)
On November 19, 2019, Plaintiff brought the instant lawsuit against the VA. (See ECF No. 1.) He filed an amended complaint on March 19, 2019 alleging seven causes of action: (1) disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, (2) hostile work environment and reprisal in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, (3) failure to accommodate in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, (4) hostile work environment based on race, sex, and reprisal in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, (5) reprisal in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, (6) reprisal in violation of Title VII, and (7) discrimination under a disparate treatment theory based on race and sex in violation of Title VII. (See ECF No. 8.)
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Summary judgment is appropriate if there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The moving party must identify the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, or other evidence that it "believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth." S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982).
The burden then shifts to the opposing party to show that summary judgment is not appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The opposing party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, to avoid summary judgment, the opposing party cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, it must designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; see also Butler v. San Diego Dist. Atty's Off., 370 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2004) (). More than a "metaphysical doubt" is required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Further, in assessing a party's motion for summary judgment, a "district court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found." Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.,237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (); see also Forsberg v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988) (). Rather, it is the obligation of each party to cite to "particular parts of materials in the record" or otherwise show that "the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute" in their briefing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in discrimination and retaliation, and fostered a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. To bring a Title VII claim before a district court, a plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); Jasch v. Potter, 302 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that the plaintiff "file a timely charge with the EEOC, thereby allowing the agency time to investigate the charge." Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). Specifically, the plaintiff "must consult a[n EEO] Counselor prior to filing a complaint in order to try to informally resolve the matter" and "initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory." Id. at 1104 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)). Failure to comply with the 45-day requirement is fatal to a plaintiff's discrimination claim. Id. If a plaintiff is unable to informally resolve the issue, he may file a formal complaint with the agency. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106. The agency is then "required to conduct an impartial and appropriate investigation of the complaint within 180 days of the filing of thecomplaint unless the parties agree in writing to extend the time period." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(e)(2).
Additionally, the "jurisdictional scope" of the plaintiff's claims before a district court depends on the scope of the EEOC charge and investigation. Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). A court may not consider incidents of discrimination that are not included in an EEOC charge, unless they are "like or reasonably related to the allegations made before the EEOC, as well as ... within the scope of an EEOC investigation that reasonably could be expected to grow out of the allegations." Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1104 (citing Green v. Los Angeles Cty. Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989); Leong, 347 F.3d at 1122 (citing Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990)). However, even if the incidents are "related to acts" alleged in timely filed charges, they are not actionable if time-barred. Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1105-06 ().
Here, Plaintiff's initial contact with an EEOC counselor was on July 31, 2018. (Pl. Depo. 127:20-25, 143:24-144:2; EEO Complaint; Notice of Partial Acceptance.) Defendant therefore requests the Court to summarily dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims arising from events alleged to have taken place before June 16, 2018—45 days prior to Plaintiff's first contact with the EEOC—on grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 27, at 17-18.) Defendant also asks the court to dismiss all Plaintiff's claims that were not raised with an EEO counselor within 45 days of their occurrence, but were instead raised for the first time when Plaintiff sought to amend his EEO complaint. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant's argument on this issue. (See generally ECF No. 28.) Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Title VII claims pertaining to events from prior to June 16, 2018 for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
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Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1103. The parties agree that this case is governed by the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: "(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more...
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